16 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
WorkBuddy 4248e9574e chore(release): 版本号 1.1.0 -> 1.2.0(红娘角色权限专项 ZC-MM-001~007 落地固化)
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2026-10-11 10:48:33 +08:00
WorkBuddy 6c2601950b docs(governance): ZC-MM-007 同步治理文档——红娘专项 DEC-MATCHMAKER-001~006 收口
- decision-register.md: 登记 DEC-MATCHMAKER-001~006 全部 LOCKED(实施摘要 + 落地提交链 2d60f78/861c78e/5e484d0/3caf5f8/1be0d98 + 验证数字 mvn verify 884/884、UI 契约 24/24、后端契约 198、负向注入 7 处判红→还原)
- open-questions.md: 新增 OQ-MATCHMAKER-003~008——003 受控联系开放前 5 项确认(①②LEGAL_VERIFY)+ ContactAuthorizationPolicy DEFERRED(MatchmakerContactGuardTest 机械锁强制复审)/ 004 NULL=NULL 平台直属规则 / 005 零缓存实时查库压测复议条件 / 006 写接口 404 化语义边界(RESOLVED)/ 007 purpose_code matchmaker.service.view 定义未使用口径漂移(QA P2①)/ 008 运营域 active 与用户域 normal 状态口径差(QA P2②)
- PENDING_DECISIONS.md: 红娘专项六项决策标已落地;新增两项待产品确认——受控联系授权机制开放(OQ-003 引用)、C 端死代码退役 3 项(getCandidates/cancelService/getRecommendationsForUser,grep 零调用已核)专项治理批次

ZC-MM-001~007 全链路闭环(架构师落盘 + 主理人 grep 锚点终验:DEC-MATCHMAKER/DEFERRED/LEGAL_VERIFY/OQ-003~008 全命中,零代码变更)
2026-10-11 10:26:35 +08:00
WorkBuddy 1be0d98ebd ZC-MM-006 审计与权限回收(阶段4)
- T01: V055 audit_logs 扩展 4 字段(purpose_code/service_assignment_id/actor_role_snapshot/request_trace_id, 全可空幂等) + AuditLog/DataScopeGuard/AuthorizationAuditListener/MatchmakerServiceService 写入链路改造 + schema-h2 同步 + LATEST_MIGRATION 54→55
- T02: JwtAuthFilter 运营分支改实时查库权限回收(每请求查 operators.status + 权限, 停用即401/撤权即403, 零缓存, claims 权限降级只写不读), 不碰 SecurityConfig/JwtTokenService/用户端
- T03: getServiceDetail 持有人分支接入 SensitiveAccessLog(成功查看落行 dataType=matchmaker_service_detail, 拒绝路径只落 audit_logs DATA_SCOPE_DENIED, 双记录结构性互斥)
- T04: 写接口 404 统一防探测(transfer/revoke/end/recommend/followup/complete/转介范围违规 404 化 deny, 先审计后 404, create/assign 无资源寻址维持 403, ReferralService 消灭裸 IllegalArgumentException)
- T05: OperatorEndpointPermissionCoverageTest +3 守卫(类级 RequestMapping 前缀合成/缺类级则逐方法 PreAuthorize/matchmaker+referral 禁 PatchMapping) + run-backend-contracts CURATED 14→18
- 新增测试 4 类 20 用例: MatchmakerAuditFieldsTest / OperatorPermissionRevocationTest / MatchmakerSensitiveAccessAuditTest / MatchmakerWriteDenyUniformityTest
- 验证: mvn verify 884/884(3 skip) + UI 契约 24/24 + 后端契约门禁 198 通过; 负向注入 5(工程师)+2(QA) 判红→还原复绿; QA fresh eyes 独立验收 PASS(0 P0/P1, 2 P2 观察项移交 ZC-MM-007)
- ContactAuthorizationPolicy 维持 DEFERRED; C 端死代码退役评估 3 项留待 007/专项治理
2026-10-11 09:19:01 +08:00
WorkBuddy 5e484d0e74 test(matchmaker,referral): ZC-MM-003/004 纯护栏——B1 联系规则锁定 + 禁止代用户决定固化
依据《善缘丹阳 V1.1 红娘角色权限正式决策与开发规则》DEC-MATCHMAKER-003(B1
平台内优先、授权例外)与 DEC-MATCHMAKER-004(红娘不得代替用户执行交友决策)。
本阶段生产代码零改动,交付物为护栏测试(MM-CONTACT-001~004、MM-ACTION-001~003
全部有自动化用例)。

MatchmakerContactGuardTest(4 用例,standalone 源码扫描,FieldPrivacyGuardTest 范式):
- MM-CONTACT-002:ReferralService 全部响应 put 键 ⊆ 16 键白名单(逐键对账吻合),
  禁词 {emergencycontact,phone,mobile,wechat,weixin,address,idnumber,id_card}——
  锁定红娘侧零联系方式回显(紧急联系人信息纯入口 write-only,连红娘本人都无读回面);
  含防清空自检(三关键键必须在场)
- MM-CONTACT-003:红娘/转介 Controller 无 contact/call/phone/channel/offline 端点;
  全仓无 ContactAuthorization 类、无 matchmaker_contact_authorizations 迁移表——
  锁定「无授权机制」;未来引入联系功能必须连同本守卫+治理同步更新
- MM-CONTACT-004:机制不存在 ⇒ 无授权到期场景(与 003 同源,未来引入同时变红)
- 004 佐证:matchmaker/referral 包 @Scheduled=0(无批处理代决策面)

MatchmakerActionGuardTest(6 用例,@SpringBootTest 行为锁定):
- MM-ACTION-001(3 例负向):operator token 调用户决策端点
  (/matchmaker/recommendations/{id}/accept、/pass、/referrals/{id}/confirm)→ 403
  且业务状态零变化(403 来源于 SecurityConfig hasRole("USER") 身份类型防线,
  与 PermissionService mock 无关,变异验证锚定真实)
- MM-ACTION-002:operator token 开启会话端点 → 403
- MM-ACTION-003 must-confirm 语义锁定:红娘代建转介 → needsUserConfirmation=true/
  userConfirmedAt=null/status=pending,后续 recommend/followup/complete 不改确认态
  (「代填草稿、用户确认」灰色点永久锁定)
- MM-CONTACT-001(正向):红娘对本人分配对象创建推荐/转介 → 平台内服务通知落库,
  title/content 无手机号/微信模式,红娘 operatorId 不在通知收件面

负向注入自证:
- 注入 A:ReferralService 临时加 emergencyContactPhoneEnc 回显 → 守卫三重命中判红 → 还原
- 注入 B:SecurityConfig hasRole("USER")→authenticated() → 4/4 负向用例判红
  (403→401/500)→ 还原复绿

验证:定向 42/42、全量 861/861(3 预存 skip)、UI 契约 24/24。
003 方案 A(纯测试锁定)决策记录与五项 LEGAL_VERIFY open questions 随 ZC-MM-007 登记;
ContactAuthorizationPolicy 桩 + matchmaker_contact_authorizations 表推迟至 ZC-MM-006
(仅当产品确认开放受控联系时立项)。
2026-10-10 14:46:53 +08:00
WorkBuddy 3caf5f8816 feat(matchmaker,referral): ZC-MM-005 统一数据范围与字段隐私(DEC-MATCHMAKER-005/§5.2 落地)
依据《善缘丹阳 V1.1 红娘角色权限正式决策与开发规则》DEC-MATCHMAKER-005 最小必要原则
与 §5.2 字段级隐私,ZC-MM-005 范围=「读接口行级数据范围统一接入判定器 + 字段白名单 +
组长团队脱敏统计」。承接 ZC-MM-002 落地的 matchmaker_assignments 事实源与
ServiceAssignmentPolicy 判定器。

E1 双轨切纯判定器(不留回退):
- assertServiceAccess 纯化(删 assigned_operator_id 回退分支),判定器成唯一事实源
- getServiceDetail 删 viewerIsOwner 双态与「非负责人脱敏详情」整段

E2 非负责人防探测 404:
- ServiceAssignmentPolicy.assertActiveAssignmentOrNotFound:无生效分配→先落
  DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计再抛 NOT_FOUND(响应 404),存在性不可枚举,
  与「查无此单」响应体逐字段一致(MM-PRIVACY-001)

E3 字段白名单显式化 + 用户隐私开关:
- 抽取 assembleMatchmakerUserProfile:仅 7 键(displayName/gender/age 派生/regionName/
  educationCode/occupationCode/maritalStatus),无 birthDate 原值/详细地址/手机号/微信/
  身份证;接 UserPrivacySettings.showOccupation(缺省全放行)

E4 死端点清理:
- 删除 GET /operator/matchmaker/my-services(operatorId 误当 user_id、恒空、前后端零调用),
  替代路径 /operator/matchmaker/assignments/my;C 端 /matchmaker/services 与
  counseling myServices 保留

P1 残留收口(读/写路径仍信任废弃 assigned_operator_id 残留列,与 E1 同类洞):
- P1-1 运营端推荐列表:MatchmakerRecommendationMapper.findByOperatorId 改 join
  生效分配(active+expires),撤/结后不再可见
- P1-2 dashboard 三计数:count*ByOperator 改 join 生效分配 + COUNT(DISTINCT) 防重,
  end/revoke 后不再计入(DEC-002 规则7)
- P1-3 转介授权:ReferralService.assertMatchmakerServesUser 切
  serviceAssignmentPolicy.assertActiveAssignment(DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计 + 403),
  删残留列查询 findActiveByOperatorAndUser

新端点(组长团队脱敏统计):
- GET /operator/matchmaker/team/statistics(@PreAuthorize matchmaker.team.assign):
  本组织 active 分配数/按红娘分组/在岗红娘数,纯计数无用户 PII;org 边界
  IS NOT DISTINCT FROM(NULL=NULL 平台直属)

P2-4 operatorName 脱敏决策:保留不脱敏(§5.2 字段分类:红娘姓名=团队范围内
工作人员标识非用户 PII;组长统计本团队工作量属管理职责),依据登记
docs/governance/open-questions.md OQ-MATCHMAKER-002(RESOLVED)

死代码清理:getOperatorServices(零调用)+ MatchmakerServiceMapper.findByOperatorId
(残留列查询,调用清零)删除;C 端 MatchmakerService 遗留信任残留列按豁免未动(006/007 退役)

测试:
- MatchmakerDataScope005Test(13 用例):MM-PRIVACY-001/002、MM-AUTH-001/003 读侧、
  MM-LIFECYCLE-001 读侧、P1-1/2/3 残留收口负向(撤/结后推荐不可见/计数归零/转介 403)、
  防探测逐字段一致、showOccupation 三态
- MatchmakerFieldPrivacyGuardTest(3 用例):字段白名单源码扫描 + 无导出端点锁定
- MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test 转介口径收紧(IllegalStateException→AccessDeniedException)
- 负向注入自证(P1-3 残留列变异→判红→恢复复绿)

验证:定向 73/73;全量 851/851(3 预存 skip);UI 契约 24/24。
2026-10-10 11:51:15 +08:00
WorkBuddy 861c78efb5 feat(matchmaker): ZC-MM-002 A1 服务对象分配建模(DEC-MATCHMAKER-002 LOCKED 落地)
数据库(V053/V054):
- 新表 matchmaker_assignments:独立分配关系(assigned_by/reason/scope/
  expires_at/ended_at/end_reason),状态机 active/ended/revoked/transferred/
  expired(CHECK 白名单),部分唯一索引防同用户多 ACTIVE 主责分配,
  存量进行中服务单幂等回填
- 新角色 matchmaker_leader(014) + 新权限 matchmaker.team.assign(10000000-…-023);
  组长授 view/service/team.assign(不给平台级 matchmaker.assign)

后端:
- ServiceAssignmentPolicy 有效分配判定器(读前惰性过期,失效分配即时拒绝)
- 分配/转分配/撤销/结束四操作:状态机非法转换拒绝、理由必填、
  同用户主责冲突拒绝;组织范围校验(team.assign 同组织,NULL=NULL 视为
  平台直属,技术默认安全值待治理登记);transfer 同时校验原持有人与新目标范围
- 全操作审计 MATCHMAKER_ASSIGNMENT_CREATE/TRANSFER/REVOKE/END,
  operatorId=当前操作者,afterData 仅记摘要(无敏感内容)
- 删除认领端点 POST /services/{id}/claim(A1 禁止普通红娘认领,MM-AUTH-004=404)
- GET /pending 收敛为分配权持有者(assign or team.assign);
  dashboard today/completed 改本人口径,inProgress 口径修正 'processing'→'in_service'
- recommend/followup/complete/detail 归属判定接入判定器,拒绝走
  DataScopeGuard(自动 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计),不再裸 IllegalStateException;
  assignService 与创建分配同事务联动;删除死查询 findAssignedTo

前端:
- admin-web 分配弹窗去硬编码假数据(operator_wang/chen)→ assignable-matchmakers
  真实接口(仅 id/name/organizationId,无联系方式)+ 理由必填;
  队列 tab 按 assign/team.assign 显隐;新增「服务对象分配」tab(转分配/撤销/结束)
- 小程序红娘工作台:删除接单入口,数据源切 GET /operator/matchmaker/assignments/my,
  枚举码不上屏(中文映射),空 serviceId 不跳转

测试:
- MatchmakerAssignmentA1Test 14 用例(MM-AUTH-001~004、MM-AUDIT-001、
  MM-LIFECYCLE-001、组长跨组织拒绝、NULL=NULL 平台直属边界、transfer 原持有人
  范围负向、/pending 403+审计),负向注入自证有效
- MatchmakerAssignmentPermissionTest 3 用例(端点权限契约 + claim 残留扫描)
- MatchmakerServiceTest 补 assignment 状态/scope 白名单守卫;迁移基线 LATEST=54
- 验证:定向 38/38 全绿;UI 契约 24/24;小程序 wcc/wcsc 真编译 0 失败
2026-10-09 22:46:32 +08:00
WorkBuddy 6187ec69df test(ui-guards): 导航契约守卫基线对齐后端真实权限码
- admin-role-navigation-contracts.mjs L40-41 原断言 referral.manage /
  matchmaker.service.view,但后端 permissions 表不存在这两个幽灵码——
  v1.1.1 权限码对齐(4edb761)时漏更新守卫基线,导致该守卫自 v1.1.1 起恒红
- 修正为后端真实 authority 码:/referral→matchmaker.service、
  /matchmaker→matchmaker.view(守卫内容修正,非删守卫,MIN_GUARDS 不变)
- 实测 UI 契约 24/24 全绿
2026-10-09 22:46:32 +08:00
WorkBuddy 2d60f7899f docs(audit): ZC-MM-001 红娘角色权限差距审计报告
- 基准:《善缘丹阳 V1.1 红娘角色权限正式决策与开发规则》(DEC-MATCHMAKER-001~006
  全部 LOCKED,A1/B1 已确认)
- 审计范围:backend matchmaker/referral/audit/security/auth、Flyway V001~V052、
  admin-web 红娘页面、现有测试、治理文档;全部结论带文件:行号证据
- 核心结论:A1 分配关系未建模(分配=工单指派)、claim/followup/complete 无归属校验、
  /pending 全局队列对全体红娘可见、无红娘组长角色、模块内越权拒绝不落审计
- P0×5 / P1×6 / P2×6 差距清单 + 可复用模块(CounselingService INV-012 范式、
  DataScopeGuard、recordSensitiveAccess)+ ZC-MM-002~007 实施顺序建议
- 首次建立 docs/audits/ 目录
2026-10-09 22:46:32 +08:00
WorkBuddy f76bda1efa fix(miniapp): 开发态 API base URL 由 localhost 改为 127.0.0.1
- 规避模拟器 localhost→::1 的 IPv6 解析歧义导致的 ERR_CONNECTION_REFUSED
  (onLaunch 全量启动拉取 /app/config 失败后不自动重试,热重载不重跑)
- 生产 base 不变;仅 env.ts/env.js 的 isDev 分支
2026-10-09 22:46:31 +08:00
WorkBuddy 4edb7619bc fix(admin-web,db): 红娘菜单权限码对齐后端真实码 + 红娘角色授权
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前端菜单/路由守卫用 referral.manage、matchmaker.service.view,但后端 permissions
表不存在这两个码(referral 控制器要 matchmaker.service、红娘控制器要
matchmaker.view/service/assign)。visibleNavigation 据此把「公益红娘」「红娘服务」
两个菜单对**所有角色(含 super_admin)隐藏**。

- admin-web: MainLayout.vue(菜单 + 角色名判定)、router/index.ts(路由 meta)、
  stores/auth.ts(DEV 预览角色)三处对齐为后端真实 authority 码。
- db: 新增 V052 迁移,将 matchmaker.view/service/assign 授予 matchmaker 角色
  (005),修复「角色定义!=可用」同族缺陷;幂等 ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING。
- 重建 danyang-admin-web 镜像并重新部署;运行时验证 wanghongniang 登录返回
  [matchmaker.assign, matchmaker.service, matchmaker.view],两菜单可见。
2026-10-09 19:33:40 +08:00
WorkBuddy dfb74f3386 fix(backend): 修复审核决策请求体契约不一致导致的 400
审核操作统一发送 {comment, reasonCodes[]}(数组),但 ReviewController 的
approve / need-evidence / approve-local-eligibility / reject-local-eligibility /
evidences/{id}/access 将 @RequestBody 声明为 Map<String,String>,数组值无法反序列
化成 String,Jackson 抛 HttpMessageNotReadableException,经 GlobalExceptionHandler
映射为 400「请求体格式错误」。

- 5 处 @RequestBody Map<String,String> 改为 Map<String,Object>,comment/purpose
  读取加 (String) 强转(与原本正确的 needEdit/reject 一致)。
- 新增回归守卫 ReviewControllerRequestBodyContractTest(standalone MockMvc +
  GlobalExceptionHandler + 自定义 @AuthenticationPrincipal 解析器),注入前端真实
  载荷 {comment, reasonCodes:[]} 断言 200;直接 new 控制器测不到 HTTP/绑定层缺陷。
- 接入后端契约门禁 scripts/run-backend-contracts.mjs(CURATED 13 -> 14)。
- 负向注入已自证判别力:临时改回 Map<String,String> 精确判红 400,恢复后 5/5 绿。
2026-10-09 19:33:16 +08:00
WorkBuddy 9fc3385d6c feat(ci): 新增后端契约门禁 scripts/run-backend-contracts.mjs 并接入 CI
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与 scripts/run-ui-contracts.mjs 同级:固化一组关键后端回归/契约测试
(含 v1.1.0 修复的 3 个回归测试 + JwtAuthFilter Cookie 兜底 + 核心不变量),
先校验测试源文件存在性下限(防改名/删除后门禁假绿),再用 mvn test -Dtest
真跑并解析 surefire 汇总。在 backend job 的 mvn verify 之后执行,复用已
编译产物与依赖缓存,开销极小。同步更新 CODE_REVIEW_STANDARDS.md 门禁说明。
2026-09-30 16:21:25 +08:00
WorkBuddy c1c75edc55 fix(backend): 修复 v1.1.0 引入的 4 项后端测试失败
上一轮 v1.1.0 修复从未真正运行过后端测试,本次接入后端契约门禁前
全量 mvn verify 暴露 4 处缺陷:

1. PhotoService.confirmDirectUpload:countActiveProfilePhotos 返回 long,
   窄化赋值给 int sortOrder 导致整个后端编译失败(全量测试 0 跑)。
2. OperatorAuthController 直接引用 JwtTokenService 计算 Cookie max-age 并在
   logout 解析 JWT,违反 PrincipalInjectionContractTest 契约(控制器不得
   解析/引用 JWT 工具)。改为由 OperatorCookieWriter 持有 TTL、logout 从
   SecurityContext 的 OperatorPrincipal 取 operatorId。
3-4. AuthServiceRefreshTtlTest 与 JwtAuthFilterTest 的 UnnecessaryStubbing:
   移除未被调用的 getExpirationMs() / validateToken("bad-cookie") 桩。

