3a4e03a9f9d22240001fc86a2f84b26b3309d1e3
6
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 WorkBuddy
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7682abd85c |
fix(api): give failures real HTTP semantics; fix 401/403 confusion and CORS default
Phase 23B ended with an E2E assertion changed to expect "HTTP 200 + body.code == BAD_REQUEST", documented at the time as "this project's convention". That description was accurate about the code and wrong about the intent: it described a defect, and I made the test accommodate it instead of fixing it. Auditing it found the convention was already broken, not merely risky: - ~100 sites (105, across 30 controllers) do `return ApiResponse.error(...)` / `forbidden()` / `notFound()` with no exception and no `@ResponseStatus`, so the HTTP status is always 200. Gateways and APM cannot separate 4xx from 5xx; callers cannot tell "fix your request" (400) from "don't retry" (403) from "check state first" (409) from "retry later" (429). - miniapp/utils/api.js already had 401/403/429 branches that could never be reached, since the backend never returned those codes. The concrete damage: an expired token returned 403, so `onSessionExpired` never fired and users were stuck with no way back to the login flow. - SecurityConfig had no `authenticationEntryPoint`, so Spring's default `Http403ForbiddenEntryPoint` returned 403 for unauthenticated calls, with a framework body that has no `code` field at all. - CorsConfig defaulted `allowed-origins` to `*` together with `allowCredentials(true)`, while its comment claimed "localhost only by default". Comment contradicting code is worse than no comment: it reads as safe. - Only 4 files / 15 assertions in the whole backend suite touched HTTP status, which is how this survived. Approach: one definition, two applications, zero controller changes. - ApiResponseCode gains an `httpStatus` field — the single source of truth. The constructor requires it, so a new code cannot be added without one. - GlobalExceptionHandler reads status from the enum instead of hardcoding `@ResponseStatus` per handler. - New ApiResponseStatusAdvice (ResponseBodyAdvice) fills in the status just before the body is written, covering all ~100 direct-return sites without touching them. Two constraints, both noted in code: only downgrade when the current status is still 2xx (the advice also sees exception-handler results, and must not override an already-correct 401/403/409), and never alter the body. - SecurityConfig: entry point returns 401 with a uniform ApiResponse body; access denied handler returns 403 likewise. - CorsConfig: default changed to empty (deny). Both clients are same-origin anyway — nginx proxies /api/ and Vite proxies /api — so nothing depends on it. - miniapp api.js: 401/403/429/409 branches now prefer the server's `body.message`, otherwise "账号已被封禁" would be flattened to "无权限访问". Implementation trap worth remembering: `ServerHttpResponse` has `setStatusCode` but no getter, so reading the current status requires casting to `ServletServerHttpResponse`. Verification: 37 E2E passed (33 + 4 new contract cases), including a live-stack check that a controller's direct `notFound()` now yields 404 — that path throws no exception and never reaches the exception handler, so if the advice were inactive it would silently return 200 while the enum unit tests stayed green. Backend regression 662 / 0 failures / 0 errors / 3 skipped (+6 new guards). The first regression run had 3 failures, all tests asserting the old wrong behavior (anonymous access expected 403; outsiders reading a conversation expected 200). Fixed the assertions, not the implementation. Where 404 is used instead of 403 for "invisible", that is deliberate — it prevents probing whether another user's conversation exists — and the substantive assertions (e.g. that an unauthorized response must not leak message bodies) were kept. Not done, needs a product decision: third-party credential issuance, whether rate limiting is actually active, publishing OpenAPI externally, per-caller audit and quotas, pagination/idempotency coverage, desensitization boundaries. |
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WorkBuddy
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730dddde30 |
test(e2e): Phase 23B — rebuild E2E infrastructure; fix 6 real prod defects it exposed
Phase 23 closed as PARTIAL: fake coverage was gone, but the E2E layer itself
was still empty — no conftest.py anywhere, ~15 fixtures that never existed,
6 files crashing at import on os.environ["E2E_PASSWORD"], and CI never ran E2E.
STATUS's "10 E2E files / ~80+ cases ✅" described files that had never executed.
Infrastructure delivered:
- tests/e2e/conftest.py: ApiClient (trust_env=False — a host http_proxy turns
localhost calls into 502), operator_token(username) / new_user / admin_token
fixtures, and a session probe that calls pytest.exit(4) when the stack is
unreachable. NOT skip: skip would launder "did not run" into "passed".
- pytest.ini, tests/e2e/requirements.txt, and tests/e2e/sql/
seed_e2e_operators.sql — migrations contain NO operator seed at all, so a
fresh database has zero logins; the seed creates 6 e2e accounts with role
bindings, idempotent, password injected via `psql -v pwd`.
- CI job `e2e`: compose up -> poll /health/live (timeout = fail) -> seed ->
pytest -> always teardown. Gate D-23-D is now closed.
- 8 E2E files migrated off import-time env reads; tautological assertions
(`x == t or not x`), a counselor token standing in for content_editor, and a
bare `status_code == 200` claiming to prove INV-020 were replaced with real
permission/behavior assertions.
Six real production defects found only by running against real PostgreSQL
(H2 has zero coverage for all of them):
- D-23B-A (Critical): stale V042__add_appointment_operator_register_permission.sql
left in target/classes; src had replaced it with V042__add_service_location_
announcements.sql. Packing without clean put two V042 in the jar -> Flyway
"Found more than one migration with version 042" -> app would not start.