全量 mvn verify:809 测试 0 失败 0 错误(3 跳过)。
2026-09-30 16:21:16 +08:00
WorkBuddy 47cccc9ca5 test: 补 v1.1.0 修复的回归测试
CI/CD Pipeline / Backend Build & Test (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / Admin Web Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / Mini Program Compile Check (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / Migration Validation (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / Test Shell Guard (Phase 23 Gate) (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / UI Contracts (source-structure gates) (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / E2E (live stack) (push) Canceled after 0s
- RealIdentityVerificationProvider: 伪造证件校验位拦截、配置缺失 fail-fast、第三方 fail-closed
- AuthService: 钉死刷新 Token Redis TTL 用 getRefreshExpirationMs(14 天)而非 access*2(4 小时)
- PhotoService: 直传落库 + 归属/存在性护栏(修复「传了白传」)
- JwtAuthFilter: 管理端 HttpOnly Cookie(dy_op_at)兜底鉴权 + 头优先于 Cookie
- miniapp profileLabels: 枚举码→中文映射不退化(serviceTypeLabel / labelOf)
2026-09-30 14:05:48 +08:00
WorkBuddy 5c97c57c76 Merge branch 'main' of http://120.27.207.134:13000/admin/danyang-match
CI/CD Pipeline / Backend Build & Test (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / Admin Web Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / Mini Program Compile Check (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / Migration Validation (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / Test Shell Guard (Phase 23 Gate) (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / UI Contracts (source-structure gates) (push) Canceled after 0s
CI/CD Pipeline / E2E (live stack) (push) Canceled after 0s
# Conflicts:
#	README.md
2026-09-30 13:44:13 +08:00
admin 8335ef780c Initial commit 2026-09-30 12:03:52 +08:00
64 changed files with 5990 additions and 290 deletions
+7
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ jobs:
working-directory: backend
run: mvn verify -B
# 后端契约门禁(与 scripts/run-ui-contracts.mjs 同级):
# 固化关键后端回归/契约测试(含 v1.1.0 修复的 3 个回归测试 + JwtAuthFilter Cookie 兜底
# + 核心不变量),先校验这些测试源文件存在性下限(防改名/删除后门禁假绿),
# 再用 `mvn test -Dtest=<列表>` 真跑。复用本 job 已编译产物与依赖缓存,开销极小。
- name: 后端契约门禁(curated + 下限校验)
run: node scripts/run-backend-contracts.mjs
- name: Upload Test Results
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
Anyone is free to copy, modify, publish, use, compile, sell, or
distribute this software, either in source code form or as a compiled
binary, for any purpose, commercial or non-commercial, and by any
means.
In jurisdictions that recognize copyright laws, the author or authors
of this software dedicate any and all copyright interest in the
software to the public domain. We make this dedication for the benefit
of the public at large and to the detriment of our heirs and
successors. We intend this dedication to be an overt act of
relinquishment in perpetuity of all present and future rights to this
software under copyright law.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR
OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE,
ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
For more information, please refer to <https://unlicense.org/>
+3 -3
View File
@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ const navigation: NavigationItem[] = [
{ label: '用户管理', path: '/users', permissions: ['user.view'], icon: User },
{ label: '资料审核', path: '/review', permissions: ['review.view'], icon: DocumentChecked },
{ label: '匹配管理', path: '/activities/interests', permissions: ['activity.review_registration'], icon: StarFilled },
{ label: '公益红娘', path: '/referral', permissions: ['referral.manage'], icon: Connection },
{ label: '红娘服务', path: '/matchmaker', permissions: ['matchmaker.service.view'], icon: Connection },
{ label: '公益红娘', path: '/referral', permissions: ['matchmaker.service'], icon: Connection },
{ label: '红娘服务', path: '/matchmaker', permissions: ['matchmaker.view'], icon: Connection },
{ label: '公益咨询', path: '/counseling', permissions: ['counseling.service.view'], icon: ChatDotRound },
{ label: '活动管理', path: '/activities', permissions: ['activity.view'], icon: Calendar },
{ label: '活动签到', path: '/activities/checkin', permissions: ['activity.checkin'], icon: Calendar },
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ const currentRoleName = computed(() => {
if (perms.includes('counseling.service.view')) return '公益咨询人员'
if (perms.includes('service_appointment.view')) return '服务站运营人员'
if (perms.includes('review.view')) return '资料审核人员'
if (perms.includes('matchmaker.service.view')) return '公益红娘'
if (perms.includes('matchmaker.view')) return '公益红娘'
return '运营人员'
})
const visibleNavigation = computed(() => navigation.filter((item) => item.permissions.every(hasPerm)))
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
<el-card>
<template #header><div class="card-header"><span>公益红娘管理</span></div></template>
<el-tabs v-model="activeTab">
<el-tab-pane label="服务请求队列" name="services">
<!-- ZC-MM-002:服务请求队列仅分配权持有者可见(matchmaker.assign 或 matchmaker.team.assign) -->
<el-tab-pane v-if="canAssign" label="服务请求队列" name="services">
<el-table :data="services" stripe v-loading="loading">
<el-table-column prop="userId" label="用户ID" width="120" />
<el-table-column prop="serviceType" label="服务类型" width="160">
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@
<el-table-column label="操作" width="200">
<template #default="{ row }">
<el-button v-if="row.status==='submitted'" size="small" type="primary" @click="openAssign(row)">分配</el-button>
<el-button v-if="row.status==='assigned' || row.status==='processing'" size="small" @click="openRecommendation(row)">创建推荐</el-button>
<el-button v-if="row.status==='assigned' || row.status==='in_service'" size="small" @click="openRecommendation(row)">创建推荐</el-button>
</template>
</el-table-column>
</el-table>
@@ -38,16 +39,47 @@
</el-table-column>
</el-table>
</el-tab-pane>
<!-- ZC-MM-002 新增:服务对象分配(本人名下生效中的分配 + 转分配/撤销/结束) -->
<el-tab-pane label="服务对象分配" name="assignments">
<el-table :data="assignments" stripe v-loading="assignmentsLoading">
<el-table-column prop="userId" label="用户ID" width="120" />
<el-table-column prop="assignmentScope" label="范围" width="90">
<template #default="{ row }">{{ assignmentScopeLabel(row.assignmentScope) }}</template>
</el-table-column>
<el-table-column prop="assignmentReason" label="分配理由" show-overflow-tooltip />
<el-table-column prop="status" label="状态" width="90">
<template #default="{ row }"><el-tag :type="assignmentStatusTag(row.status)">{{ assignmentStatusLabel(row.status) }}</el-tag></template>
</el-table-column>
<el-table-column prop="assignedAt" label="分配时间" width="170">
<template #default="{ row }">{{ formatDateTime(row.assignedAt) }}</template>
</el-table-column>
<el-table-column prop="expiresAt" label="有效期至" width="170">
<template #default="{ row }">{{ row.expiresAt ? formatDateTime(row.expiresAt) : '长期' }}</template>
</el-table-column>
<el-table-column label="操作" width="220">
<template #default="{ row }">
<el-button size="small" type="primary" @click="openTransfer(row)">转分配</el-button>
<el-button size="small" @click="openTerminate(row, 'revoke')">撤销</el-button>
<el-button size="small" @click="openTerminate(row, 'end')">结束</el-button>
</template>
</el-table-column>
</el-table>
</el-tab-pane>
</el-tabs>
</el-card>
<!-- 分配弹窗 -->
<el-dialog v-model="assignDialogVisible" title="分配红娘服务" width="400px">
<el-form label-width="80px">
<el-form-item label="红娘"><el-select v-model="assignForm.operatorId" placeholder="选择红娘">
<el-option label="王红娘" value="operator_wang" />
<el-option label="陈红娘" value="operator_chen" />
</el-select></el-form-item>
<!-- 分配弹窗(ZC-MM-002:去硬编码红娘名单,改为加载可分配红娘接口;理由必填) -->
<el-dialog v-model="assignDialogVisible" title="分配红娘服务" width="440px">
<el-form label-width="90px">
<el-form-item label="红娘">
<el-select v-model="assignForm.matchmakerOperatorId" placeholder="选择红娘" style="width: 100%">
<el-option v-for="op in assignableMatchmakers" :key="op.id" :label="op.name" :value="op.id" />
</el-select>
</el-form-item>
<el-form-item label="分配理由" required>
<el-input v-model="assignForm.reason" type="textarea" :rows="2" placeholder="说明分配依据(必填)" />
</el-form-item>
</el-form>
<template #footer>
<el-button @click="assignDialogVisible=false">取消</el-button>
@@ -55,6 +87,37 @@
</template>
</el-dialog>
<!-- 转分配弹窗(ZC-MM-002:服务对象分配) -->
<el-dialog v-model="transferDialogVisible" title="转分配服务对象" width="440px">
<el-form label-width="90px">
<el-form-item label="新红娘">
<el-select v-model="transferForm.newMatchmakerOperatorId" placeholder="选择接手红娘" style="width: 100%">
<el-option v-for="op in assignableMatchmakers" :key="op.id" :label="op.name" :value="op.id" />
</el-select>
</el-form-item>
<el-form-item label="转分配理由" required>
<el-input v-model="transferForm.reason" type="textarea" :rows="2" placeholder="说明转分配依据(必填)" />
</el-form-item>
</el-form>
<template #footer>
<el-button @click="transferDialogVisible=false">取消</el-button>
<el-button type="primary" @click="doTransfer">确认转分配</el-button>
</template>
</el-dialog>
<!-- 撤销/结束弹窗(ZC-MM-002:服务对象分配) -->
<el-dialog v-model="terminateDialogVisible" :title="terminateAction==='revoke' ? '撤销服务对象分配' : '结束服务对象分配'" width="440px">
<el-form label-width="90px">
<el-form-item :label="terminateAction==='revoke' ? '撤销理由' : '结束理由'" required>
<el-input v-model="terminateForm.reason" type="textarea" :rows="2" placeholder="说明理由(必填)" />
</el-form-item>
</el-form>
<template #footer>
<el-button @click="terminateDialogVisible=false">取消</el-button>
<el-button type="danger" @click="doTerminate">确认</el-button>
</template>
</el-dialog>
<!-- 创建推荐弹窗 -->
<el-dialog v-model="recDialogVisible" title="创建红娘推荐" width="480px">
<el-form label-width="100px">
@@ -71,18 +134,35 @@
</template>
<script setup lang="ts">
import { ref, onMounted } from 'vue'
import { ref, computed, onMounted } from 'vue'
import { get, post } from '@/api/client'
import { ElMessage } from 'element-plus'
import { useAuthStore } from '@/stores/auth'
const activeTab = ref('services')
const authStore = useAuthStore()
// ZC-MM-002:分配权 = matchmaker.assign(平台授权)或 matchmaker.team.assign(红娘组长)
const canAssign = computed(() => {
const perms: string[] = authStore.permissions || []
return perms.includes('matchmaker.assign') || perms.includes('matchmaker.team.assign')
})
const activeTab = ref(canAssign.value ? 'services' : 'assignments')
const loading = ref(false)
const services = ref<any[]>([])
const recommendations = ref<any[]>([])
const assignments = ref<any[]>([])
const assignmentsLoading = ref(false)
const assignableMatchmakers = ref<any[]>([])
const assignDialogVisible = ref(false)
const recDialogVisible = ref(false)
const transferDialogVisible = ref(false)
const terminateDialogVisible = ref(false)
const currentServiceId = ref('')
const assignForm = ref({ operatorId: '' })
const currentUserId = ref('')
const currentAssignmentId = ref('')
const terminateAction = ref<'revoke' | 'end'>('revoke')
const assignForm = ref({ matchmakerOperatorId: '', reason: '' })
const transferForm = ref({ newMatchmakerOperatorId: '', reason: '' })
const terminateForm = ref({ reason: '' })
const recForm = ref({ userId: '', targetUserId: '', reason: '' })
const SERVICE_TYPE_LABEL: Record<string, string> = {
@@ -90,10 +170,12 @@ const SERVICE_TYPE_LABEL: Record<string, string> = {
referral_activity: '转介活动', referral_station: '转介服务站'
}
const STATUS_LABEL: Record<string, string> = {
submitted: '待分配', assigned: '已分配', processing: '处理中', completed: '已完成', cancelled: '已取消'
submitted: '待分配', assigned: '已分配', in_service: '服务中', waiting_user: '等待用户',
processing: '处理中', completed: '已完成', cancelled: '已取消'
}
const STATUS_TAG: Record<string, string> = {
submitted: 'warning', assigned: 'primary', processing: '', completed: 'success', cancelled: 'danger'
submitted: 'warning', assigned: 'primary', in_service: 'primary', waiting_user: 'warning',
processing: '', completed: 'success', cancelled: 'danger'
}
const REC_STATUS_LABEL: Record<string, string> = {
pending_view: '待用户查看', viewed: '已查看', liked: '已喜欢',
@@ -103,18 +185,27 @@ const REC_STATUS_TAG: Record<string, string> = {
pending_view: 'warning', viewed: 'info', liked: 'primary',
passed: 'info', confirmed_mutual: 'success', rejected: 'danger', expired: 'info'
}
const ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_LABEL: Record<string, string> = {
active: '生效中', ended: '已结束', revoked: '已撤销', transferred: '已转分配', expired: '已过期'
}
const ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_TAG: Record<string, string> = {
active: 'success', ended: 'info', revoked: 'danger', transferred: 'info', expired: 'info'
}
function serviceTypeLabel(t: string) { return SERVICE_TYPE_LABEL[t] || t }
function statusLabel(s: string) { return STATUS_LABEL[s] || s }
function statusTag(s: string) { return STATUS_TAG[s] || 'info' }
function recStatusLabel(s: string) { return REC_STATUS_LABEL[s] || s }
function recStatusTag(s: string) { return REC_STATUS_TAG[s] || 'info' }
function assignmentStatusLabel(s: string) { return ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_LABEL[s] || s }
function assignmentStatusTag(s: string) { return ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_TAG[s] || 'info' }
function assignmentScopeLabel(s: string) { return s === 'primary' ? '主责' : '协同' }
function formatDateTime(d: string) { return d ? new Date(d).toLocaleString('zh-CN') : '-' }
async function loadServices() {
loading.value = true
// Phase 13 契约修复:原 `/matchmaker/services/operator/queue` 后端不存在(404)。
// 后端实际为 GET /operator/matchmaker/pending(待分配队列)。
// 后端实际为 GET /operator/matchmaker/pending(待分配队列,ZC-MM-002 后仅分配权持有者可调)。
try { const res: any = await get('/operator/matchmaker/pending'); services.value = res?.data || [] } finally { loading.value = false }
}
async function loadRecommendations() {
@@ -123,19 +214,80 @@ async function loadRecommendations() {
// 后端新增 GET /operator/matchmaker/recommendations(限本人名下服务的推荐)。
try { const res: any = await get('/operator/matchmaker/recommendations'); recommendations.value = res?.data || [] } finally { loading.value = false }
}
async function loadAssignments() {
assignmentsLoading.value = true
// ZC-MM-002:本人名下生效中的服务对象分配
try { const res: any = await get('/operator/matchmaker/assignments/my'); assignments.value = res?.data || [] } finally { assignmentsLoading.value = false }
}
async function loadAssignableMatchmakers() {
// ZC-MM-002:去硬编码红娘名单,改为后端可分配红娘接口(组长按组织过滤、平台授权人员全部)
try { const res: any = await get('/operator/matchmaker/assignments/assignable-matchmakers'); assignableMatchmakers.value = res?.data || [] } catch { assignableMatchmakers.value = [] }
}
async function refresh() {
if (activeTab.value === 'services') await loadServices(); else await loadRecommendations()
if (activeTab.value === 'services') await loadServices()
else if (activeTab.value === 'assignments') await loadAssignments()
else await loadRecommendations()
}
async function openAssign(row: any) { currentServiceId.value = row.id; assignForm.value.operatorId = ''; assignDialogVisible.value = true }
async function openAssign(row: any) {
// /pending 返回字段为 serviceId(Phase 13 契约),兜底 row.id
currentServiceId.value = row.serviceId || row.id
currentUserId.value = row.userId
assignForm.value = { matchmakerOperatorId: '', reason: '' }
await loadAssignableMatchmakers()
assignDialogVisible.value = true
}
async function doAssign() {
// Phase 13 契约修复:原 PUT /matchmaker/services/{id}/assign → 后端为 POST /operator/matchmaker/services/{id}/assign
if (!assignForm.value.matchmakerOperatorId) { ElMessage.warning('请选择红娘'); return }
if (!assignForm.value.reason || !assignForm.value.reason.trim()) { ElMessage.warning('分配理由必填'); return }
// ZC-MM-002:分配走统一分配接口(创建 assignment + 服务单联动置 assigned,同事务)
try {
await post(`/operator/matchmaker/services/${currentServiceId.value}/assign`, { operatorId: assignForm.value.operatorId })
await post('/operator/matchmaker/assignments', {
userId: currentUserId.value,
matchmakerOperatorId: assignForm.value.matchmakerOperatorId,
serviceId: currentServiceId.value,
reason: assignForm.value.reason.trim()
})
ElMessage.success('分配成功'); assignDialogVisible.value = false; loadServices()
} catch (e: any) { ElMessage.error(e?.response?.data?.message || '操作失败') }
}
async function openTransfer(row: any) {
currentAssignmentId.value = row.id
transferForm.value = { newMatchmakerOperatorId: '', reason: '' }
await loadAssignableMatchmakers()
transferDialogVisible.value = true
}
async function doTransfer() {
if (!transferForm.value.newMatchmakerOperatorId) { ElMessage.warning('请选择接手红娘'); return }
if (!transferForm.value.reason || !transferForm.value.reason.trim()) { ElMessage.warning('转分配理由必填'); return }
try {
await post(`/operator/matchmaker/assignments/${currentAssignmentId.value}/transfer`, {
newMatchmakerOperatorId: transferForm.value.newMatchmakerOperatorId,
reason: transferForm.value.reason.trim()
})
ElMessage.success('转分配成功'); transferDialogVisible.value = false; loadAssignments()
} catch (e: any) { ElMessage.error(e?.response?.data?.message || '操作失败') }
}
function openTerminate(row: any, action: 'revoke' | 'end') {
currentAssignmentId.value = row.id
terminateAction.value = action
terminateForm.value = { reason: '' }
terminateDialogVisible.value = true
}
async function doTerminate() {
if (!terminateForm.value.reason || !terminateForm.value.reason.trim()) {
ElMessage.warning(terminateAction.value === 'revoke' ? '撤销理由必填' : '结束理由必填'); return
}
try {
await post(`/operator/matchmaker/assignments/${currentAssignmentId.value}/${terminateAction.value}`, {
reason: terminateForm.value.reason.trim()
})
ElMessage.success('操作成功'); terminateDialogVisible.value = false; loadAssignments()
} catch (e: any) { ElMessage.error(e?.response?.data?.message || '操作失败') }
}
function openRecommendation(row: any) {
currentServiceId.value = row.id
recForm.value = { userId: row.userId, targetUserId: '', reason: '' }
+2 -2
View File
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ const routes: RouteRecordRaw[] = [
{ path: 'service-appointment', name: 'ServiceAppointment', component: () => import('@/modules/service-appointment/ServiceAppointmentView.vue'), meta: { title: '服务预约', permissions: ['service_appointment.view'] } },
{ path: 'service-program', name: 'ServiceProgram', component: () => import('@/modules/service-program/ServiceProgramView.vue'), meta: { title: '专项服务项目', permissions: ['service_program.manage'] } },
{ path: 'counseling', name: 'Counseling', component: () => import('@/modules/counseling/CounselingView.vue'), meta: { title: '婚恋咨询', permissions: ['counseling.service.view'] } },
{ path: 'referral', name: 'ReferralManagement', component: () => import('@/modules/referral/ReferralManagementView.vue'), meta: { title: '转介管理', permissions: ['referral.manage'] } },
{ path: 'matchmaker', name: 'MatchmakerManagement', component: () => import('@/modules/matchmaker/MatchmakerManagementView.vue'), meta: { title: '红娘管理', permissions: ['matchmaker.service.view'] } },
{ path: 'referral', name: 'ReferralManagement', component: () => import('@/modules/referral/ReferralManagementView.vue'), meta: { title: '转介管理', permissions: ['matchmaker.service'] } },
{ path: 'matchmaker', name: 'MatchmakerManagement', component: () => import('@/modules/matchmaker/MatchmakerManagementView.vue'), meta: { title: '红娘管理', permissions: ['matchmaker.view'] } },
],
},
+5 -3
View File
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ interface OperatorInfo {
const previewRolePermissions: Record<string, string[]> = {
reviewer: ['review.view', 'user.view'],
counselor: ['counseling.service.view', 'referral.manage'],
counselor: ['counseling.service.view', 'matchmaker.service'],
station: ['service_location.view', 'service_appointment.view'],
operator: ['review.view', 'user.view', 'organization.manage', 'permission.manage', 'activity.review_registration', 'risk.report.view', 'risk.report.process', 'analytics.view', 'banner.view', 'content.view', 'service_location.view', 'service_appointment.view', 'service_program.manage', 'counseling.service.view', 'referral.manage'],
operator: ['review.view', 'user.view', 'organization.manage', 'permission.manage', 'activity.review_registration', 'risk.report.view', 'risk.report.process', 'analytics.view', 'banner.view', 'content.view', 'service_location.view', 'service_appointment.view', 'service_program.manage', 'counseling.service.view', 'matchmaker.view', 'matchmaker.service'],
}
export const useAuthStore = defineStore('auth', () => {
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ export const useAuthStore = defineStore('auth', () => {
const isLoggedIn = computed(() => !!token.value && !!operator.value)
const permissions = computed(() => operator.value?.permissions || [])
// ZC-MM-002:最小只读 helper —— 组件按权限码做 UI 显隐(与后端 @PreAuthorize 同码)
const hasPermission = (code: string) => permissions.value.includes(code)
function applyAuthData(data: any) {
token.value = data.accessToken || ''
@@ -87,5 +89,5 @@ export const useAuthStore = defineStore('auth', () => {
clearAccessToken()
}
return { token, operator, isLoggedIn, permissions, login, logout, initializeSession }
return { token, operator, isLoggedIn, permissions, hasPermission, login, logout, initializeSession }
})
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
<groupId>com.danyang.match</groupId>
<artifactId>danyang-match-platform</artifactId>
<version>1.1.0</version>
<version>1.2.0</version>
<name>Danyang Match Platform</name>
<description>丹阳公益婚恋服务平台 V1.1 - Backend</description>
@@ -19,4 +19,15 @@ public class AuditLog extends BaseEntity {
private String afterData;
private String ip;
private String userAgent;
// ==================== ZC-MM-006 / T01 扩展审计字段(V055,全可空) ====================
/** 业务目的码,规范:matchmaker.service.assign/recommend/followup/complete/view。 */
private String purposeCode;
/** 关联的 matchmaker_assignments.id(非分配场景为 null)。 */
private String serviceAssignmentId;
/** 落库时操作者权限快照(permissions 逗号拼接,截断 128)。 */
private String actorRoleSnapshot;
/** 请求追踪 ID(RequestIdFilter 写入 MDC 的 requestId)。 */
private String requestTraceId;
}
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@ public class AuditLogService {
m.put("ip", log.getIp());
m.put("userAgent", log.getUserAgent());
m.put("createdAt", log.getCreatedAt());
// ZC-MM-006 / T01:扩展审计字段输出(可空键,存量行输出 null,读取兼容)
m.put("purposeCode", log.getPurposeCode());
m.put("serviceAssignmentId", log.getServiceAssignmentId());
m.put("actorRoleSnapshot", log.getActorRoleSnapshot());
m.put("requestTraceId", log.getRequestTraceId());
return m;
}).collect(java.util.stream.Collectors.toList());
@@ -73,11 +78,23 @@ public class AuditLogService {
*/
@Transactional
public void recordSensitiveAccess(String operatorId, String resourceType, String resourceId) {
recordSensitiveAccess(operatorId, resourceType, resourceId, null, null);
}
/**
* ZC-MM-006 / T01 扩展版敏感访问记录:附加目的码与关联分配 ID。
* 旧 3 参签名委托本方法(purposeCode/serviceAssignmentId 为 null),存量调用兼容。
*/
@Transactional
public void recordSensitiveAccess(String operatorId, String resourceType, String resourceId,
String purposeCode, String serviceAssignmentId) {
AuditLog auditLog = new AuditLog();
auditLog.setOperatorId(operatorId);
auditLog.setAction("SENSITIVE_ACCESS");
auditLog.setResourceType(resourceType);
auditLog.setResourceId(resourceId);
auditLog.setPurposeCode(purposeCode);
auditLog.setServiceAssignmentId(serviceAssignmentId);
if (RequestContextHolder.getRequestAttributes() instanceof ServletRequestAttributes attrs) {
HttpServletRequest req = attrs.getRequest();
auditLog.setIp(req.getRemoteAddr());
@@ -2,13 +2,14 @@ package com.danyang.match.platform.auth.controller;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.cookie.OperatorCookieWriter;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.service.OperatorAuthService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.token.JwtTokenService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.dto.ApiResponse;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.OperatorPrincipal;
import jakarta.servlet.http.Cookie;
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
import org.springframework.security.core.annotation.AuthenticationPrincipal;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestBody;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
@@ -23,7 +24,6 @@ public class OperatorAuthController {
private final OperatorAuthService operatorAuthService;
private final OperatorCookieWriter cookieWriter;
private final JwtTokenService jwtTokenService;
@PostMapping("/login")
public ApiResponse<Map<String, Object>> login(@RequestBody Map<String, String> body,
@@ -34,10 +34,11 @@ public class OperatorAuthController {
return ApiResponse.error(ApiResponseCode.BAD_REQUEST, "用户名和密码不能为空");
}
Map<String, Object> result = operatorAuthService.login(username, password);
// 同时下发 HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax Cookie(access / refresh),抗 XSS 读取令牌
// 同时下发 HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax Cookie(access / refresh),抗 XSS 读取令牌。
// Cookie max-age 由 OperatorCookieWriter 按 JWT 有效期计算,控制器不引用 JWT 工具
// (控制器禁止解析/引用 JWT 工具,见 PrincipalInjectionContractTest 契约)。
cookieWriter.writeLoginCookies(response,
(String) result.get("accessToken"), (String) result.get("refreshToken"),
jwtTokenService.getExpirationMs() / 1000, jwtTokenService.getRefreshExpirationMs() / 1000);
(String) result.get("accessToken"), (String) result.get("refreshToken"));
return ApiResponse.ok(result);
}
@@ -61,25 +62,22 @@ public class OperatorAuthController {
String operatorId = (body != null) ? body.get("operatorId") : null;
Map<String, Object> result = operatorAuthService.refreshToken(operatorId, refreshToken);
cookieWriter.writeLoginCookies(response,
(String) result.get("accessToken"), (String) result.get("refreshToken"),
jwtTokenService.getExpirationMs() / 1000, jwtTokenService.getRefreshExpirationMs() / 1000);
(String) result.get("accessToken"), (String) result.get("refreshToken"));
return ApiResponse.ok(result);
}
/**
* 登出:后端将当前 access token 加入黑名单并清除 HttpOnly Cookie。
* token 取自 Authorization 头,缺省时回退到 access Cookie。
* operatorId 取自 SecurityContext 中的 OperatorPrincipal(由 JwtAuthFilter 写入),
* 不再由控制器自行解析 JWT;token 取自 Authorization 头,缺省时回退到 access Cookie,
* 仅用于黑名单登记。
*/
@PostMapping("/logout")
public ApiResponse<Void> logout(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
public ApiResponse<Void> logout(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response,
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal) {
String token = readBearer(request);
if (token != null) {
try {
String operatorId = jwtTokenService.getUserIdFromToken(token);
operatorAuthService.logout(operatorId, token);
} catch (Exception ignored) {
// token 已失效也无妨,仍清除 Cookie
}
if (token != null && principal != null) {
operatorAuthService.logout(principal.id(), token);
}
cookieWriter.clearCookies(response);
return ApiResponse.ok();
@@ -27,6 +27,20 @@ public class OperatorCookieWriter {
@Value("${app.auth-cookie-secure:true}")
private boolean secure;
// Cookie 生命周期与 JWT 自身有效期对齐(access 2h / refresh 14d),由配置驱动、不写死。
// 由本组件持有而非控制器持有:控制器不得直接引用 JwtTokenService
// (PrincipalInjectionContractTest 契约禁止控制器解析/引用 JWT 工具)。
@Value("${jwt.access-token-expiration-ms:7200000}")
private long accessExpirationMs;
@Value("${jwt.refresh-token-expiration-ms:1209600000}")
private long refreshExpirationMs;
/** 登录/刷新下发 Cookie,max-age 自动取 JWT 有效期(秒)。 */
public void writeLoginCookies(HttpServletResponse response, String accessToken, String refreshToken) {
writeLoginCookies(response, accessToken, refreshToken, accessExpirationMs / 1000, refreshExpirationMs / 1000);
}
public void writeLoginCookies(HttpServletResponse response, String accessToken, String refreshToken,
long accessMaxAgeSec, long refreshMaxAgeSec) {
response.addHeader(HttpHeaders.SET_COOKIE, build(ACCESS_COOKIE, accessToken, accessMaxAgeSec).toString());
@@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ public class OperatorAuthService {
.toList();
// 签发 Token
// ZC-MM-006 / T02 声明:claims 中的 permissions 仅为登录时刻的展示快照(只写不读),
// **不是授权事实源** —— 服务端每请求实时查库(JwtAuthFilter → PermissionMapper),
// 权限回收/角色调整/账号禁用即时生效,无需等待 token 过期或撤销名单。
Map<String, Object> claims = new HashMap<>();
claims.put("operatorId", operator.getId());
claims.put("organizationId", operator.getOrganizationId());
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.controller;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerAssignmentService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.dto.ApiResponse;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.OperatorPrincipal;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
import org.springframework.security.access.prepost.PreAuthorize;
import org.springframework.security.core.annotation.AuthenticationPrincipal;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* 服务对象分配接口(运营端,ZC-MM-002 / A1)。
*
* <p>权限模型(D2):
* <ul>
* <li>写操作(创建/转分配/撤销/结束/可分配列表):
* {@code matchmaker.assign}(平台授权人员,不限组织)
* 或 {@code matchmaker.team.assign}(红娘组长,同组织范围);</li>
* <li>读自己名下分配(/my):{@code matchmaker.service}(普通红娘即可)。</li>
* </ul>
* operatorId 一律取当前认证主体(principal),不信任请求参数。
*/
@RestController
@RequestMapping("/operator/matchmaker/assignments")
@RequiredArgsConstructor
public class MatchmakerAssignmentController {
private final MatchmakerAssignmentService assignmentService;
/**
* 创建分配。
* Body: userId / matchmakerOperatorId / serviceId? / reason(必填)/ expiresAt?(ISO-8601)
*/
@PostMapping
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.assign') or hasAuthority('matchmaker.team.assign')")
public ApiResponse<?> create(@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
MatchmakerAssignment created = assignmentService.create(
principal.id(),
principal.hasPermission("matchmaker.assign"),
body.get("userId"),
body.get("matchmakerOperatorId"),
body.getOrDefault("serviceId", null),
body.get("reason"),
parseInstant(body.get("expiresAt")));
return ApiResponse.ok(assignmentView(created));
}
/** 转分配:旧记录置 transferred,同事务新建 active。reason 必填。 */
@PostMapping("/{id}/transfer")
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.assign') or hasAuthority('matchmaker.team.assign')")
public ApiResponse<?> transfer(@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String id,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
MatchmakerAssignment created = assignmentService.transfer(
id,
principal.id(),
principal.hasPermission("matchmaker.assign"),
body.get("newMatchmakerOperatorId"),
body.get("reason"));
return ApiResponse.ok(assignmentView(created));
}
/** 撤销分配。reason 必填。 */
@PostMapping("/{id}/revoke")
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.assign') or hasAuthority('matchmaker.team.assign')")
public ApiResponse<?> revoke(@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String id,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
return ApiResponse.ok(assignmentView(assignmentService.revoke(
id, principal.id(), principal.hasPermission("matchmaker.assign"),
body.get("reason"))));
}
/** 结束分配。reason 必填。 */
@PostMapping("/{id}/end")
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.assign') or hasAuthority('matchmaker.team.assign')")
public ApiResponse<?> end(@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String id,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
return ApiResponse.ok(assignmentView(assignmentService.end(
id, principal.id(), principal.hasPermission("matchmaker.assign"),
body.get("reason"))));
}
/** 我名下生效中的服务对象分配(普通红娘工作台)。 */
@GetMapping("/my")
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.service')")
public ApiResponse<List<Map<String, Object>>> my(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal) {
List<Map<String, Object>> list = assignmentService.listMy(principal.id()).stream()
.map(this::assignmentView)
.toList();
return ApiResponse.ok(list);
}
/**
* 可分配红娘列表(创建/转分配弹窗数据源)。
* 返回 id/name/organizationId,不含联系方式(字段级隐私,ZC-MM-005 范围)。
*/
@GetMapping("/assignable-matchmakers")
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.assign') or hasAuthority('matchmaker.team.assign')")
public ApiResponse<List<Map<String, Object>>> assignable(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal) {
return ApiResponse.ok(assignmentService.listAssignableMatchmakers(
principal.id(), principal.hasPermission("matchmaker.assign")));
}
/**
* 组长团队统计(ZC-MM-005 / E4 新增)。仅 matchmaker.team.assign 持有者可调;
* 以组长本人 organization_id 为边界(NULL 组长统计平台直属)。
* 返回纯脱敏计数:activeAssignmentCount / perMatchmakerCounts / activeMatchmakerCount,
* 不含任何用户身份或联系方式。
*/
@GetMapping("/team/statistics")
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.team.assign')")
public ApiResponse<Map<String, Object>> teamStatistics(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal) {
return ApiResponse.ok(assignmentService.teamStatistics(principal.id()));
}
private Instant parseInstant(String raw) {
if (raw == null || raw.isBlank()) {
return null;
}
return Instant.parse(raw);
}
private Map<String, Object> assignmentView(MatchmakerAssignment a) {
return Map.ofEntries(
Map.entry("id", a.getId()),
Map.entry("userId", a.getUserId()),
Map.entry("matchmakerOperatorId", a.getMatchmakerOperatorId()),
Map.entry("serviceId", a.getServiceId() == null ? "" : a.getServiceId()),
Map.entry("assignmentScope", a.getAssignmentScope()),
Map.entry("status", a.getStatus()),
Map.entry("assignmentReason", a.getAssignmentReason()),
Map.entry("assignedAt", a.getAssignedAt() == null ? "" : a.getAssignedAt().toString()),
Map.entry("expiresAt", a.getExpiresAt() == null ? "" : a.getExpiresAt().toString()),
Map.entry("endedAt", a.getEndedAt() == null ? "" : a.getEndedAt().toString()),
Map.entry("endReason", a.getEndReason() == null ? "" : a.getEndReason())
);
}
}
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ import java.util.Map;
/**
* 红娘工作台控制器(Operator调用)
*
* <p>ZC-MM-002(A1)状态机变更:原 {@code POST /services/{id}/claim}(红娘接单)端点已删除。
* 服务对象归属统一由 matchmaker_assignments 建模(D3 决策:不保留组长认领),
* 分配入口收敛为 {@code MatchmakerAssignmentController}(POST /operator/matchmaker/assignments),
* 服务单状态由分配动作同事务联动(submitted → assigned)。
*/
@RestController
@RequestMapping("/operator/matchmaker")
@@ -29,42 +34,57 @@ public class MatchmakerOperatorController {
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.getDashboard(operatorId));
}
/**
* 待分配队列。ZC-MM-002(D4):方法级权限收敛 —— 仅分配权持有者
* (matchmaker.assign 平台授权 / matchmaker.team.assign 组长)可看全局待分配队列,
* 普通红娘(仅 matchmaker.view/service)403。
*
* <p>组长视角说明(ZC-MM-005 / E4,治理登记 007):matchmaker_services 表无组织归属字段
* (organization_id 恒 null 的已知限制),因此待分配队列无法按组长组织过滤,
* 权衡后对分配权持有者全局可读 —— 待分配服务单尚无负责人,队列不含敏感分配关系。
* 组织归属字段的补齐登记至 ZC-MM-007。
*/
@GetMapping("/pending")
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.assign') or hasAuthority('matchmaker.team.assign')")
public ApiResponse<List<Map<String, Object>>> getPending(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal) {
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.getPendingServices());
}
/**
* 分配服务给红娘(兼容入口)。ZC-MM-002(D4):
* 同事务联动「创建 matchmaker_assignments 分配 + 服务单置 assigned」。
*/
@PostMapping("/services/{id}/assign")
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.assign')")
public ApiResponse<?> assignService(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String id,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
String operatorId = principal.id();
String assignOperatorId = body.get("operatorId");
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.assignService(id, assignOperatorId, null));
String assignerOperatorId = principal.id();
String targetOperatorId = body.get("operatorId");
String reason = body.getOrDefault("reason", "红娘服务单分配");
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.assignService(
id, assignerOperatorId, targetOperatorId, reason));
}
@PostMapping("/services/{id}/claim")
@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.service')")
public ApiResponse<?> claimService(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String id) {
String operatorId = principal.id();
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.claimService(operatorId, id));
}
@GetMapping("/my-services")
public ApiResponse<?> getMyServices(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal) {
String operatorId = principal.id();
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.getMyServices(operatorId));
}
// GET /my-services 已删除(ZC-MM-005 / E4 死端点清理):
// 原实现把 operatorId 误当 user_id 传给 getMyServices(按 C 端 user_id 查询,恒空),
// 且 admin-web / miniapp 零调用。运营端"我的服务对象"替代路径:
// GET /operator/matchmaker/assignments/my(ZC-MM-002 A1 新增)。
// getMyServices 服务方法保留,供 C 端 GET /matchmaker/services 使用。
/**
* Phase 13:红娘名下服务的全部推荐列表(运营端工作台用)。
* 红娘名下服务的全部推荐列表(运营端工作台用)。
* 补此前 admin-web 调用 `/matchmaker/recommendations/operator` 404 的契约缺口。
*
* <p>口径核查(ZC-MM-005 收口 / P1-1):范围事实源是 {@code matchmaker_assignments}
* 中本人<b>生效中的分配</b>(active 且未过有效期)→ 该分配对象(user)名下
* 服务单上的推荐,经 matchmaker_services 桥接;既不按
* matchmaker_services.assigned_operator_id 残留列过滤,也<b>不</b>按
* recommendation.operator_id 过滤(推荐条目只含 targetUserId/reason/status
* 摘要,不涉及服务对象字段级隐私)。分配 revoke/end 后不再可见
* (DEC-002 规则7:撤销即失权)。
*/
@GetMapping("/recommendations")
public ApiResponse<List<Map<String, Object>>> getRecommendations(
@@ -72,16 +92,19 @@ public class MatchmakerOperatorController {
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.getRecommendationsByOperator(principal.id()));
}
/**
* 服务详情(ZC-MM-005 / E2 防探测 404)。
*
* <p>语义变更:非持有人与查无 serviceId 抛出完全相同的
* BusinessException(NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在") —— 响应体逐字段一致
* (success=false / code=NOT_FOUND / message=服务不存在),无法区分"无权"与"不存在"。
* 此前 002 的 viewerIsOwner 双态(持有人完整 / 非负责人脱敏)已删除。
*/
@GetMapping("/services/{id}")
public ApiResponse<Map<String, Object>> getServiceDetail(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String id) {
// Phase 13 D4:传入调用者身份,Service 层按归属决定返回完整/脱敏详情
Map<String, Object> detail = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(id, principal.id());
if (detail == null) {
return ApiResponse.error(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND);
}
return ApiResponse.ok(detail);
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(id, principal.id()));
}
@PostMapping("/services/{id}/recommend")
@@ -114,7 +137,8 @@ public class MatchmakerOperatorController {
public ApiResponse<?> completeService(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String id) {
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.completeService(id));
// ZC-MM-002(D4):归属判定切换到 ServiceAssignmentPolicy(服务层完成)
return ApiResponse.ok(matchmakerServiceService.completeService(id, principal.id()));
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.annotation.TableName;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.base.BaseEntity;
import lombok.Data;
import lombok.EqualsAndHashCode;
import java.time.Instant;
/**
* 服务对象分配(ZC-MM-002 / A1)
* 对应 DB: matchmaker_assignments(V053)
*
* <p>建模说明:
* <ul>
* <li>{@code matchmakerOperatorId}:持有该用户服务对象的红娘(operators 主体,
* 沿用 matchmaker_services.assigned_operator_id 惯例)。</li>
* <li>{@code assignedBy}:做出本次分配的操作者(组长 / 平台授权人员)。</li>
* <li>状态机(D5):active → transferred / revoked / ended;
* expires_at 届满由 {@code ServiceAssignmentPolicy} 惰性置 expired(无定时任务);
* 终态一律拒绝再转换。</li>
* <li>scope:primary(主责,同用户仅一条生效中,DB 部分唯一索引兜底)/
* collaborating(协同)。</li>
* </ul>
*/
@Data
@EqualsAndHashCode(callSuper = true)
@TableName("matchmaker_assignments")
public class MatchmakerAssignment extends BaseEntity {
/** 被服务用户 */
private String userId;
/** 持有服务对象的红娘(operators.id) */
private String matchmakerOperatorId;
/** 关联的服务单(可空:允许脱离服务单的用户级分配) */
private String serviceId;
/** 做出本次分配的操作者(operators.id) */
private String assignedBy;
/** 分配范围:primary / collaborating(与 V053 chk_mm_assignment_scope 白名单一致) */
private String assignmentScope;
/** 分配理由(必填) */
private String assignmentReason;
/** 状态:active/ended/revoked/transferred/expired(与 V053 chk_mm_assignment_status 白名单一致) */
private String status;
private Instant assignedAt;
/** 有效期届满时间;null 表示长期有效 */
private Instant expiresAt;
/** 终态时间(ended/revoked/transferred/expired 时落库) */
private Instant endedAt;
/** 终态理由(revoked/ended 必填;transferred 记录转分配理由;expired 为固定文案) */
private String endReason;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.mapper.BaseMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import org.apache.ibatis.annotations.Mapper;
import org.apache.ibatis.annotations.Param;
import org.apache.ibatis.annotations.Select;
import org.apache.ibatis.annotations.Update;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Optional;
/**
* 服务对象分配 Mapper(ZC-MM-002 / A1)
*
* <p>「生效中」的统一口径:status = 'active' 且(expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at &gt; NOW())。
* 惰性过期由 {@link #expireOverdue} 负责(读前触发,无定时任务),