Guard added: testBuildOutputHasNoDuplicateMigrationVersions scans build output
(src is clean, so only this catches it).
- D-23B-B (High): non-UUID path variable reached the DB -> 500 + leaked
`invalid input syntax for type uuid`. Now rejected at the controller.
- D-23B-C (High): 6 E2E files raised KeyError at import -> never collected.
- D-23B-E (Critical): permissions = 48, role_permissions for super_admin = 18,
matchmaker = 0. V015's "grant all to super_admin" was a point-in-time snapshot;
the 30 permissions added later were never granted. On a fresh stack an admin
cannot create a service station and matchmakers can do nothing. V044 restores
super_admin to its documented definition (not an expansion); the matchmaker
permission set needs a product decision and is left as a residual.
- D-23B-I (Medium): IllegalArgumentException (e.g. invalid activity type) was
unmapped -> 500. Now BAD_REQUEST.
- D-23B-J (High): `operator does not exist: uuid = character varying` — Java
ids are String, columns are uuid, PostgreSQL does not implicitly cast in
comparisons. Fixed at the source with JDBC `stringtype=unspecified` (docker
profile); production datasource comes from deploy env and needs the same.
One judgement retracted: an initial read suggested service_appointment.register
was missing. It is not — the endpoint uses service.assisted_registration, seeded
in V029, and the code deliberately avoids a duplicate permission. Nothing was
changed on that basis.
Verification: 33 E2E passed against a live stack; unreachable stack and a
missing operator password both exit 4 (never skip/pass); backend regression
656 / 0 failures / 0 errors / 3 skipped (baseline 655, +1 guard, negatively
validated by injecting a duplicate V042 -> exactly one test turned red).
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WorkBuddy
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ae1bd2b734 |
test(phase23): KEEP-VERIFY — remove 44 pass shells + fake INV tests, add shell guard
Phase 23 "可信系统测试重建 (REFACTOR)" re-audit. STATUS claimed "10 E2E
files / ~80+ cases" and "INV-011~020 ✅"; measurement showed the opposite.
D-23-A (Critical): V11InvariantsTest's 14 cases asserted only Constants
strings. INV-016 "Banner target types" actually asserted ARTICLE_STATUS_*;
INV-017 "home 8 entries" declared local arrays then asserted
firstRow.length == 4 (tautology, never called the home service);
INV-018/019/020 used appointment/article/account status constants as
stand-ins for permission and data-scope checks. Rewritten to 12 cases:
4 real service-behavior guards (INV-013 via real CounselingService.getDetail
— Matchmaker sees null userRequestSummary, with an assigned-Counselor
counter-proof so global sanitization cannot fake a pass; INV-016 reads the
production ALLOWED_TARGET_TYPES whitelist and asserts no external/http/url/
web entry; INV-017 calls real getHome and pins all 8 codes + order;
INV-019 asserts content_editor reads null), plus assertBehaviorTestExists
turning "行为验证见 XxxTest" pointers into executable Class.forName contracts.
D-23-B (High): 44 `pass` shells across 6 files in tests/e2e (4 files were
100% shells). Gate forbids skip/pass shells. Rewritten in place as honest
placeholders with the full scenario lists preserved.
D-23-C (High, residual): the pytest E2E suite is not executable at all —
no conftest.py anywhere, ~15 fixtures (api_client/verified_user/
banner_factory/...) do not exist. Only run_v11_tests.py really runs
(16 cases, needs a live stack + E2E_PASSWORD).
D-23-D (High, residual, NOT fixed): CI does not chain E2E as the plan
requires. Needs an infrastructure decision on how CI provisions a live
stack; not implemented rather than written unverified.
D-23-E (Medium): the CI migration job claimed to "验证 migration SQL 语法"
but only checked file non-emptiness, while the real syntax/baseline checks
live in MigrationValidationTest (already run by the backend job). Replaced
with a real sequence check (naming / non-empty / unique versions / no
gaps); verified by extracting the exact inline script and running it.
New gate: scripts/check-no-empty-tests.py (AST scan, blocks pass-only and
unconditionally skipped tests) + a CI test-shell-guard job. Verified both
ways: 0 findings on the real tree, 2 precise findings on injected shells.
Negative validation: 3 injected production defects (external_url in the
banner whitelist, swapped home entry order, isMatchmaker returning the full
record) turned exactly inv016/inv017/inv013 red, 9 others green, zero
unrelated failures; md5sum -c confirmed byte-identical restore.
Full regression: 655 tests / 652 passed / 0 failures / 0 errors / 3 skipped
(baseline 657; -2 because 14 vacuous cases were merged into 12). The 3
skips carry explicit reasons (2x @EnabledIfEnvironmentVariable(CI=true),
1x @Disabled "需要完整数据库连接") — none is a shell.
Phase 23 is PARTIALLY closed: fake coverage is gone, but the UAT gate
requires the end-to-end chain to actually execute, so "失败为零可进入 UAT"
is NOT claimed.
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 admin
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ac2327b499 | chore: checkpoint before switching to main | ||
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admin
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5b51d5b3f1 | feat: complete phase 02 RBAC and data scope recovery | ||
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admin
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b46b48eb33 | chore: establish V1.1 recovery baseline |