* 这里的 expires 条件是双保险:即使惰性过期尚未执行,已届满的行也不会被当作生效中。
*/
@Mapper
public interface MatchmakerAssignmentMapper extends BaseMapper<MatchmakerAssignment> {
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_assignments WHERE id = #{id} AND deleted_at IS NULL LIMIT 1")
Optional<MatchmakerAssignment> findById(@Param("id") String id);
/** 某红娘名下全部生效中的分配(GET /my、GET /assignable 的工作台口径) */
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_assignments WHERE matchmaker_operator_id = #{operatorId} " +
"AND status = 'active' AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND deleted_at IS NULL ORDER BY assigned_at DESC")
List<MatchmakerAssignment> findActiveByOperator(@Param("operatorId") String operatorId);
/** 某红娘对某用户是否持有生效中的分配(数据范围判定核心查询) */
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_assignments WHERE matchmaker_operator_id = #{operatorId} " +
"AND user_id = #{userId} AND status = 'active' " +
"AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND deleted_at IS NULL ORDER BY assigned_at DESC LIMIT 1")
Optional<MatchmakerAssignment> findActiveByOperatorAndUser(@Param("operatorId") String operatorId,
@Param("userId") String userId);
/** 某用户当前生效中的主责分配(创建/转分配前的唯一性预检) */
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_assignments WHERE user_id = #{userId} " +
"AND status = 'active' AND assignment_scope = 'primary' " +
"AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND deleted_at IS NULL LIMIT 1")
Optional<MatchmakerAssignment> findActivePrimaryByUser(@Param("userId") String userId);
/** 某服务单上生效中的分配(服务单维度的归属判定) */
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_assignments WHERE service_id = #{serviceId} " +
"AND status = 'active' AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND deleted_at IS NULL ORDER BY assigned_at DESC LIMIT 1")
Optional<MatchmakerAssignment> findActiveByService(@Param("serviceId") String serviceId);
/** 某服务单的全部分配历史(追溯用) */
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_assignments WHERE service_id = #{serviceId} " +
"AND deleted_at IS NULL ORDER BY assigned_at DESC")
List<MatchmakerAssignment> findByService(@Param("serviceId") String serviceId);
/**
* 惰性过期:把 expires_at 已届满的 active 行置为 expired 并落库。
* 由 {@code ServiceAssignmentPolicy} 在读取路径前触发,无定时任务。
*
* @return 本次被置为 expired 的行数
*/
@Update("UPDATE matchmaker_assignments SET status = 'expired', " +
"ended_at = NOW(), end_reason = '有效期届满自动失效', updated_at = NOW() " +
"WHERE status = 'active' AND expires_at IS NOT NULL AND expires_at < NOW() " +
"AND deleted_at IS NULL")
int expireOverdue();
// ==================== ZC-MM-005 / E4:组长团队统计(纯脱敏计数) ====================
// 组织边界:organization_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM #{organizationId} ——
// NULL=NULL 平台直属规则在 SQL 层等价复用(有组织组长统计本组织;NULL 组长统计平台直属)。
/** 某组织范围内生效中的分配总数 */
@Select("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM matchmaker_assignments ma " +
"JOIN operators o ON o.id = ma.matchmaker_operator_id " +
"WHERE ma.status = 'active' AND (ma.expires_at IS NULL OR ma.expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND ma.deleted_at IS NULL AND o.deleted_at IS NULL " +
"AND o.organization_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM #{organizationId}")
long countActiveByOrganization(@Param("organizationId") String organizationId);
/** 某组织范围内各红娘的生效分配数(operatorId/name/activeCount;别名加引号保持驼峰键名) */
@Select("SELECT o.id AS \"operatorId\", o.name AS \"operatorName\", COUNT(*) AS \"activeCount\" " +
"FROM matchmaker_assignments ma " +
"JOIN operators o ON o.id = ma.matchmaker_operator_id " +
"WHERE ma.status = 'active' AND (ma.expires_at IS NULL OR ma.expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND ma.deleted_at IS NULL AND o.deleted_at IS NULL " +
"AND o.organization_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM #{organizationId} " +
"GROUP BY o.id, o.name ORDER BY \"activeCount\" DESC")
List<Map<String, Object>> countActiveGroupByOperator(@Param("organizationId") String organizationId);
/** 某组织范围内持有生效分配的红娘数(去重) */
@Select("SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT ma.matchmaker_operator_id) FROM matchmaker_assignments ma " +
"JOIN operators o ON o.id = ma.matchmaker_operator_id " +
"WHERE ma.status = 'active' AND (ma.expires_at IS NULL OR ma.expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND ma.deleted_at IS NULL AND o.deleted_at IS NULL " +
"AND o.organization_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM #{organizationId}")
long countActiveOperators(@Param("organizationId") String organizationId);
}
@@ -30,13 +30,19 @@ public interface MatchmakerRecommendationMapper extends BaseMapper<MatchmakerRec
int markViewed(@Param("id") String id);
/**
* Phase 13:某红娘名下服务的全部推荐(运营端列表用)。
* 通过 service_id 关联 matchmaker_services.assigned_operator_id 限定为本人名下,
* 避免运营端越权看到他人推荐。
* 某红娘推荐列表(运营端工作台用)。
*
* <p>ZC-MM-005 收口(P1-1):范围事实源由 matchmaker_services.assigned_operator_id
* 残留列切换为 matchmaker_assignments 生效中分配(active 且未过有效期)。
* 语义 = 「本人当前有效分配对象(user)名下服务单上的推荐」—— 分配 revoke/end 后
* 残留列不再构成可见凭据(DEC-002 规则7:撤销即失权)。
*/
@Select("SELECT r.* FROM matchmaker_recommendations r " +
"JOIN matchmaker_services s ON s.id = r.service_id " +
"WHERE s.assigned_operator_id = #{operatorId} AND s.deleted_at IS NULL " +
"JOIN matchmaker_services s ON s.id = r.service_id AND s.deleted_at IS NULL " +
"JOIN matchmaker_assignments a ON a.user_id = s.user_id " +
"AND a.matchmaker_operator_id = #{operatorId} " +
"AND a.status = 'active' AND (a.expires_at IS NULL OR a.expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND a.deleted_at IS NULL " +
"ORDER BY r.created_at DESC")
List<MatchmakerRecommendation> findByOperatorId(@Param("operatorId") String operatorId);
}
@@ -26,35 +26,51 @@ public interface MatchmakerServiceMapper extends BaseMapper<MatchmakerServiceRec
@Select("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM matchmaker_services WHERE status = 'submitted' AND deleted_at IS NULL")
long countSubmitted();
/** 某红娘进行中的服务数(工作台统计) */
@Select("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM matchmaker_services WHERE assigned_operator_id = #{operatorId} " +
"AND status = 'processing' AND deleted_at IS NULL")
/**
* 某红娘进行中的服务数(工作台统计)。
* ZC-MM-005 收口(P1-2):范围事实源由 assigned_operator_id 残留列切换为
* matchmaker_assignments 生效中分配(active 且未过有效期)——「本人名下进行中」
* = 本人 active 分配关联 user 的服务单中 status='in_service'。
* 分配 end/revoke 后,该用户的服务单不再计入本人(DEC-002 规则7:服务结束失去访问权)。
* 状态口径沿用 ZC-MM-002(D4)修正:'in_service'('processing' 不在 V009 白名单)。
*/
@Select("SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT s.id) FROM matchmaker_services s " +
"JOIN matchmaker_assignments a ON a.user_id = s.user_id " +
"AND a.matchmaker_operator_id = #{operatorId} " +
"AND a.status = 'active' AND (a.expires_at IS NULL OR a.expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND a.deleted_at IS NULL " +
"WHERE s.status = 'in_service' AND s.deleted_at IS NULL")
long countInProgressByOperator(@Param("operatorId") String operatorId);
/** 某红娘今天名下新流转的服务数(工作台「今日」本人口径,ZC-MM-005 收口 / P1-2:按生效分配 join) */
@Select("SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT s.id) FROM matchmaker_services s " +
"JOIN matchmaker_assignments a ON a.user_id = s.user_id " +
"AND a.matchmaker_operator_id = #{operatorId} " +
"AND a.status = 'active' AND (a.expires_at IS NULL OR a.expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND a.deleted_at IS NULL " +
"WHERE CAST(s.assigned_at AS DATE) = CURRENT_DATE AND s.deleted_at IS NULL")
long countTodayByOperator(@Param("operatorId") String operatorId);
/**
* 某红娘名下已完成的服务数(工作台「已完成」本人口径,ZC-MM-005 收口 / P1-2)。
* 口径说明(与 E1「服务结束失去访问权」一致):按当前生效分配统计 ——
* 分配 end/revoke 后,该用户的历史 completed 服务单<b>不再计入</b>本人完成数;
* 仅当分配仍生效时,其名下 completed 单才计入。
*/
@Select("SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT s.id) FROM matchmaker_services s " +
"JOIN matchmaker_assignments a ON a.user_id = s.user_id " +
"AND a.matchmaker_operator_id = #{operatorId} " +
"AND a.status = 'active' AND (a.expires_at IS NULL OR a.expires_at > NOW()) " +
"AND a.deleted_at IS NULL " +
"WHERE s.status = 'completed' AND s.deleted_at IS NULL")
long countCompletedByOperator(@Param("operatorId") String operatorId);
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_services WHERE user_id = #{userId} ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT #{limit}")
List<MatchmakerServiceRecord> findByUser(@Param("userId") String userId, @Param("limit") int limit);
/** 某红娘名下全部服务(含历史)—— 红娘工作台 */
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_services WHERE assigned_operator_id = #{operatorId} " +
"AND deleted_at IS NULL ORDER BY created_at DESC")
List<MatchmakerServiceRecord> findByOperatorId(@Param("operatorId") String operatorId);
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_services WHERE assigned_operator_id = #{operatorId} AND status IN ('submitted','assigned','processing') ORDER BY created_at DESC")
List<MatchmakerServiceRecord> findAssignedTo(@Param("operatorId") String operatorId);
/**
* Phase 13:查该红娘名下、且服务对象为该用户的进行中服务(转介授权校验用)。
* 转介必须挂在真实存在的服务关系上,否则等于任意红娘可代任意用户操作。
*/
@Select("SELECT * FROM matchmaker_services WHERE assigned_operator_id = #{operatorId} " +
"AND user_id = #{userId} AND status IN ('assigned','in_service','waiting_user','submitted') " +
"AND deleted_at IS NULL ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1")
Optional<MatchmakerServiceRecord> findActiveByOperatorAndUser(@Param("operatorId") String operatorId,
@Param("userId") String userId);
/**
* 注销前检查(P16 收尾 2e):该用户仍处于非终态的红娘服务数。
* 状态口径与 {@link #findActiveByOperatorAndUser} 一致(submitted/assigned/in_service/waiting_user)。
* 状态口径(submitted/assigned/in_service/waiting_user)。
* ⚠️ 勿用 {@code Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_PENDING} / {@code IN_PROGRESS} ——
* 这两个常量不在生产 chk_matchmaker_status 白名单(V009),该表永不出现这两个值。
*/
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.AuditLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerServiceRecord;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerAssignmentMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerServiceMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.DataScopeGuard;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import org.springframework.dao.DuplicateKeyException;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Service;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Objects;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;
/**
* 服务对象分配服务(ZC-MM-002 / A1,架构师设计 D5)。
*
* <p>状态机矩阵(status ∈ active/ended/revoked/transferred/expired):
* <pre>
* active → transferred(transfer:旧记录置 transferred + end_reason,同事务新建 active)
* active → revoked (撤销,end_reason 必填)
* active → ended (结束,end_reason 必填)
* 终态(ended/revoked/transferred/expired)一律拒绝再转换 → CONFLICT
* </pre>
*
* <p>权限模型(D2):
* <ul>
* <li>{@code matchmaker.assign}:平台授权人员,不限组织;</li>
* <li>{@code matchmaker.team.assign}:红娘组长,团队边界 = 同 organization_id。</li>
* </ul>
* 组织边界规则(技术默认,治理登记后续补充):
* <b>NULL=NULL 视为平台直属</b> —— 平台直属组长只能分配平台直属红娘;
* 有组织组长不能分配 org=NULL 红娘;org=NULL 普通红娘只能由 matchmaker.assign 持有者分配。
* 范围违规统一走 {@link DataScopeGuard#deny}(自动落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计,403)。
*
* <p>唯一性:同 user_id + primary scope 同时最多一条 active(DB 部分唯一索引兜底),
* 业务层预检 + 捕获 DuplicateKeyException 双保险,均映射 CONFLICT。
*/
@Slf4j
@Service
@RequiredArgsConstructor
public class MatchmakerAssignmentService {
private static final String RESOURCE_TYPE = "matchmaker_assignment";
private final MatchmakerAssignmentMapper assignmentMapper;
private final MatchmakerServiceMapper serviceMapper;
private final OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
private final DataScopeGuard dataScopeGuard;
private final AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
/** 读路径复用判定器(含惰性过期);Policy 不反向依赖本 Service,无环。 */
private final ServiceAssignmentPolicy serviceAssignmentPolicy;
/**
* 创建分配(primary)。含可选服务单联动:serviceId 非空时同事务把服务单置为 assigned。
*
* @param assignerOperatorId 当前操作者(分配人)
* @param hasGlobalAssign 操作者是否持有 matchmaker.assign(true=不限组织)
* @param userId 被服务用户
* @param matchmakerOperatorId 目标红娘
* @param serviceId 关联服务单(可空)
* @param reason 分配理由(必填)
* @param expiresAt 有效期(可空=长期)
*/
@Transactional
public MatchmakerAssignment create(String assignerOperatorId, boolean hasGlobalAssign,
String userId, String matchmakerOperatorId,
String serviceId, String reason, Instant expiresAt) {
requireReason(reason, "分配理由必填");
Operator target = requireActiveOperator(matchmakerOperatorId, "目标红娘不存在");
// create/assign 类无资源寻址端点维持 403(ZC-MM-006 / T04 口径)
assertAssignScope(assignerOperatorId, hasGlobalAssign, matchmakerOperatorId,
"组长只能分配同组织的红娘(NULL=NULL 平台直属)", matchmakerOperatorId, false);
assignmentMapper.findActivePrimaryByUser(userId).ifPresent(existing -> {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT,
"该用户已存在生效中的主责分配,请先转分配或撤销");
});
if (serviceId != null && !serviceId.isBlank()) {
linkServiceRow(serviceId, matchmakerOperatorId);
}
MatchmakerAssignment assignment = new MatchmakerAssignment();
assignment.setUserId(userId);
assignment.setMatchmakerOperatorId(matchmakerOperatorId);
assignment.setServiceId(serviceId);
assignment.setAssignedBy(assignerOperatorId);
assignment.setAssignmentScope(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_SCOPE_PRIMARY);
assignment.setAssignmentReason(reason);
assignment.setStatus(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE);
assignment.setAssignedAt(Instant.now());
assignment.setExpiresAt(expiresAt);
try {
assignmentMapper.insert(assignment);
} catch (DuplicateKeyException e) {
// 并发竞态兜底:uq_mm_assignment_active_primary 部分唯一索引拒绝第二条 active+primary
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT,
"该用户已存在生效中的主责分配(并发创建被唯一索引拒绝)");
}
log.info("服务对象分配创建: assignmentId={}, userId={}, matchmakerOperatorId={}, by={}",
assignment.getId(), userId, matchmakerOperatorId, assignerOperatorId);
saveAudit(assignerOperatorId, Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_CREATE, assignment.getId(),
auditSummary(matchmakerOperatorId, assignment.getAssignmentScope(), reason));
return assignment;
}
/**
* 转分配(active → transferred + 同事务新建 active)。
* 旧记录置 transferred + end_reason,新记录 assigned_by = 当前操作者。
*/
@Transactional
public MatchmakerAssignment transfer(String assignmentId, String assignerOperatorId,
boolean hasGlobalAssign, String newMatchmakerOperatorId,
String reason) {
requireReason(reason, "转分配理由必填");
MatchmakerAssignment old = requireAssignment(assignmentId);
assertActiveForTransition(old, "转分配");
// 防御纵深(QA P2-1):不仅新目标红娘要在操作者范围内,
// 被转记录的**原持有人**也必须在范围内(与 terminate 路径同口径;
// 否则 org=X 组长可把 org=Y 红娘持有的分配"顺手"转走)。
// ZC-MM-006 / T04:transfer 为资源寻址写端点,范围违规 404 化(防探测)。
assertAssignScope(assignerOperatorId, hasGlobalAssign, old.getMatchmakerOperatorId(),
"组长只能处置同组织红娘持有的分配(NULL=NULL 平台直属)", assignmentId, true);
requireActiveOperator(newMatchmakerOperatorId, "目标红娘不存在");
assertAssignScope(assignerOperatorId, hasGlobalAssign, newMatchmakerOperatorId,
"组长只能转分配给同组织的红娘(NULL=NULL 平台直属)", assignmentId, true);
// 1) 旧记录置 transferred
old.setStatus(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_TRANSFERRED);
old.setEndReason(reason);
old.setEndedAt(Instant.now());
assignmentMapper.updateById(old);
// 2) 同事务新建 active 分配
MatchmakerAssignment created = new MatchmakerAssignment();
created.setUserId(old.getUserId());
created.setMatchmakerOperatorId(newMatchmakerOperatorId);
created.setServiceId(old.getServiceId());
created.setAssignedBy(assignerOperatorId);
created.setAssignmentScope(old.getAssignmentScope());
created.setAssignmentReason(reason);
created.setStatus(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE);
created.setAssignedAt(Instant.now());
created.setExpiresAt(old.getExpiresAt());
try {
assignmentMapper.insert(created);
} catch (DuplicateKeyException e) {
// 事务内旧记录已非 active,正常不应触发;仍兜底映射 CONFLICT(整个事务回滚)
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT,
"该用户已存在生效中的主责分配(并发转分配被唯一索引拒绝)");
}
log.info("服务对象转分配: oldId={}, newId={}, fromUser={}, toOperator={}, by={}",
old.getId(), created.getId(), old.getUserId(), newMatchmakerOperatorId, assignerOperatorId);
saveAudit(assignerOperatorId, Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_TRANSFER, assignmentId,
auditSummary(newMatchmakerOperatorId, created.getAssignmentScope(), reason));
return created;
}
/** 撤销分配(active → revoked,end_reason 必填)。 */
@Transactional
public MatchmakerAssignment revoke(String assignmentId, String operatorId,
boolean hasGlobalAssign, String reason) {
return terminate(assignmentId, operatorId, hasGlobalAssign, reason,
Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_REVOKED, Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKE, "撤销");
}
/** 结束分配(active → ended,end_reason 必填)。 */
@Transactional
public MatchmakerAssignment end(String assignmentId, String operatorId,
boolean hasGlobalAssign, String reason) {
return terminate(assignmentId, operatorId, hasGlobalAssign, reason,
Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ENDED, Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_END, "结束");
}
/** 我(当前红娘)名下生效中的服务对象分配。读前惰性过期。 */
public List<MatchmakerAssignment> listMy(String operatorId) {
return serviceAssignmentPolicy.findActiveByOperator(operatorId);
}
/**
* 可分配红娘列表(创建分配弹窗数据源)。
* operators.status='active';组长按组织过滤、平台授权人员(matchmaker.assign)返回全部。
* 返回 id/name/organizationId,<b>不含联系方式</b>(字段级隐私,ZC-MM-005 范围)。
*/
public List<Map<String, Object>> listAssignableMatchmakers(String assignerOperatorId,
boolean hasGlobalAssign) {
String assignerOrg = null;
if (!hasGlobalAssign) {
Operator assigner = operatorMapper.findById(assignerOperatorId)
.orElseThrow(() -> new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "操作者不存在"));
assignerOrg = assigner.getOrganizationId();
}
String orgFilter = assignerOrg;
return operatorMapper.selectList(
new com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper<Operator>()
.eq(Operator::getStatus, "active")
.isNull(Operator::getDeletedAt))
.stream()
.filter(op -> hasGlobalAssign || Objects.equals(orgFilter, op.getOrganizationId()))
.map(op -> {
Map<String, Object> item = new HashMap<>();
item.put("id", op.getId());
item.put("name", op.getName());
item.put("organizationId", op.getOrganizationId());
return item;
})
.collect(Collectors.toList());
}
/**
* 组长团队统计(ZC-MM-005 / E4 新增):以组长本人 organization_id 为边界
* (NULL 组长统计平台直属,SQL 侧 IS NOT DISTINCT FROM 复用 NULL=NULL 规则)。
* 返回纯脱敏计数,不含任何用户身份或联系方式:
* <ul>
* <li>activeAssignmentCount —— 组织内生效中的分配总数;</li>
* <li>perMatchmakerCounts —— 各红娘的生效分配数(operatorId/name/activeCount);</li>
* <li>activeMatchmakerCount —— 持有生效分配的红娘数(去重)。</li>
* </ul>
*
* <p><b>字段脱敏决策(P2-4,对照《决策》§5.2 字段分类 + 功能权限矩阵)</b>:
* perMatchmakerCounts 中的 <b>operatorName(红娘姓名)保留、不做脱敏</b>。依据:
* <ol>
* <li>红娘姓名属于「本人/团队范围内的工作人员标识」,<b>不是用户 PII</b>
* (§5.2 隐私清单的禁放字段是 phone/wechat/idNumber 等用户敏感数据);</li>
* <li>组长统计本团队工作量属其管理职责(DEC-MATCHMAKER-002 红娘组长:
* 团队内进度与工作量管理),「查看脱敏服务统计:组长=团队范围」是既有授权口径;</li>
* <li>组长已可经 GET /assignable-matchmakers 拿到同批红娘姓名 —— 此字段
* 非新增泄露面,管理范围 ≠ 用户敏感数据。</li>
* </ol>
* 决策依据同时登记于 docs/governance/open-questions.md(OQ-MATCHMAKER-002),
* 避免后人误判"统计含姓名=越权"。
*/
public Map<String, Object> teamStatistics(String leaderOperatorId) {
Operator leader = operatorMapper.findById(leaderOperatorId)
.orElseThrow(() -> new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "操作者不存在"));
String orgId = leader.getOrganizationId();
Map<String, Object> result = new HashMap<>();
result.put("organizationId", orgId);
result.put("activeAssignmentCount", assignmentMapper.countActiveByOrganization(orgId));
result.put("perMatchmakerCounts", assignmentMapper.countActiveGroupByOperator(orgId));
result.put("activeMatchmakerCount", assignmentMapper.countActiveOperators(orgId));
return result;
}
// ==================== 内部实现 ====================
/** revoke / end 共用的终态迁移(仅允许 active → 终态)。 */
private MatchmakerAssignment terminate(String assignmentId, String operatorId,
boolean hasGlobalAssign, String reason,
String targetStatus, String auditAction,
String actionLabel) {
requireReason(reason, actionLabel + "理由必填");
MatchmakerAssignment assignment = requireAssignment(assignmentId);
assertActiveForTransition(assignment, actionLabel);
// 范围校验:操作者必须有权处置该红娘的分配(assign 不限组织 / team.assign 同组织)
// ZC-MM-006 / T04:revoke/end 为资源寻址写端点,范围违规 404 化(防探测)
assertAssignScope(operatorId, hasGlobalAssign, assignment.getMatchmakerOperatorId(),
"组长只能处置同组织红娘的分配(NULL=NULL 平台直属)", assignmentId, true);
assignment.setStatus(targetStatus);
assignment.setEndReason(reason);
assignment.setEndedAt(Instant.now());
assignmentMapper.updateById(assignment);
log.info("服务对象分配{}: assignmentId={}, operatorId={}, by={}",
actionLabel, assignmentId, assignment.getMatchmakerOperatorId(), operatorId);
saveAudit(operatorId, auditAction, assignmentId,
auditSummary(assignment.getMatchmakerOperatorId(), assignment.getAssignmentScope(), reason));
return assignment;
}
/**
* 组织范围判定(D2):hasGlobalAssign(matchmaker.assign)不限组织;
* team.assign 时校验操作者与目标红娘 organization_id 一致。
* <b>NULL=NULL 视为平台直属</b>:平台直属组长只能分配平台直属红娘;
* 有组织组长不能分配 org=NULL 红娘。违规统一先落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计。
*
* <p>拒绝口径(ZC-MM-006 / T04):
* <ul>
* <li>{@code notFoundOnDeny=false}(create/assign 类,无资源寻址)→ 403 AccessDeniedException;</li>
* <li>{@code notFoundOnDeny=true}(transfer/revoke/end,资源寻址写端点)→ 404 化
* {@link DataScopeGuard#denyAsNotFound}(响应与"资源不存在"逐字段一致,防探测)。</li>
* </ul>
*/
private void assertAssignScope(String assignerOperatorId, boolean hasGlobalAssign,
String targetOperatorId, String denyMessage,
String auditResourceId, boolean notFoundOnDeny) {
if (hasGlobalAssign) {
return; // 平台授权人员(matchmaker.assign),不限组织
}
Operator assigner = operatorMapper.findById(assignerOperatorId)
.orElseThrow(() -> new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "操作者不存在"));
Operator target = operatorMapper.findById(targetOperatorId)
.orElseThrow(() -> new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "目标红娘不存在"));
// Objects.equals 的 NULL=NULL → true 语义即「平台直属对平台直属」规则
if (Objects.equals(assigner.getOrganizationId(), target.getOrganizationId())) {
return;
}
if (notFoundOnDeny) {
dataScopeGuard.denyAsNotFound(assignerOperatorId, RESOURCE_TYPE, auditResourceId,
"服务不存在", null, null);
} else {
dataScopeGuard.deny(assignerOperatorId, RESOURCE_TYPE, auditResourceId, denyMessage);
}
}
/** 服务单联动(同事务):仅 submitted 状态允许关联分配并置为 assigned。 */
private void linkServiceRow(String serviceId, String matchmakerOperatorId) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord service = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
if (service == null) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "关联服务单不存在");
}
if (!Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_SUBMITTED.equals(service.getStatus())) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT, "服务单当前状态不允许关联分配");
}
service.setAssignedOperatorId(matchmakerOperatorId);
service.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_ASSIGNED);
service.setAssignedAt(Instant.now());
serviceMapper.updateById(service);
}
private MatchmakerAssignment requireAssignment(String assignmentId) {
return assignmentMapper.findById(assignmentId)
.orElseThrow(() -> new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "分配记录不存在"));
}
private Operator requireActiveOperator(String operatorId, String notFoundMessage) {
Operator operator = operatorMapper.findById(operatorId)
.orElseThrow(() -> new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, notFoundMessage));
if (!"active".equals(operator.getStatus())) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT, "目标红娘账号非 active 状态");
}
return operator;
}
/** 终态一律拒绝再转换(D5 状态机矩阵)。 */
private void assertActiveForTransition(MatchmakerAssignment assignment, String actionLabel) {
if (!Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE.equals(assignment.getStatus())) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT,
"分配已处于终态(" + assignment.getStatus() + "),不允许" + actionLabel);
}
}
private void requireReason(String reason, String message) {
if (reason == null || reason.isBlank()) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.VALIDATION_ERROR, message);
}
}
/** afterData 摘要:只记 operatorId/scope/reason(D5 审计口径,不落敏感数据)。 */
private String auditSummary(String matchmakerOperatorId, String scope, String reason) {
String summary = "matchmakerOperatorId=" + matchmakerOperatorId
+ ";scope=" + scope
+ ";reason=" + (reason == null ? "" : reason);
return summary.length() > 500 ? summary.substring(0, 500) : summary;
}
private void saveAudit(String operatorId, String action, String resourceId, String afterData) {
AuditLog auditLog = new AuditLog();
auditLog.setOperatorId(operatorId);
auditLog.setAction(action);
auditLog.setResourceType(RESOURCE_TYPE);
auditLog.setResourceId(resourceId);
auditLog.setAfterData(afterData);
auditLogMapper.insert(auditLog);
}
}
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.AuditLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.SensitiveAccessLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.SensitiveAccessLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.dto.MatchmakerRecommendationDTO;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerFollowup;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerRecommendation;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerServiceRecord;
@@ -11,7 +13,9 @@ import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerFollowupMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerRecommendationMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerServiceMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.notification.service.NotificationService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.profile.entity.UserPrivacySettings;
import com.danyang.match.platform.profile.entity.UserProfile;
import com.danyang.match.platform.profile.mapper.UserPrivacySettingsMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.profile.mapper.UserProfileMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
@@ -27,6 +31,31 @@ import java.util.stream.Collectors;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException;
/**
* 红娘服务服务层。
*
* <p>ZC-MM-002(A1)变更说明:
* <ul>
* <li>claimService(红娘接单)已删除(D3:不保留组长认领),服务对象归属统一由
* matchmaker_assignments 建模;</li>
* <li>写接口(recommend/followup/complete)归属判定切换到
* {@link ServiceAssignmentPolicy}(D4),拒绝统一走 DataScopeGuard(审计 + 403);
* 存量兼容:assignment 表上线前的服务单仍按 assigned_operator_id 判定(005 阶段收敛);</li>
* <li>assignService 同事务联动「创建分配 + 服务单置 assigned」。</li>
* </ul>
*
* <p>ZC-MM-005(E1 双轨切纯判定器)变更说明:
* <ul>
* <li><b>删除 assigned_operator_id 回退分支</b>:002 的 "assignment 优先 +
* assigned_operator_id 回退" 有真漏洞 —— 分配 revoke/end 后服务单残留
* assigned_operator_id,回退分支会放行已失去访问权的红娘(违反 DEC-002 规则7)。
* V053 已回填全部存量进行中服务单,数据一致性已建立;终态服务单不回填是有意设计
* (服务结束即失去访问权)。{@link ServiceAssignmentPolicy} 成为唯一事实源;</li>
* <li>读详情(getServiceDetail)改用 E2 防探测 404:非持有人响应与"不存在"逐字段一致,
* 删除 viewerIsOwner 双态与"非负责人脱敏详情"整段;</li>
* <li>行为变化:红娘读自己历史 completed 服务单详情将 404(符合 DEC-002 决策)。</li>
* </ul>
*/
@Service
@RequiredArgsConstructor
public class MatchmakerServiceService {
@@ -37,8 +66,12 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
private final MatchmakerRecommendationMapper recommendationMapper;
private final MatchmakerFollowupMapper followupMapper;
private final UserProfileMapper userProfileMapper;
private final UserPrivacySettingsMapper userPrivacySettingsMapper;
private final NotificationService notificationService;
private final AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
private final SensitiveAccessLogMapper sensitiveAccessLogMapper;
private final ServiceAssignmentPolicy serviceAssignmentPolicy;
private final MatchmakerAssignmentService matchmakerAssignmentService;
/**
* 用户申请红娘服务
@@ -82,43 +115,46 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
}
/**
* 分配服务给红娘
* 分配服务给红娘(ZC-MM-002 / D4 联动版)。
*
* <p>同事务完成:① 创建 matchmaker_assignments 主责分配(含组织范围校验、
* 唯一性约束、CREATE 审计,由 {@link MatchmakerAssignmentService#create} 承担);
* ② 服务单 submitted → assigned、写回 assigned_operator_id。
* 任何一步失败整体回滚。
*
* @param serviceId 服务单 ID
* @param assignerOperatorId 当前操作者(分配人,principal)
* @param targetOperatorId 目标红娘
* @param reason 分配理由(默认文案由 Controller 传入)
*/
@Transactional
public MatchmakerServiceRecord assignService(String serviceId, String operatorId, String organizationId) {
public MatchmakerServiceRecord assignService(String serviceId, String assignerOperatorId,
String targetOperatorId, String reason) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord service = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
if (service == null) throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在");
if (!Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_SUBMITTED.equals(service.getStatus())) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT, "当前状态不允许分配");
}
service.setAssignedOperatorId(operatorId);
service.setOrganizationId(organizationId);
service.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_ASSIGNED);
service.setAssignedAt(Instant.now());
serviceMapper.updateById(service);
log.info("分配红娘服务: serviceId={}, operatorId={}", serviceId, operatorId);
saveAuditLog(operatorId, "MATCHMAKER_ASSIGN", "matchmaker_service", serviceId, null, null);
return service;
}
/**
* 红娘接单
*/
@Transactional
public MatchmakerServiceRecord claimService(String operatorId, String serviceId) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord service = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
if (service == null) throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在");
if (!Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_ASSIGNED.equals(service.getStatus())) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT, "当前状态不允许接单");
if (targetOperatorId == null || targetOperatorId.isBlank()) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.VALIDATION_ERROR, "目标红娘必填");
}
service.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_IN_SERVICE);
serviceMapper.updateById(service);
// ① 创建分配(matchmaker.assign 入口为平台授权,hasGlobalAssign=true)
MatchmakerAssignment createdAssignment = matchmakerAssignmentService.create(assignerOperatorId, true,
service.getUserId(), targetOperatorId, serviceId, reason, null);
log.info("红娘接单: operatorId={}, serviceId={}", operatorId, serviceId);
return service;
// ② 服务单联动(create 内已对 submitted 服务单置 assigned;此处再校验一次确保联动生效)
MatchmakerServiceRecord after = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
if (!Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_ASSIGNED.equals(after.getStatus())) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT, "服务单分配联动失败");
}
log.info("分配红娘服务: serviceId={}, targetOperatorId={}, by={}",
serviceId, targetOperatorId, assignerOperatorId);
// ZC-MM-006 / T01:审计补 purpose_code + service_assignment_id
saveAuditLog(assignerOperatorId, "MATCHMAKER_ASSIGN", "matchmaker_service", serviceId, null, null,
"matchmaker.service.assign", createdAssignment.getId());
return after;
}
/**
@@ -132,10 +168,10 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
/**
* 红娘推荐候选人给用户
*
* Phase 13 复验修复(D3):补 assigned_operator 归属校验。
* 此前只校验 service 存在,任何持 matchmaker.service 权限的 operator
* 都能对**任意** serviceId 创建推荐(越权)。与
* MatchmakerService.createRecommendation:118-121 的校验保持同一口径。
* Phase 13 复验修复(D3):补归属校验。
* ZC-MM-002(D4):归属判定切换到 {@link ServiceAssignmentPolicy}(matchmaker_assignments
* 是服务对象归属的唯一事实源,无任何 assigned_operator_id 回退);拒绝统一走
* DataScopeGuard(DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计 + 403),不再抛裸 IllegalStateException。
*
* AGENTS.md #5:红娘只创建 pending_view 推荐记录,不替用户 Like。
*/
@@ -145,10 +181,8 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
MatchmakerServiceRecord service = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
if (service == null) throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在");
// Phase 13 D3:归属校验 —— 只有该服务的负责人才能推荐
if (!operatorId.equals(service.getAssignedOperatorId())) {
throw new IllegalStateException("您不是此服务的负责人");
}
// D4:归属校验 —— 只有该服务对象的负责人(分配持有人)才能推荐
MatchmakerAssignment assignment = assertServiceAccess(operatorId, service);
// 不能推荐给自己(服务申请人)
if (service.getUserId() != null && service.getUserId().equals(targetUserId)) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("不能推荐用户给自己");
@@ -171,7 +205,9 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
"matchmaker_recommendation", rec.getId().toString());
log.info("红娘推荐: serviceId={}, operatorId={}, targetUserId={}", serviceId, operatorId, targetUserId);
saveAuditLog(operatorId, "MATCHMAKER_RECOMMEND", "matchmaker_service", serviceId, null, null);
// ZC-MM-006 / T01:审计补 purpose_code + service_assignment_id
saveAuditLog(operatorId, "MATCHMAKER_RECOMMEND", "matchmaker_service", serviceId, null, null,
"matchmaker.service.recommend", assignment != null ? assignment.getId() : null);
Map<String, Object> result = new HashMap<>();
result.put("recommendationId", rec.getId());
@@ -182,11 +218,18 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
/**
* 红娘添加跟进记录
*
* ZC-MM-002(D4):补归属校验(此前无任何校验,任何持 matchmaker.service 权限的
* operator 可对任意 serviceId 写跟进 → 越权写)。判定口径同 recommendPartner。
*/
@Transactional
public MatchmakerFollowup addFollowup(String serviceId, String operatorId,
String followupType, String content,
String nextFollowupAt) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord service = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
if (service == null) throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在");
MatchmakerAssignment followupAssignment = assertServiceAccess(operatorId, service);
MatchmakerFollowup followup = new MatchmakerFollowup();
followup.setServiceId(serviceId);
followup.setOperatorId(operatorId);
@@ -198,17 +241,23 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
followupMapper.insert(followup);
log.info("红娘跟进: serviceId={}, operatorId={}, type={}", serviceId, operatorId, followupType);
saveAuditLog(operatorId, "MATCHMAKER_FOLLOWUP", "matchmaker_service", serviceId, null, null);
// ZC-MM-006 / T01:审计补 purpose_code + service_assignment_id
saveAuditLog(operatorId, "MATCHMAKER_FOLLOWUP", "matchmaker_service", serviceId, null, null,
"matchmaker.service.followup", followupAssignment != null ? followupAssignment.getId() : null);
return followup;
}
/**
* 完成服务
*
* ZC-MM-002(D4):补归属校验(判定口径同 recommendPartner);
* operatorId 由 Controller 传入 principal,不信任请求参数。
*/
@Transactional
public MatchmakerServiceRecord completeService(String serviceId) {
public MatchmakerServiceRecord completeService(String serviceId, String operatorId) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord service = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
if (service == null) throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在");
MatchmakerAssignment completeAssignment = assertServiceAccess(operatorId, service);
if (!Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_IN_SERVICE.equals(service.getStatus()) &&
!Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_WAITING_USER.equals(service.getStatus())) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT, "当前状态不能完成");
@@ -219,7 +268,9 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
serviceMapper.updateById(service);
log.info("红娘服务完成: serviceId={}", serviceId);
saveAuditLog(null, "MATCHMAKER_COMPLETE", "matchmaker_service", serviceId, null, null);
// ZC-MM-006 / T01:审计补 purpose_code + service_assignment_id
saveAuditLog(null, "MATCHMAKER_COMPLETE", "matchmaker_service", serviceId, null, null,
"matchmaker.service.complete", completeAssignment != null ? completeAssignment.getId() : null);
return service;
}
@@ -257,6 +308,24 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
.collect(java.util.stream.Collectors.toList());
}
/**
* 获取红娘工作台数据。
*
* ZC-MM-002(D4):today / completed 改为本人口径(该红娘名下的服务),
* pendingCount 保留全局口径(待分配队列是分配权持有者的全局视图);
* inProgress 统计的状态口径由错误的 'processing' 修正为 'in_service'
* ('processing' 不在 V009 chk_matchmaker_status 白名单,恒为 0)。
*
* <p>ZC-MM-005 收口(P1-2):inProgress / today / completed 三项计数统一切换为
* <b>matchmaker_assignments 生效中分配</b>口径(SQL 侧 join assignments,见
* MatchmakerServiceMapper 计数查询)。口径说明:
* <ul>
* <li>三项均只统计「本人当前生效分配对象名下」的服务单;</li>
* <li>分配 end / revoke 后(含他人接手后原红娘),该用户的服务单
* <b>不再计入</b>原红娘的 dashboard 计数(DEC-002 规则7:服务结束失去访问权);</li>
* <li>completed 计数同理:历史 completed 单仅在分配仍生效时计入本人。</li>
* </ul>
*/
public Map<String, Object> getDashboard(String operatorId) {
long pendingCount = serviceMapper.countSubmitted();
long inProgressCount = serviceMapper.countInProgressByOperator(operatorId);
@@ -264,57 +333,69 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
Map<String, Object> dashboard = new HashMap<>();
dashboard.put("pendingCount", pendingCount);
dashboard.put("inProgressCount", inProgressCount);
long todayCount = serviceMapper.selectCount(
new LambdaQueryWrapper<MatchmakerServiceRecord>()
.eq(MatchmakerServiceRecord::getStatus, "submitted"));
// 本人口径:今天新流转到该红娘名下(按 assigned_at)的服务数
long todayCount = serviceMapper.countTodayByOperator(operatorId);
dashboard.put("todayCount", todayCount);
long completedCount = serviceMapper.selectCount(
new LambdaQueryWrapper<MatchmakerServiceRecord>()
.eq(MatchmakerServiceRecord::getStatus, "completed"));
// 本人口径:该红娘名下已完成的服务数
long completedCount = serviceMapper.countCompletedByOperator(operatorId);
dashboard.put("completedCount", completedCount);
return dashboard;
}
/**
* 获取我的服务列表(红娘工作台)
*/
public List<MatchmakerServiceRecord> getOperatorServices(String operatorId) {
return serviceMapper.findByOperatorId(operatorId);
}
/**
* 获取服务详情
* 获取服务详情(ZC-MM-005 / E1+E2 重构)。
*
* Phase 13 复验修复(D4):改为按调用者授权范围返回。
* 此前无任何归属校验,任何持 matchmaker.view 的 operator 都能读取
* **任意** serviceId 的详情,其中包含该用户的完整资料
* (displayName/gender/age/regionName/education/occupation/maritalStatus)→ 越权读。
* <p>此前(002 双轨)语义:负责人 → 完整详情;其他 operator → 脱敏详情(含 viewerIsOwner
* 双态)。该设计有两个问题:① assigned_operator_id 回退分支在分配 revoke/end 后仍放行
* (服务单残留该列);② 脱敏详情响应可被用于按 serviceId 枚举探测资源存在性。
*
* 现语义:
* - 服务负责人(assigned_operator_id)→ 返回完整详情(含 userProfile + followups)
* - 其他 operator(如仅需了解队列的中台人员)→ 返回脱敏详情
* (不含 userProfile;followups 正文也不返回,仅给条数)
* <p>现语义(判定器唯一事实源,无回退):
* <ul>
* <li>查无此 serviceId → 抛 BusinessException(NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在");</li>
* <li>非持有人(无生效中的分配)→ {@link ServiceAssignmentPolicy}
* #assertActiveAssignmentOrNotFound:先落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计,
* 再抛与"查无"完全相同的 NOT_FOUND 异常 —— 两种失败响应逐字段一致,防探测;</li>
* <li>持有人 → 完整详情(申请人 userId / 诉求描述 / 白名单 userProfile / 跟进正文 /
* 推荐列表),不再有 viewerIsOwner 双态字段。</li>
* </ul>
*
* @param serviceId 服务 ID
* <p>行为变化:红娘读自己历史 completed 服务单详情将 404(分配已终态,符合 DEC-002)。
*
* @param serviceId 服务 ID
* @param requesterId 调用者 operator ID
*/
public Map<String, Object> getServiceDetail(String serviceId, String requesterId) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord service = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
if (service == null) return null;
if (service == null) {
// 与"非持有人"路径抛出完全相同的异常 → 响应体逐字段一致(防探测,E2)
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在");
}
boolean isOwner = requesterId != null && requesterId.equals(service.getAssignedOperatorId());
// E1:判定器唯一事实源;E2:非持有人防探测 404(先审计后 NOT_FOUND)
serviceAssignmentPolicy.assertActiveAssignmentOrNotFound(
requesterId, service.getUserId(), "matchmaker_service", serviceId);
// ZC-MM-006 / T03:持有人读取服务对象详情 = 敏感数据访问,必须落 sensitive_access_logs
// (AGENTS.md #8:查看动作本身必须可溯源)。拒绝路径走判定器的 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计,
// 双记录互斥 —— 非持有人不会走到本行(不重复写 SensitiveAccessLog)。
SensitiveAccessLog accessLog = new SensitiveAccessLog();
accessLog.setOperatorId(requesterId);
accessLog.setUserId(service.getUserId());
accessLog.setDataType(Constants.SENSITIVE_DATA_TYPE_MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_DETAIL);
accessLog.setReason(Constants.SENSITIVE_ACCESS_REASON_MATCHMAKER_DETAIL);
accessLog.setAccessTarget(serviceId);
accessLog.setAccessResult(Constants.SENSITIVE_ACCESS_RESULT_SUCCESS);
sensitiveAccessLogMapper.insert(accessLog);
Map<String, Object> detail = new HashMap<>();
detail.put("serviceId", service.getId());
detail.put("serviceType", service.getServiceType());
detail.put("status", service.getStatus());
detail.put("assignedOperatorId", service.getAssignedOperatorId());
detail.put("createdAt", service.getCreatedAt());
detail.put("assignedAt", service.getAssignedAt());
detail.put("completedAt", service.getCompletedAt());
detail.put("viewerIsOwner", isOwner);
// 加载推荐列表(推荐是服务进展的必要摘要,两者都可见)
// 推荐列表(服务进展摘要)
List<MatchmakerRecommendation> recs = recommendationMapper.findByService(serviceId);
detail.put("recommendations", recs.stream().map(r -> {
Map<String, Object> map = new HashMap<>();
@@ -326,35 +407,78 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
return map;
}).collect(Collectors.toList()));
if (isOwner) {
// 仅服务负责人可见:申请人 userId / 诉求描述 / 用户资料 / 跟进正文
detail.put("userId", service.getUserId());
detail.put("description", service.getDescription());
userProfileMapper.findByUserId(service.getUserId()).ifPresent(profile -> {
Map<String, Object> userProfile = new HashMap<>();
userProfile.put("displayName", profile.getDisplayName());
userProfile.put("gender", profile.getGender());
userProfile.put("age", calculateAge(profile.getBirthDate()));
userProfile.put("regionName", profile.getRegionName());
userProfile.put("educationCode", profile.getEducationCode());
userProfile.put("occupationCode", profile.getOccupationCode());
userProfile.put("maritalStatus", profile.getMaritalStatus());
detail.put("userProfile", userProfile);
});
detail.put("followups", followupMapper.findByServiceId(serviceId));
} else {
// 非负责人:只给跟进条数作为进度摘要,不返回正文
detail.put("followupCount", followupMapper.findByServiceId(serviceId).size());
}
// 仅持有人可见:申请人 userId / 诉求描述 / 白名单用户资料 / 跟进正文
detail.put("userId", service.getUserId());
detail.put("description", service.getDescription());
UserPrivacySettings privacy = userPrivacySettingsMapper.findByUserId(service.getUserId())
.orElse(null);
userProfileMapper.findByUserId(service.getUserId()).ifPresent(profile ->
detail.put("userProfile", assembleMatchmakerUserProfile(profile, privacy)));
detail.put("followups", followupMapper.findByServiceId(serviceId));
return detail;
}
/**
* 红娘侧用户资料装配(ZC-MM-005 / E3 字段白名单显式化)。
*
* <p>逐字段对照《安全、隐私、合规与风控体系设计》§5.2 字段级隐私清单:
* <ul>
* <li>displayName —— 基础展示字段,允许</li>
* <li>gender —— 基础展示字段,允许</li>
* <li>age —— 由 birthDate 计算的派生值(<b>不输出原始 birthDate</b>)</li>
* <li>regionName —— 地区展示名(非精确坐标),允许</li>
* <li>educationCode —— 枚举码,允许</li>
* <li>occupationCode —— 枚举码,<b>受隐私开关 showOccupation 控制</b>:
* 用户明确关闭(false)时不输出;隐私记录缺失或开关未设置(null)按缺省放行</li>
* <li>maritalStatus —— 枚举码,允许</li>
* </ul>
* §5.2 禁放字段(phone/mobile/wechat/idNumber/birthDate/address/id_card 等)
* 一律不进入装配;守卫见 MatchmakerFieldPrivacyGuardTest(源码级白名单扫描)。
*
* @param profile 用户资料(可空字段自然输出 null,由前端按缺失处理)
* @param privacy 用户隐私设置;null 表示用户未设置过(缺省=全放行)
*/
private Map<String, Object> assembleMatchmakerUserProfile(UserProfile profile,
UserPrivacySettings privacy) {
// 缺省=全放行:仅在用户显式关闭(showOccupation == false)时隐藏职业
boolean showOccupation = privacy == null || !Boolean.FALSE.equals(privacy.getShowOccupation());
Map<String, Object> userProfile = new HashMap<>();
userProfile.put("displayName", profile.getDisplayName());
userProfile.put("gender", profile.getGender());
// 派生年龄:不输出原始 birthDate(§5.2 禁放)
userProfile.put("age", calculateAge(profile.getBirthDate()));
userProfile.put("regionName", profile.getRegionName());
userProfile.put("educationCode", profile.getEducationCode());
if (showOccupation) {
userProfile.put("occupationCode", profile.getOccupationCode());
}
userProfile.put("maritalStatus", profile.getMaritalStatus());
return userProfile;
}
private int calculateAge(java.time.LocalDate birthDate) {
if (birthDate == null) return 0;
return java.time.Period.between(birthDate, java.time.LocalDate.now()).getYears();
}
/**
* 服务归属校验(ZC-MM-005 / E1 纯判定器版;ZC-MM-006 / T04 写接口 404 化)。
*
* <p><b>无任何回退</b>:matchmaker_assignments 是服务对象归属的唯一事实源。
* 002 的 assigned_operator_id 回退分支已删除 —— 分配 revoke/end 后服务单残留的
* assigned_operator_id 不再构成访问凭据(DEC-002 规则7:撤销即失权)。
* 写接口(recommend/followup/complete,资源寻址端点)口径:判定无效 →
* {@link ServiceAssignmentPolicy#assertActiveAssignmentOrNotFound}:
* 先落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计,再抛 404「服务不存在」—— 与读详情口径逐字段一致,防探测。
*
* @return 生效中的分配记录(供审计写入 service_assignment_id;deny 必然抛出,不会返回 null)
*/
private MatchmakerAssignment assertServiceAccess(String operatorId, MatchmakerServiceRecord service) {
return serviceAssignmentPolicy.assertActiveAssignmentOrNotFound(operatorId, service.getUserId(),
"matchmaker_service", service.getId());
}
/**
* 获取红娘为该用户推荐的人员列表
@@ -394,11 +518,25 @@ public class MatchmakerServiceService {
private void saveAuditLog(String operatorId, String action, String resourceType,
String resourceId, String beforeData, String afterData) {
// ZC-MM-006 / T01 兼容性:缺省调用(不带 purposeCode/assignmentId)仍可写(负向用例覆盖)
saveAuditLog(operatorId, action, resourceType, resourceId, beforeData, afterData, null, null);
}
/**
* ZC-MM-006 / T01 扩展版审计写入:附加 purpose_code 与 service_assignment_id。
*/
private void saveAuditLog(String operatorId, String action, String resourceType,
String resourceId, String beforeData, String afterData,
String purposeCode, String serviceAssignmentId) {
AuditLog auditLog = new AuditLog();
auditLog.setOperatorId(operatorId);
auditLog.setAction(action);
auditLog.setResourceType(resourceType);
auditLog.setResourceId(resourceId);
auditLog.setBeforeData(beforeData);
auditLog.setAfterData(afterData);
auditLog.setPurposeCode(purposeCode);
auditLog.setServiceAssignmentId(serviceAssignmentId);
auditLogMapper.insert(auditLog);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerAssignmentMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.DataScopeGuard;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Component;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Optional;
/**
* 服务对象分配判定器(ZC-MM-002 / A1,架构师设计 D6;ZC-MM-005 / E1-E2 增强)。
*
* <p>红娘对某个用户能否读/写,唯一事实源是 matchmaker_assignments 里
* 「生效中的分配」(active 且未过有效期)。所有读路径前先 {@link #expireOverdue}
* 惰性过期(无定时任务,D5 决策),保证过期分配立即失效。
*
* <p>判定无效时的两种处置:
* <ul>
* <li>{@link #assertActiveAssignment}:写接口口径 —— 落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计 +
* 抛 AccessDeniedException(403);</li>
* <li>{@link #assertActiveAssignmentOrNotFound}(ZC-MM-005 / E2):读详情口径 ——
* 先落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计(语义上仍是 403 越权),再抛
* BusinessException(NOT_FOUND)(响应 404,与"资源不存在"逐字段一致),
* 防止枚举 serviceId 探测资源存在性。</li>
* </ul>
*/
@Slf4j
@Component
@RequiredArgsConstructor
public class ServiceAssignmentPolicy {
private final MatchmakerAssignmentMapper assignmentMapper;
private final DataScopeGuard dataScopeGuard;
/**
* 惰性过期:把 expires_at 已届满的 active 分配置为 expired 并落库。
* 读路径入口统一调用;无定时任务(D5 决策)。
*/
public int expireOverdue() {
return assignmentMapper.expireOverdue();
}
/** 查询某红娘对某用户的生效中分配;不存在返回 empty。 */
public Optional<MatchmakerAssignment> findActiveAssignment(String operatorId, String userId) {
expireOverdue();
return assignmentMapper.findActiveByOperatorAndUser(operatorId, userId);
}
/** 某红娘当前是否可访问某用户(存在生效中的分配)。 */
public boolean canAccessUser(String operatorId, String userId) {
return findActiveAssignment(operatorId, userId).isPresent();
}
/**
* 断言某红娘对某用户持有生效中的分配;无效时:
* 落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计 + 抛 AccessDeniedException(403)。
*
* @param resourceType 审计 resourceType(如 matchmaker_service / matchmaker_user)
* @return 生效中的分配记录(永不返回 null)
*/
public MatchmakerAssignment assertActiveAssignment(String operatorId, String userId,
String resourceType) {
Optional<MatchmakerAssignment> found = findActiveAssignment(operatorId, userId);
if (found.isPresent()) {
return found.get();
}
dataScopeGuard.deny(operatorId, resourceType, userId,
"未持有该服务对象的分配关系,禁止访问");
return null; // deny 必然抛出,此行不可达
}
/**
* 读详情口径的断言(ZC-MM-005 / E2 防探测 404)。
*
* <p>无效时先写 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计(字段口径与 {@link DataScopeGuard#deny} 对齐,
* 语义上这是一次越权尝试),再抛 {@code BusinessException(NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在")}。
* 全局异常处理器将其映射为 404 响应体 {@code {success:false, code:NOT_FOUND,
* message:"服务不存在"}} —— 与查询一个真正不存在的 serviceId 的响应逐字段一致,
* 调用方无法区分"无权"与"不存在",杜绝按 serviceId 枚举探测。
*
* <p>适用面(ZC-MM-006 / T04 扩展):读详情 + <b>带资源寻址的写端点</b>
* (recommend / followup / complete / 转介)范围校验失败统一 404 化(防探测);
* create / assign 类无资源寻址端点维持 {@link #assertActiveAssignment} 的 403 口径。
*
* @param resourceType 审计 resourceType(如 matchmaker_service)
* @param resourceId 审计 resourceId(被探测的 serviceId)
* @return 生效中的分配记录(永不返回 null)
*/
public MatchmakerAssignment assertActiveAssignmentOrNotFound(String operatorId, String userId,
String resourceType,
String resourceId) {
Optional<MatchmakerAssignment> found = findActiveAssignment(operatorId, userId);
if (found.isPresent()) {
return found.get();
}
// ZC-MM-006 / T04:防探测 404 化 deny —— 审计与 404 抛出统一收敛到
// {@link DataScopeGuard#denyAsNotFound}(审计含权限快照 + 请求追踪 ID)。
// 该方法同时服务读详情与(本阶段起)写接口范围校验,拒绝口径全程一致。
dataScopeGuard.denyAsNotFound(operatorId, resourceType, resourceId, "服务不存在", null, null);
return null; // denyAsNotFound 必然抛出,此行不可达
}
/** 某红娘名下全部生效中的分配(GET /my 口径),读前惰性过期。 */
public List<MatchmakerAssignment> findActiveByOperator(String operatorId) {
expireOverdue();
return assignmentMapper.findActiveByOperator(operatorId);
}
}
@@ -208,7 +208,9 @@ public class PhotoService {
if (!amazonS3.doesObjectExist(privateBucket, fileKey)) {
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.BAD_REQUEST, "文件尚未上传完成");
}
int sortOrder = photoMapper.countActiveProfilePhotos(userId) + 1;
// countActiveProfilePhotos 返回 long,落库排序用 int(与 savePhoto 形参一致);
// 照片数量不会触及 int 上界,此处安全窄化。
int sortOrder = (int) (photoMapper.countActiveProfilePhotos(userId) + 1);
return savePhoto(userId, fileKey, photoType, sortOrder);
}
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ public class ReferralService {
private final ActivityRegistrationMapper activityRegistrationMapper;
private final OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
private final NotificationService notificationService;
private final com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerServiceMapper matchmakerServiceMapper;
private final com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.ServiceAssignmentPolicy serviceAssignmentPolicy;
/**
* Phase 13 复验修复(D5):转介必须挂在「该红娘名下、服务对象为该用户」的真实服务关系上。
@@ -39,16 +39,24 @@ public class ReferralService {
* 任何持 matchmaker.service 权限的 operator 可把**任意用户**转介到任意活动/服务站,
* 并顺带为该用户创建一条 activity_registration / service_appointment(越权代操作)。
*
* 修复后:先断言存在进行中的 matchmaker_service(assigned_operator_id=红娘, user_id=目标用户),
* 否则拒绝。这样工作人员只能在真实的红娘服务关系内转介。
* 修复后:先断言存在生效中的分配关系,否则拒绝。这样工作人员只能在真实的红娘服务关系内转介。
*
* <p>ZC-MM-005 收口(P1-3):授权事实源切换为
* {@link com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.ServiceAssignmentPolicy}
* 判定器 —— 与写接口 recommend / followup 同口径(matchmaker_assignments 生效中分配)。
* 分配 revoke / end 后残留列不再构成转介凭据(DEC-002 规则7:撤销即失权)。
*
* <p>ZC-MM-006 / T04(写接口 404 统一·防探测):转介为资源寻址写端点,拒绝路径
* 404 化 {@code denyAsNotFound}(先 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计,再抛 404「服务不存在」,
* 与读详情口径逐字段一致);并消灭裸 IllegalArgumentException ——
* 缺失目标用户也统一映射为同一 404 响应,不泄露"目标是否存在"的任何信号。
*/
private void assertMatchmakerServesUser(String matchmakerId, String userId) {
if (userId == null || userId.isBlank()) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("缺少转介目标用户");
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在");
}
matchmakerServiceMapper.findActiveByOperatorAndUser(matchmakerId, userId)
.orElseThrow(() -> new IllegalStateException(
"您不是该用户的服务负责人,无法发起转介"));
serviceAssignmentPolicy.assertActiveAssignmentOrNotFound(matchmakerId, userId,
"matchmaker_referral", userId);
}
@Transactional
@@ -95,9 +95,9 @@ public class ReviewController {
public ApiResponse<ReviewResultDTO> approve(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String taskId,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
@RequestBody Map<String, Object> body) {
String operatorId = principal.id();
String comment = body.getOrDefault("comment", "");
String comment = (String) body.getOrDefault("comment", "");
return ApiResponse.ok(reviewService.approve(taskId, operatorId, comment));
}
@@ -140,8 +140,8 @@ public class ReviewController {
public ApiResponse<ReviewResultDTO> needEvidence(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String taskId,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
return ApiResponse.ok(reviewService.needEvidence(taskId, principal.id(), body.get("comment")));
@RequestBody Map<String, Object> body) {
return ApiResponse.ok(reviewService.needEvidence(taskId, principal.id(), (String) body.get("comment")));
}
@PostMapping("/{taskId}/approve-local-eligibility")
@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ public class ReviewController {
public ApiResponse<ReviewResultDTO> approveLocalEligibility(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String taskId,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
return ApiResponse.ok(reviewService.approveLocalEligibility(taskId, principal.id(), body.get("comment")));
@RequestBody Map<String, Object> body) {
return ApiResponse.ok(reviewService.approveLocalEligibility(taskId, principal.id(), (String) body.get("comment")));
}
@PostMapping("/{taskId}/reject-local-eligibility")
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ public class ReviewController {
public ApiResponse<ReviewResultDTO> rejectLocalEligibility(
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String taskId,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
return ApiResponse.ok(reviewService.rejectLocalEligibility(taskId, principal.id(), body.get("comment")));
@RequestBody Map<String, Object> body) {
return ApiResponse.ok(reviewService.rejectLocalEligibility(taskId, principal.id(), (String) body.get("comment")));
}
@PostMapping("/{taskId}/evidences/{evidenceId}/access")
@@ -168,9 +168,9 @@ public class ReviewController {
@AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal principal,
@PathVariable String taskId,
@PathVariable String evidenceId,
@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
@RequestBody Map<String, Object> body) {
return ApiResponse.ok(reviewService.accessLocalEligibilityEvidence(
taskId, evidenceId, principal.id(), body.get("purpose")));
taskId, evidenceId, principal.id(), (String) body.get("purpose")));
}
/**
@@ -330,9 +330,36 @@ public final class Constants {
public static final String RECOMMENDATION_SOURCE_MATCHMAKER = "matchmaker";
public static final String PROFILE_STATUS_PENDING_REVIEW = "pending_review";
// ========== 服务对象分配(ZC-MM-002 / A1,与 V053 数据库 CHECK 白名单一致)==========
// 状态机:active → transferred / revoked / ended;expires_at 届满由判定器惰性置 expired。
// 终态(ended/revoked/transferred/expired)一律拒绝再转换。
public static final String ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE = "active";
public static final String ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ENDED = "ended";
public static final String ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_REVOKED = "revoked";
public static final String ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_TRANSFERRED = "transferred";
public static final String ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_EXPIRED = "expired";
// 分配范围:primary(主责,同用户仅一条生效中)/ collaborating(协同)
public static final String ASSIGNMENT_SCOPE_PRIMARY = "primary";
public static final String ASSIGNMENT_SCOPE_COLLABORATING = "collaborating";
// 服务对象分配审计 action(resourceType = matchmaker_assignment)
public static final String AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_CREATE = "MATCHMAKER_ASSIGNMENT_CREATE";
public static final String AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_TRANSFER = "MATCHMAKER_ASSIGNMENT_TRANSFER";
public static final String AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKE = "MATCHMAKER_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKE";
public static final String AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_END = "MATCHMAKER_ASSIGNMENT_END";
// ========== V1.1 本地资格审核 ==========
/** 本地资格审核任务类型 */
public static final String REVIEW_TYPE_LOCAL_ELIGIBILITY = "local_eligibility";
/** 本地资格佐证数据类型(用于敏感访问审计) */
public static final String SENSITIVE_DATA_TYPE_LOCAL_EVIDENCE = "local_eligibility_evidence";
// ========== ZC-MM-006 / T03 红娘域敏感访问审计 ==========
/** 红娘工作台服务对象详情数据类型(用于敏感访问审计) */
public static final String SENSITIVE_DATA_TYPE_MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_DETAIL = "matchmaker_service_detail";
/** 敏感访问成功结果(与 SensitiveAccessLog.accessResult 白名单 success/denied/failed 对齐) */
public static final String SENSITIVE_ACCESS_RESULT_SUCCESS = "success";
/** 红娘查看服务对象详情的访问理由文案 */
public static final String SENSITIVE_ACCESS_REASON_MATCHMAKER_DETAIL = "matchmaker 工作台查看服务对象详情";
}
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.shared.filter;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.token.JwtTokenService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.service.PermissionService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.OperatorPrincipal;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.PlatformPrincipal;
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ public class JwtAuthFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter {
private final JwtTokenService jwtTokenService;
private final PermissionService permissionService;
private final OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
private static final List<String> PERMITTED_PATHS = List.of(
"/api/v1/auth/**",
@@ -87,6 +89,20 @@ public class JwtAuthFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter {
String subject = jwtTokenService.getUserIdFromToken(token);
String tokenType = jwtTokenService.parseToken(token).get("type", String.class);
boolean operatorToken = "operator_access".equals(tokenType);
if (operatorToken) {
// ZC-MM-006 / T02(JWT 权限回收·实时查库路线,不建撤销名单):
// 运营 token 每请求实时查 operators.status —— 账号不存在(含软删除)或非 active
// 一律 401、不建 principal,已签发 token 立即失效;零缓存。
// 注意:此处只接受 "active";"normal" 是用户账号状态(ACCOUNT_STATUS_NORMAL),
// 运营账号禁用/待激活均不得通过过滤器。
var operator = operatorMapper.findById(subject);
if (operator.isEmpty() || !"active".equals(operator.get().getStatus())) {
sendUnauthorized(response);
return;
}
}
// ZC-MM-006 / T02:权限实时查库(PermissionMapper join role_permissions/operator_roles),
// 每请求生效;token claims 中的 permissions 仅作展示快照(只写不读),不是授权事实源。
List<String> permissions = operatorToken
? permissionService.getPermissions(subject)
: List.of();
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ public class AuthorizationAuditListener {
audit.setAction("AUTHORIZATION_DENIED");
audit.setResourceType("authorization");
audit.setResourceId(limit(String.valueOf(event.getObject()), 128));
// ZC-MM-006 / T01:权限快照(permissions 逗号拼接,截断 128)+ 请求追踪 ID
audit.setActorRoleSnapshot(limit(String.join(",", principal.permissions()), 128));
audit.setRequestTraceId(org.slf4j.MDC.get("requestId"));
audit.setCreatedAt(Instant.now());
if (RequestContextHolder.getRequestAttributes() instanceof ServletRequestAttributes attributes) {
@@ -2,13 +2,18 @@ package com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.AuditLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import org.springframework.security.access.AccessDeniedException;
import org.springframework.security.core.Authentication;
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Component;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.UUID;
import org.slf4j.MDC;
/** Denies out-of-scope operator access and records the attempt before returning 403. */
@Slf4j
@@ -19,12 +24,28 @@ public class DataScopeGuard {
private final AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
public void deny(String operatorId, String resourceType, String resourceId, String message) {
// ZC-MM-006 / T01 兼容性:缺省调用(不带 purposeCode/assignmentId)仍可写
deny(operatorId, resourceType, resourceId, message, null, null);
}
/**
* ZC-MM-006 / T01 扩展版拒绝审计:附加业务目的码与关联分配 ID。
*
* @param purposeCode 业务目的码(如 matchmaker.service.view),可空
* @param serviceAssignmentId 关联的 matchmaker_assignments.id(拒绝路径通常无生效分配 → null)
*/
public void deny(String operatorId, String resourceType, String resourceId, String message,
String purposeCode, String serviceAssignmentId) {
AuditLog audit = new AuditLog();
audit.setId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
audit.setOperatorId(operatorId);
audit.setAction("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED");
audit.setResourceType(resourceType);
audit.setResourceId(resourceId);
audit.setPurposeCode(purposeCode);
audit.setServiceAssignmentId(serviceAssignmentId);
audit.setActorRoleSnapshot(currentActorRoleSnapshot());
audit.setRequestTraceId(MDC.get("requestId"));
audit.setCreatedAt(Instant.now());
try {
auditLogMapper.insert(audit);
@@ -34,4 +55,57 @@ public class DataScopeGuard {
}
throw new AccessDeniedException(message);
}
}
/**
* ZC-MM-006 / T04(写接口 404 统一·防探测):范围校验失败的写端点 ——
* 先落与 {@link #deny} 完全相同的 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计(语义上仍是 403 越权),
* 再抛 {@code BusinessException(NOT_FOUND, "服务不存在")}:响应与"资源不存在"逐字段一致,
* 调用方无法区分"无权"与"不存在",杜绝按资源 ID 枚举探测写端点。
*
* <p>适用面:带资源寻址的写端点(transfer/revoke/end/recommend/followup/complete/转介);
* create/assign 类无资源寻址端点维持 {@link #deny} 的 403 口径。
*
* @param message 404 响应 message(统一 "服务不存在",与读详情口径一致)
*/
public void denyAsNotFound(String operatorId, String resourceType, String resourceId, String message,
String purposeCode, String serviceAssignmentId) {
AuditLog audit = new AuditLog();
audit.setId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
audit.setOperatorId(operatorId);
audit.setAction("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED");
audit.setResourceType(resourceType);
audit.setResourceId(resourceId);
audit.setPurposeCode(purposeCode);
audit.setServiceAssignmentId(serviceAssignmentId);
audit.setActorRoleSnapshot(currentActorRoleSnapshot());
audit.setRequestTraceId(MDC.get("requestId"));
audit.setCreatedAt(Instant.now());
try {
auditLogMapper.insert(audit);
} catch (RuntimeException exception) {
log.error("写入数据范围拒绝审计失败: operatorId={}, resourceType={}, resourceId={}",
operatorId, resourceType, resourceId, exception);
}
throw new BusinessException(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, message);
}
/**
* 当前操作者权限快照(与 {@link AuthorizationAuditListener} 同口径):
* OperatorPrincipal.permissions() 逗号拼接,截断 128。
*/
private String currentActorRoleSnapshot() {
Authentication authentication = SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication();
if (authentication != null && authentication.getPrincipal()
instanceof com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.OperatorPrincipal principal) {
return limit(String.join(",", principal.permissions()), 128);
}
return null;
}
private String limit(String value, int maxLength) {
if (value == null || value.length() <= maxLength) {
return value;
}
return value.substring(0, maxLength);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
-- ============================================================
-- V052: 补齐 matchmaker(公益红娘)角色权限
--
-- 发现方式:2026-10-09 搭建本地演示栈、创建红娘运营账号 wanghongniang 并授予
-- matchmaker 角色后发现,该角色在 role_permissions 中零条授权。
-- 用该账号登录后台,点「红娘服务」菜单加载 GET /operator/matchmaker/dashboard
-- 直接 403;同时前端菜单权限码(referral.manage / matchmaker.service.view)与后端
-- 真实 authority 码(matchmaker.service / matchmaker.view)不匹配,导致这两个菜单
-- 对所有角色(含 super_admin)被 visibleNavigation 过滤隐藏。
--
-- 根因:与 V043/V044 同族 —— 角色定义了、权限定义了,两者之间从未连上。
-- V015 只把全部权限授予 super_admin;matchmaker 等运营角色从未被授予任何权限。
--
-- 授权范围(最小权限原则,与后端 @PreAuthorize 严格对应):
-- * matchmaker.view —— 查看红娘服务(GET /operator/matchmaker/*)
-- * matchmaker.service —— 认领/推荐/跟进/完成红娘服务 + 转介管理(referral 控制器)
-- * matchmaker.assign —— 分配红娘服务
-- 后端 MatchmakerOperatorController / ReferralController 的 @PreAuthorize 仅要求这三条,
-- 故仅授予这三条,不扩权。
--
-- 幂等:ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id) DO NOTHING。
-- ============================================================
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id)
SELECT '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000005', id
FROM permissions
WHERE code IN ('matchmaker.view', 'matchmaker.service', 'matchmaker.assign')
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id) DO NOTHING;
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
-- ============================================================
-- V053: 服务对象分配表(ZC-MM-002 / A1 服务对象分配建模)
--
-- 建模决策(架构师设计 D1/D5):
-- * 决策文档 5.1 的 matchmaker_user_id 对应 operators 主体,
-- 定名 matchmaker_operator_id(沿用 matchmaker_services.assigned_operator_id 惯例)。
-- * status 状态机:active → transferred / revoked / ended;
-- expires_at < now 的 active 行由 ServiceAssignmentPolicy 惰性置 expired(无定时任务);
-- 终态(transferred/revoked/ended/expired)一律不允许再次转换。
-- * assignment_scope:primary(主责)/ collaborating(协同)。
-- * 同一用户同时最多一条 active + primary 分配 → 部分唯一索引兜底
-- (业务层 SELECT-then-INSERT 有竞态,只有 DB 唯一索引能兜住)。
--
-- 存量回填说明:
-- matchmaker_services.assigned_operator_id IS NOT NULL 且服务仍处于非终态
-- (assigned / in_service / waiting_user,与 V009 chk_matchmaker_status 白名单一致)的行,
-- 回填为 active + primary 分配。assigned_by 无历史记录可考,取技术回填值
-- = assigned_operator_id(仅表示"分配关系成立",不代表当年实际操作者)。
-- 幂等:NOT EXISTS 防重复回填(按 service_id 关联)。
-- ============================================================
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS matchmaker_assignments (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
matchmaker_operator_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES operators(id),
service_id UUID REFERENCES matchmaker_services(id),
assigned_by UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES operators(id),
assignment_scope VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'primary',
assignment_reason VARCHAR(500) NOT NULL,
status VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
assigned_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
ended_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
end_reason VARCHAR(500),
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
deleted_at TIMESTAMPTZ
);
ALTER TABLE matchmaker_assignments ADD CONSTRAINT chk_mm_assignment_status CHECK (status IN (
'active', 'ended', 'revoked', 'transferred', 'expired'
));
ALTER TABLE matchmaker_assignments ADD CONSTRAINT chk_mm_assignment_scope CHECK (assignment_scope IN (
'primary', 'collaborating'
));
-- 部分唯一索引:同一用户最多一条「生效中的主责分配」。
-- 终态行(ended/revoked/transferred/expired)不占位,允许历史多条。
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_mm_assignment_active_primary
ON matchmaker_assignments(user_id)
WHERE status = 'active' AND assignment_scope = 'primary';
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_mm_assignment_operator ON matchmaker_assignments(matchmaker_operator_id, status);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_mm_assignment_user ON matchmaker_assignments(user_id, status);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_mm_assignment_service ON matchmaker_assignments(service_id);
-- 存量回填(幂等)
INSERT INTO matchmaker_assignments (
id, user_id, matchmaker_operator_id, service_id, assigned_by,
assignment_scope, assignment_reason, status, assigned_at, created_at, updated_at
)
SELECT
gen_random_uuid(),
ms.user_id,
ms.assigned_operator_id,
ms.id,
ms.assigned_operator_id, -- assigned_by 为技术回填值:历史分配操作者未记录
'primary',
'V053 存量回填:原始分配人未记录',
'active',
COALESCE(ms.assigned_at, NOW()),
NOW(),
NOW()
FROM matchmaker_services ms
WHERE ms.assigned_operator_id IS NOT NULL
AND ms.status IN ('assigned', 'in_service', 'waiting_user')
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM matchmaker_assignments ma WHERE ma.service_id = ms.id
);
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
-- ============================================================
-- V054: 新增红娘组长角色与团队分配权限(ZC-MM-002 / A1,架构师设计 D2)
--
-- 角色权限边界:
-- * matchmaker_leader(014)授 view(020) + service(022) + team.assign(023),
-- **不给** matchmaker.assign(021) —— 组长只能在同组织范围内分配;
-- 组织边界判定:组长团队边界 = 同 organization_id,NULL=NULL 视为平台直属
-- (平台直属组长只能分配平台直属红娘;有组织组长不能分配 org=NULL 红娘;
-- org=NULL 普通红娘只能由 matchmaker.assign 持有者分配 —— 该技术默认
-- 写在 ServiceAssignmentPolicy / MatchmakerAssignmentService 代码注释,
-- 治理登记后续补充)。
-- * 普通红娘(005)权限现状不变(view/service),由 V052 授予。
--
-- 幂等:全部 ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING(对照 V052 风格)。
-- ============================================================
INSERT INTO roles (id, code, name, description, system_role) VALUES (
'00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000014',
'matchmaker_leader',
'红娘组长',
'公益红娘团队组长,可在同组织范围内分配/转分配服务对象',
TRUE
) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
INSERT INTO permissions (id, code, name, module, description) VALUES (
'10000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000023',
'matchmaker.team.assign',
'红娘团队分配',
'matchmaker',
'在组长同组织范围内分配/转分配/撤销/结束服务对象分配'
) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
-- 红娘组长:view + service + team.assign(不含 matchmaker.assign)
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id)
SELECT '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000014', id
FROM permissions
WHERE code IN ('matchmaker.view', 'matchmaker.service', 'matchmaker.team.assign')
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id) DO NOTHING;
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
-- ============================================================
-- V055: audit_logs 扩展红娘域审计字段(ZC-MM-006 / T01)
--
-- 新增 4 列(全部可空、存量不回填、语句幂等):
-- purpose_code 业务目的码,规范:matchmaker.service.assign/recommend/followup/complete/view
-- service_assignment_id 关联的 matchmaker_assignments.id(可空:非分配场景为 NULL)
-- actor_role_snapshot 审计落库时操作者的权限快照(OperatorPrincipal.permissions() 逗号拼接,截断 128)
-- request_trace_id 请求追踪 ID(RequestIdFilter 写入 MDC 的 requestId,16 位)
--
-- 兼容性:全部可空 → 缺省调用(不传新字段)仍可正常写入,存量行为不变。
-- 幂等:H2/PostgreSQL 均无 ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS 统一保障时,
-- 用 information_schema 判空后执行(对照 V034/V035 风格)。
-- ============================================================
ALTER TABLE audit_logs ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS purpose_code VARCHAR(64);
ALTER TABLE audit_logs ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS service_assignment_id UUID;
ALTER TABLE audit_logs ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS actor_role_snapshot VARCHAR(128);
ALTER TABLE audit_logs ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS request_trace_id VARCHAR(64);
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.auth.service;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.provider.WechatLoginProvider;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.token.JwtTokenService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.entity.User;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.mapper.UserMapper;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.ExtendWith;
import org.mockito.ArgumentCaptor;
import org.mockito.InjectMocks;
import org.mockito.Mock;
import org.mockito.junit.jupiter.MockitoExtension;
import org.springframework.data.redis.core.StringRedisTemplate;
import org.springframework.data.redis.core.ValueOperations;
import java.time.Duration;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Optional;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.*;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.*;
/**
* 回归守卫:刷新 Token 在 Redis 中登记的 TTL 必须与 refresh JWT 自身有效期一致
* ({@code JwtTokenService#getRefreshExpirationMs},默认 14 天),而不是
* {@code getExpirationMs() * 2}(4 小时)。
*
* <p>此前 AuthService 用 {@code getExpirationMs() * 2} 写入,导致 4h 后 Redis 记录消失、
* 刷新即失效,用户被迫频繁重新登录。本测试钉死两处写入点(登录 / 刷新)。
*/
@ExtendWith(MockitoExtension.class)
class AuthServiceRefreshTtlTest {
@Mock private UserMapper userMapper;
@Mock private WechatLoginProvider wechatLoginProvider;
@Mock private JwtTokenService jwtTokenService;
@Mock private StringRedisTemplate redisTemplate;
@Mock private com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
@Mock private com.danyang.match.platform.local_eligibility.mapper.LocalEligibilityMapper localEligibilityMapper;
@Mock private com.danyang.match.platform.capability.service.CapabilityService capabilityService;
@Mock private com.danyang.match.platform.profile.mapper.UserProfileMapper userProfileMapper;
@Mock private com.danyang.match.platform.review.mapper.ReviewTaskMapper reviewTaskMapper;
@Mock private ValueOperations<String, String> valueOps;
@InjectMocks private AuthService authService;
private static final long ACCESS_MS = 7_200_000L; // 2h
private static final long REFRESH_MS = 1_209_600_000L; // 14d
/** 捕获 refresh token 在 Redis 中的登记 TTL。 */
private Duration captureRefreshTtl() {
ArgumentCaptor<Duration> cap = ArgumentCaptor.forClass(Duration.class);
verify(valueOps).set(eq("auth:refresh_token:u1"), anyString(), cap.capture());
return cap.getValue();
}
@Test
void wechatLoginStoresRefreshTokenWithRefreshExpiration() {
when(redisTemplate.opsForValue()).thenReturn(valueOps);
when(wechatLoginProvider.getCodeSession("code")).thenReturn(Map.of("openid", "o1"));
User user = new User();
user.setId("u1");
user.setAccountStatus(Constants.ACCOUNT_STATUS_NORMAL);
user.setPhone(null);
when(userMapper.findByWechatOpenid("o1")).thenReturn(Optional.of(user));
when(jwtTokenService.generateAccessToken("u1", null)).thenReturn("access");
when(jwtTokenService.generateRefreshToken("u1")).thenReturn("refresh");
when(jwtTokenService.getRefreshExpirationMs()).thenReturn(REFRESH_MS);
when(auditLogMapper.insert(any())).thenReturn(1);
when(userMapper.updateById(any())).thenReturn(1);
authService.wechatLogin("code");
Duration ttl = captureRefreshTtl();
assertEquals(Duration.ofMillis(REFRESH_MS), ttl, "登录:刷新 Token TTL 必须等于 refresh 有效期(14 天)");
assertNotEquals(Duration.ofMillis(ACCESS_MS * 2), ttl, "回归:不得再写成 access*2(4h)导致频繁登出");
}
@Test
void refreshTokenStoresRefreshTokenWithRefreshExpiration() {
when(redisTemplate.opsForValue()).thenReturn(valueOps);
when(jwtTokenService.validateRefreshToken("rt")).thenReturn(true);
when(jwtTokenService.getUserIdFromRefreshToken("rt")).thenReturn("u1");
when(redisTemplate.opsForValue().get("auth:refresh_token:u1")).thenReturn("rt");
when(jwtTokenService.generateAccessToken("u1", null)).thenReturn("newAccess");
when(jwtTokenService.generateRefreshToken("u1")).thenReturn("newRefresh");
when(jwtTokenService.getRefreshExpirationMs()).thenReturn(REFRESH_MS);
authService.refreshToken("u1", "rt");
Duration ttl = captureRefreshTtl();
assertEquals(Duration.ofMillis(REFRESH_MS), ttl, "刷新:刷新 Token TTL 必须等于 refresh 有效期(14 天)");
assertNotEquals(Duration.ofMillis(ACCESS_MS * 2), ttl, "回归:不得再写成 access*2(4h)导致频繁登出");
}
}
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ class MigrationValidationTest {
// V1.0.1 配置与规则纠偏(CFG-001):V051 活体核验配置键归一
// —— feature_flag_overrides 清理遗留键(livenessVerification.enabled / livenessEnabled),
// 写入 canonical 键 identity.liveness.enabled=false(fail-safe 默认关闭)
private static final int LATEST_MIGRATION = 51;
// ZC-MM-002(A1 服务对象分配建模):V052 补齐 matchmaker 角色权限(V052 其实早于本轮,漏计);
// V053 matchmaker_assignments 建表 + 存量回填;V054 matchmaker_leader 角色与团队分配权限
// ZC-MM-006(T01 审计字段扩展):V055 audit_logs 补 purpose_code / service_assignment_id /
// actor_role_snapshot / request_trace_id 四列(全可空、存量不回填、幂等)
private static final int LATEST_MIGRATION = 55;
private static final String MIGRATION_DIR =
"backend/src/main/resources/db/migration/";
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.activity.entity.ActivityRegistration;
import com.danyang.match.platform.activity.mapper.ActivityRegistrationMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.token.JwtTokenService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.token.TokenBlacklistService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerRecommendation;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerServiceRecord;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerAssignmentMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerRecommendationMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerServiceMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerServiceService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.notification.entity.Notification;
import com.danyang.match.platform.notification.mapper.NotificationMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.referral.service.ReferralService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.entity.User;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.mapper.UserMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.verification.mapper.UserIdentityMapper;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.autoconfigure.web.servlet.AutoConfigureMockMvc;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.boot.test.mock.mockito.MockBean;
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.web.servlet.MockMvc;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.anyString;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.request.MockMvcRequestBuilders.post;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.result.MockMvcResultMatchers.status;
/**
* ZC-MM-004(禁止代替用户决定复核)+ MM-CONTACT-001 行为锁定
* ({@code @SpringBootTest} 走真实安全过滤器链,沿用 MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test 数据构造范式)。
*
* <p>锁定四条行为不变量(架构师设计 T02):
* <ol>
* <li><b>MM-ACTION-001 强化(负向)</b>:operator 主体 token 打用户专属决定端点
* (推荐 accept / pass、转介 confirm)→ 认证层 403
* (SecurityConfig 兜底 {@code hasRole("USER")}:运营身份根本进不到 Controller,
* SecurityPathCoverageTest 已机械锁定该兜底不得退回 authenticated()),
* 且 recommendation / registration 状态零变化 —— 「红娘不能替用户 Like/Pass/确认转介」。</li>
* <li><b>MM-ACTION-002</b>:会话开启端点(POST /conversations/from-match/{matchId})同为
* UserPrincipal 路径 → operator token 403(match 的产生同样只在用户 Like 路径,
* 无 operator 触达面)。</li>
* <li><b>MM-ACTION-003 / must-confirm 语义</b>:红娘创建转介 → 响应
* needsUserConfirmation=true、库中 userConfirmedAt=null、status 停留 pending;
* 红娘侧 recommend / followup / complete 动作不改变用户确认状态 ——
* 「转介代建 = 代填草稿、用户确认」语义被永久锁定。</li>
* <li><b>MM-CONTACT-001(正向)</b>:红娘对本人分配对象创建推荐/转介 → notifications 表
* 落平台内服务通知(type=matchmaker),title/body 不含手机号/微信号模式;
* 通知收件面只有 C 端用户(无 operator 收件行)—— 平台内联系经通知中转,
* 红娘与用户之间不存在直连联系方式交换。</li>
* </ol>
*/
@SpringBootTest
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Transactional
@AutoConfigureMockMvc
class MatchmakerActionGuardTest {
@Autowired private MockMvc mockMvc;
@Autowired private JwtTokenService jwtTokenService;
/** 测试环境无 Redis:黑名单查询打桩为"未拉黑"(ChatPhase09IntegrationTest 同款) */
@MockBean private TokenBlacklistService tokenBlacklistService;
/**
* ZC-MM-006 / T02 起由真实 DB 路径接管权限装载(schema-h2 已补权限四表),
* 此处打桩仅为兼容既有断言口径(本测试只依赖身份类型 403,不依赖具体权限集)。
*/
@MockBean private com.danyang.match.platform.permission.service.PermissionService permissionService;
@Autowired private com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceMapper matchmakerServiceMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentMapper matchmakerAssignmentMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerRecommendationMapper recommendationMapper;
@Autowired private ActivityRegistrationMapper activityRegistrationMapper;
@Autowired private NotificationMapper notificationMapper;
@Autowired private UserMapper userMapper;
@Autowired private com.danyang.match.platform.profile.mapper.UserProfileMapper userProfileMapper;
@Autowired private UserIdentityMapper userIdentityMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceService matchmakerServiceService;
@Autowired private ReferralService referralService;
private static final String MATCHMAKER_OWNER = "op-ag-owner";
private String user;
private String target;
private String serviceId;
private String operatorToken;
/** 手机号模式(中国大陆 11 位) */
private static final Pattern PHONE_PATTERN = Pattern.compile("1[3-9]\\d{9}");
/** 微信号/微信引导词模式 */
private static final List<String> WECHAT_TOKENS = List.of("wechat", "weixin", "微信", "vx", "加v", "v信");
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
user = createUser("ag-user");
target = createUser("ag-target");
// 一条归属 MATCHMAKER_OWNER 的红娘服务(assigned),并补生效分配(E1 纯判定器口径)
serviceId = createService(user, MATCHMAKER_OWNER, Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_ASSIGNED);
MatchmakerAssignment assignment = new MatchmakerAssignment();
assignment.setUserId(user);
assignment.setMatchmakerOperatorId(MATCHMAKER_OWNER);
assignment.setServiceId(serviceId);
assignment.setAssignedBy(MATCHMAKER_OWNER);
assignment.setAssignmentScope(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_SCOPE_PRIMARY);
assignment.setAssignmentReason("003/004 守卫前置分配");
assignment.setStatus(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE);
assignment.setAssignedAt(Instant.now());
matchmakerAssignmentMapper.insert(assignment);
// operator token:type=operator_access → JwtAuthFilter 授 ROLE_OPERATOR
// ZC-MM-006 / T02:JwtAuthFilter 实时查 operators.status,须为 token subject 落一条 active 运营行
com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator op =
new com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator();
op.setId(MATCHMAKER_OWNER);
op.setName("003/004 守卫红娘");
op.setUsername("ag_mm_owner_" + System.nanoTime());
op.setPasswordHash("test-hash");
op.setStatus("active");
operatorMapper.insert(op);
when(permissionService.getPermissions(anyString())).thenReturn(List.of());
operatorToken = jwtTokenService.generateOperatorToken(MATCHMAKER_OWNER, null);
}
@AfterEach
void clearSecurityContext() {
SecurityContextHolder.clearContext();
}
// ==================== 数据构造(Phase13 范式) ====================
/** 基础资格满足的用户:正常账号 + 实名 + 资料通过(RelationService.like 路径可走) */
private String createUser(String tag) {
User u = new User();
u.setWechatOpenid("ag_" + tag + "_" + System.nanoTime());
u.setAccountStatus(Constants.ACCOUNT_STATUS_NORMAL);
u.setRelationshipStatus(Constants.RELATIONSHIP_STATUS_SEARCHING);
u.setRecommendationEnabled(true);
userMapper.insert(u);
var profile = new com.danyang.match.platform.profile.entity.UserProfile();
profile.setUserId(u.getId());
profile.setDisplayName(tag);
profile.setProfileStatus(Constants.PROFILE_STATUS_APPROVED);
userProfileMapper.insert(profile);
var identity = new com.danyang.match.platform.verification.entity.UserIdentity();
identity.setUserId(u.getId());
identity.setVerificationStatus(Constants.VERIFICATION_STATUS_VERIFIED);
userIdentityMapper.insert(identity);
return u.getId();
}
private String createService(String userId, String operatorId, String status) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord svc = new MatchmakerServiceRecord();
svc.setId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
svc.setUserId(userId);
svc.setServiceType(Constants.MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_TYPE_RECOMMEND_PARTNER);
svc.setStatus(status);
svc.setAssignedOperatorId(operatorId);
matchmakerServiceMapper.insert(svc);
return svc.getId();
}
private MatchmakerRecommendation insertRecommendation(String recUser, String recTarget) {
MatchmakerRecommendation rec = new MatchmakerRecommendation();
rec.setId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
rec.setServiceId(serviceId);
rec.setUserId(recUser);
rec.setTargetUserId(recTarget);
rec.setOperatorId(MATCHMAKER_OWNER);
rec.setReason("004 守卫测试推荐");
rec.setStatus(Constants.RECOMMENDATION_STATUS_PENDING_VIEW);
recommendationMapper.insert(rec);
return rec;
}
private ActivityRegistration insertReferralRegistration(String regUser, String activityId) {
ActivityRegistration reg = new ActivityRegistration();
reg.setId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
reg.setActivityId(activityId);
reg.setUserId(regUser);
reg.setStatus(Constants.REGISTRATION_STATUS_PENDING);
reg.setSource(Constants.REFERRAL_SOURCE_MATCHMAKER_REFERRAL);
reg.setRequestSource(Constants.REFERRAL_SOURCE_MATCHMAKER_REFERRAL);
reg.setCreatedByOperatorId(MATCHMAKER_OWNER);
reg.setCreatedAt(Instant.now());
activityRegistrationMapper.insert(reg);
return reg;
}
// ==================== MM-ACTION-001:红娘不能替用户做 Like/Pass/确认决定 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-ACTION-001(负向): operator token 打推荐 accept → 403,推荐状态零变化")
void operatorCannotAcceptRecommendationOnBehalfOfUser() throws Exception {
MatchmakerRecommendation rec = insertRecommendation(user, target);
mockMvc.perform(post("/matchmaker/recommendations/{id}/accept", rec.getId())
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + operatorToken))
.andExpect(status().isForbidden());
MatchmakerRecommendation after = recommendationMapper.selectById(rec.getId());
assertEquals(Constants.RECOMMENDATION_STATUS_PENDING_VIEW, after.getStatus(),
"越权 accept 被认证层 403 拒绝后,推荐状态必须零变化");
assertNull(after.getRespondedAt(), "越权 accept 不得写入 respondedAt");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-ACTION-001(负向): operator token 打推荐 pass → 403,推荐状态零变化")
void operatorCannotPassRecommendationOnBehalfOfUser() throws Exception {
MatchmakerRecommendation rec = insertRecommendation(user, target);
mockMvc.perform(post("/matchmaker/recommendations/{id}/pass", rec.getId())
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + operatorToken))
.andExpect(status().isForbidden());
MatchmakerRecommendation after = recommendationMapper.selectById(rec.getId());
assertEquals(Constants.RECOMMENDATION_STATUS_PENDING_VIEW, after.getStatus(),
"越权 pass 被拒绝后,推荐状态必须零变化(仍 pending_view)");
assertNull(after.getRespondedAt(), "越权 pass 不得写入 respondedAt");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-ACTION-001(负向): operator token 打转介 confirm → 403,用户确认状态零变化")
void operatorCannotConfirmReferralOnBehalfOfUser() throws Exception {
ActivityRegistration reg = insertReferralRegistration(user, "act-ag-001");
mockMvc.perform(post("/referrals/{id}/confirm", reg.getId())
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + operatorToken)
.contentType("application/json")
.content("{\"targetType\":\"activity\"}"))
.andExpect(status().isForbidden());
ActivityRegistration after = activityRegistrationMapper.selectById(reg.getId());
assertNull(after.getUserConfirmedAt(),
"越权 confirm 被拒绝后,userConfirmedAt 必须仍为 null(用户决定权)");
assertEquals(Constants.REGISTRATION_STATUS_PENDING, after.getStatus(),
"越权 confirm 后报名状态必须停留 pending");
}
// ==================== MM-ACTION-002:会话/关系开启无 operator 触达面 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-ACTION-002(负向): operator token 打会话开启端点 → 403(match/conversation 仅用户路径)")
void operatorCannotOpenConversationFromMatch() throws Exception {
// 认证层即拒绝(hasRole("USER")),无需真实 match 存在
mockMvc.perform(post("/conversations/from-match/{matchId}", "no-such-match")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + operatorToken))
.andExpect(status().isForbidden());
}
// ==================== MM-ACTION-003:must-confirm 语义锁定 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-ACTION-003: 转介代建=代填草稿(needsUserConfirmation=true、userConfirmedAt=null);红娘后续动作不改变确认状态")
void referralCreationStaysPendingUntilUserConfirms() {
// 红娘创建转介(本人分配对象)
Map<String, Object> result = referralService.referToActivity(
MATCHMAKER_OWNER, user, "act-ag-002", "紧急联系人", "enc-phone");
// must-confirm 语义:响应标记待确认,库中确认字段为空、状态停留 pending
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, result.get("needsUserConfirmation"),
"红娘创建转介必须标记 needsUserConfirmation=true(不替用户完成报名)");
String regId = (String) result.get("registrationId");
ActivityRegistration reg = activityRegistrationMapper.selectById(regId);
assertNotNull(reg, "转介必须真实落库");
assertNull(reg.getUserConfirmedAt(), "创建时 userConfirmedAt 必须为 null");
assertEquals(Constants.REGISTRATION_STATUS_PENDING, reg.getStatus(),
"创建时报名状态必须停留 pending");
// 红娘侧后续动作:recommend / followup / complete —— 均不得改变用户确认状态
matchmakerServiceService.recommendPartner(serviceId, MATCHMAKER_OWNER, target, "合适人选");
matchmakerServiceService.addFollowup(serviceId, MATCHMAKER_OWNER, "note", "003 守卫跟进", null);
MatchmakerServiceRecord svc = matchmakerServiceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
svc.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_IN_SERVICE);
matchmakerServiceMapper.updateById(svc);
matchmakerServiceService.completeService(serviceId, MATCHMAKER_OWNER);
ActivityRegistration after = activityRegistrationMapper.selectById(regId);
assertNull(after.getUserConfirmedAt(),
"recommend/followup/complete 红娘侧动作不得代替用户确认(userConfirmedAt 必须仍为 null)");
assertEquals(Constants.REGISTRATION_STATUS_PENDING, after.getStatus(),
"红娘侧动作不得推动报名状态(必须停留 pending 等待用户确认)");
}
// ==================== MM-CONTACT-001:平台内联系 = 通知中转,无联系方式交换 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-CONTACT-001(正向): 推荐/转介经平台通知触达用户,文案无手机号/微信号模式,收件面仅用户")
void platformNotificationsCarryNoContactPatternsAndOnlyTargetUsers() {
// 推荐路径:recommendPartner → sendAsync(type=matchmaker, businessType=matchmaker_recommendation)
matchmakerServiceService.recommendPartner(serviceId, MATCHMAKER_OWNER, target, "003 正向推荐");
// 转介路径:referToServiceStation → sendMatchmakerReferralCreated(type=matchmaker, businessType=service_station)
referralService.referToServiceStation(MATCHMAKER_OWNER, user, "loc-ag-001",
"counselor_consultation", null, "备注");
List<Notification> notes = notificationMapper.selectList(new LambdaQueryWrapper<Notification>()
.eq(Notification::getUserId, user)
.eq(Notification::getType, Constants.NOTIFICATION_TYPE_MATCHMAKER));
assertFalse(notes.isEmpty(), "推荐/转介必须为用户落平台内服务通知(type=matchmaker)");
for (Notification note : notes) {
String title = note.getTitle() == null ? "" : note.getTitle();
String content = note.getContent() == null ? "" : note.getContent();
assertFalse(PHONE_PATTERN.matcher(title).find(),
"通知标题不得含手机号模式: " + title);
assertFalse(PHONE_PATTERN.matcher(content).find(),
"通知正文不得含手机号模式: " + content);
for (String token : WECHAT_TOKENS) {
assertFalse(title.toLowerCase().contains(token),
"通知标题不得含微信引导词「" + token + "」: " + title);
assertFalse(content.toLowerCase().contains(token),
"通知正文不得含微信引导词「" + token + "」: " + content);
}
}
// 负向佐证:通知收件面只有 C 端用户 —— 红娘 operatorId 不在 notification 收件面
long operatorInbox = notificationMapper.selectCount(new LambdaQueryWrapper<Notification>()
.eq(Notification::getUserId, MATCHMAKER_OWNER));
assertEquals(0L, operatorInbox,
"红娘不得成为通知收件人(联系方式交换无 operator 侧触达面)");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.AuditLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.controller.MatchmakerAssignmentController;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.controller.MatchmakerOperatorController;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerAssignmentMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerAssignmentService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerServiceService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.ServiceAssignmentPolicy;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.OperatorPrincipal;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.entity.User;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.mapper.UserMapper;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.mockito.Mockito;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.security.access.AccessDeniedException;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken;
import org.springframework.security.core.authority.SimpleGrantedAuthority;
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.web.servlet.MockMvc;
import org.springframework.test.web.servlet.setup.MockMvcBuilders;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.stream.Stream;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.request.MockMvcRequestBuilders.post;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.result.MockMvcResultMatchers.status;
/**
* ZC-MM-002(A1 服务对象分配建模)验收测试 —— 真实 H2 数据构造。
*
* <p>覆盖:
* <ul>
* <li>MM-AUTH-001:红娘对本人有效分配对象 canAccessUser=true,GET /assignments/my 含该对象;</li>
* <li>MM-AUTH-002(负向):访问未分配用户 → DataScopeGuard 拒绝 + DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计;</li>
* <li>MM-AUTH-003(负向):访问他人(红娘D)分配对象 → 拒绝 + 审计;</li>
* <li>MM-AUTH-004(负向):POST /services/{id}/claim → 404(D3:claim 端点已删除);</li>
* <li>MM-AUDIT-001:create/transfer/revoke/end 各产生对应 action 审计且 operatorId=操作者;</li>
* <li>MM-LIFECYCLE-001:end/revoke 后 canAccessUser=false;expires_at 届满惰性 expired;</li>
* <li>负向:组长跨组织分配 → 403 + 审计;普通红娘调 /pending → 403 + 审计。</li>
* </ul>
*/
@SpringBootTest
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Transactional
class MatchmakerAssignmentA1Test {
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentService assignmentService;
@Autowired private ServiceAssignmentPolicy assignmentPolicy;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentMapper assignmentMapper;
@Autowired private OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
@Autowired private UserMapper userMapper;
@Autowired private AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentController assignmentController;
@Autowired private MatchmakerOperatorController operatorController;
private String leaderA; // 组长,org X
private String mmB; // 红娘,org X
private String mmC; // 红娘,org Y
private String mmD; // 红娘,org X
private String user1; // B 的服务对象
private String user2; // 无人分配
private String user3; // D 的服务对象
private static final String ORG_X = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private static final String ORG_Y = "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222";
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
leaderA = createOperator("组长A", ORG_X);
mmB = createOperator("红娘B", ORG_X);
mmC = createOperator("红娘C", ORG_Y);
mmD = createOperator("红娘D", ORG_X);
user1 = createUser("a1-user1");
user2 = createUser("a1-user2");
user3 = createUser("a1-user3");
}
@AfterEach
void clearSecurityContext() {
SecurityContextHolder.clearContext();
}
// ==================== 数据构造 ====================
private String createOperator(String name, String organizationId) {
Operator op = new Operator();
op.setName(name);
op.setOrganizationId(organizationId);
op.setUsername("a1_" + name + "_" + System.nanoTime());
op.setPasswordHash("test-hash");
op.setStatus("active");
operatorMapper.insert(op);
return op.getId();
}
private String createUser(String tag) {
User u = new User();
u.setWechatOpenid("a1_" + tag + "_" + System.nanoTime());
u.setAccountStatus(Constants.ACCOUNT_STATUS_NORMAL);
userMapper.insert(u);
return u.getId();
}
/** 以指定操作者身份 + 权限集设置 SecurityContext(方法级 @PreAuthorize 据此判定)。 */
private void authenticate(String operatorId, String... permissions) {
Set<String> permSet = Set.of(permissions);
var authorities = Stream.concat(
Stream.of(new SimpleGrantedAuthority("ROLE_OPERATOR")),
permSet.stream().map(SimpleGrantedAuthority::new)).toList();
SecurityContextHolder.getContext().setAuthentication(
UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken.authenticated(
new OperatorPrincipal(operatorId, permSet), null, authorities));
}
private long countAudits(String action, String operatorId) {
return auditLogMapper.selectCount(new LambdaQueryWrapper<AuditLog>()
.eq(AuditLog::getAction, action)
.eq(operatorId != null, AuditLog::getOperatorId, operatorId));
}
// ==================== MM-AUTH-001 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-AUTH-001: 红娘B 对本人有效分配对象 canAccessUser=true,GET /assignments/my 含该对象")
void mmAuth001_matchmakerAccessesOwnAssignedUser() {
// 组长A(同组织 X,team.assign 路径)创建 B → user1 分配
MatchmakerAssignment created = assignmentService.create(
leaderA, false, user1, mmB, null, "同一社区,就近服务", null);
assertNotNull(created.getId());
assertEquals(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE, created.getStatus());
assertEquals(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_SCOPE_PRIMARY, created.getAssignmentScope());
assertTrue(assignmentPolicy.canAccessUser(mmB, user1),
"红娘B 必须能访问其名下生效分配的服务对象");
// GET /assignments/my(matchmaker.service 权限)包含该对象
authenticate(mmB, "matchmaker.view", "matchmaker.service");
var result = assignmentController.my(new OperatorPrincipal(mmB,
Set.of("matchmaker.view", "matchmaker.service")));
assertTrue(result.isSuccess());
List<Map<String, Object>> data = result.getData();
assertNotNull(data);
assertEquals(1, data.size(), "GET /my 应恰好返回红娘B 名下的生效分配");
assertEquals(user1, data.get(0).get("userId"));
}
// ==================== MM-AUTH-002 / 003 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-AUTH-002(负向): B 访问未分配用户 → DataScopeGuard 拒绝 + DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计")
void mmAuth002_accessUnassignedUserDeniedAndAudited() {
assertFalse(assignmentPolicy.canAccessUser(mmB, user2));
long before = countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", mmB);
assertThrows(AccessDeniedException.class,
() -> assignmentPolicy.assertActiveAssignment(mmB, user2, "matchmaker_user"),
"未持有分配的红娘访问用户必须被拒绝");
long after = countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", mmB);
assertEquals(before + 1, after, "拒绝必须落一条 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计行");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-AUTH-003(负向): B 访问他人(红娘D)分配对象 → 拒绝 + 审计")
void mmAuth003_accessOthersAssignedUserDeniedAndAudited() {
// D 名下分配(组长A 同组织创建)
assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user3, mmD, null, "D 负责该用户", null);
assertTrue(assignmentPolicy.canAccessUser(mmD, user3));
assertFalse(assignmentPolicy.canAccessUser(mmB, user3), "他人的分配对象对 B 不可见");
long before = countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", mmB);
assertThrows(AccessDeniedException.class,
() -> assignmentPolicy.assertActiveAssignment(mmB, user3, "matchmaker_user"),
"B 访问红娘D 的分配对象必须被拒绝");
assertEquals(before + 1, countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", mmB),
"拒绝必须落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计");
}
// ==================== MM-AUTH-004 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-AUTH-004(负向): POST /services/{id}/claim → 404(claim 端点已删除)")
void mmAuth004_claimEndpointRemoved() throws Exception {
// standalone MockMvc:仅注册真实控制器路由,验证 /claim 已不在映射中(D3 决策)
MatchmakerServiceService stubService = Mockito.mock(MatchmakerServiceService.class);
MockMvc mockMvc = MockMvcBuilders
.standaloneSetup(new MatchmakerOperatorController(stubService))
.build();
mockMvc.perform(post("/operator/matchmaker/services/some-id/claim"))
.andExpect(status().isNotFound());
}
// ==================== MM-AUDIT-001 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-AUDIT-001: create/transfer/revoke/end 各产生对应 action 审计且 operatorId=操作者")
void mmAudit001_eachOperationWritesAuditWithActor() {
// 1) create: A 分配 B → user1
MatchmakerAssignment a1 = assignmentService.create(
leaderA, false, user1, mmB, null, "初始分配", null);
assertTrue(countAudits(Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_CREATE, leaderA) > 0,
"create 必须落 MATCHMAKER_ASSIGNMENT_CREATE 审计");
// 2) transfer: B → D
MatchmakerAssignment a2 = assignmentService.transfer(
a1.getId(), leaderA, false, mmD, "B 休假,转给 D");
assertEquals(mmD, a2.getMatchmakerOperatorId());
assertEquals(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_TRANSFERRED,
assignmentMapper.findById(a1.getId()).orElseThrow().getStatus());
assertTrue(countAudits(Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_TRANSFER, leaderA) > 0,
"transfer 必须落 MATCHMAKER_ASSIGNMENT_TRANSFER 审计");
// 3) revoke: 撤销 D 名下的新分配
assignmentService.revoke(a2.getId(), leaderA, false, "用户主动申请更换");
assertEquals(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_REVOKED,
assignmentMapper.findById(a2.getId()).orElseThrow().getStatus());
assertTrue(countAudits(Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKE, leaderA) > 0,
"revoke 必须落 MATCHMAKER_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKE 审计");
// 4) end: 新建再结束
MatchmakerAssignment a3 = assignmentService.create(
leaderA, false, user2, mmB, null, "第二次分配", null);
assignmentService.end(a3.getId(), leaderA, false, "服务完结");
assertEquals(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ENDED,
assignmentMapper.findById(a3.getId()).orElseThrow().getStatus());
assertTrue(countAudits(Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_END, leaderA) > 0,
"end 必须落 MATCHMAKER_ASSIGNMENT_END 审计");
// 审计行 operatorId 必须是操作者(组长A),且 resourceType 正确
// 注:本用例共 5 次操作(create×2 + transfer + revoke + end),审计 1:1 对应
List<AuditLog> audits = auditLogMapper.selectList(new LambdaQueryWrapper<AuditLog>()
.eq(AuditLog::getOperatorId, leaderA)
.in(AuditLog::getAction, List.of(
Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_CREATE,
Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_TRANSFER,
Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKE,
Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_END)));
assertEquals(5, audits.size(), "五次操作各产生一条审计(create×2/transfer/revoke/end)");
assertEquals(2, audits.stream().filter(a ->
Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_CREATE.equals(a.getAction())).count());
assertTrue(audits.stream().allMatch(a -> "matchmaker_assignment".equals(a.getResourceType())),
"resourceType 必须是 matchmaker_assignment");
// afterData 摘要口径:只含 matchmakerOperatorId/scope/reason
assertTrue(audits.stream().allMatch(a -> a.getAfterData() != null
&& a.getAfterData().contains("matchmakerOperatorId=")
&& a.getAfterData().contains("scope=")
&& a.getAfterData().contains("reason=")),
"afterData 必须记录 operatorId/scope/reason 摘要");
}
// ==================== MM-LIFECYCLE-001 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-LIFECYCLE-001: end/revoke 后 canAccessUser=false;expires_at 届满惰性置 expired")
void mmLifecycle001_terminalStatesRevokeAccessAndLazyExpiry() {
// end 之后不可访问
MatchmakerAssignment a1 = assignmentService.create(
leaderA, false, user1, mmB, null, "待结束分配", null);
assertTrue(assignmentPolicy.canAccessUser(mmB, user1));
assignmentService.end(a1.getId(), leaderA, false, "服务完结");
assertFalse(assignmentPolicy.canAccessUser(mmB, user1), "end 后必须立即失去访问权");
// revoke 之后不可访问
MatchmakerAssignment a2 = assignmentService.create(
leaderA, false, user2, mmB, null, "待撤销分配", null);
assignmentService.revoke(a2.getId(), leaderA, false, "误分配");
assertFalse(assignmentPolicy.canAccessUser(mmB, user2), "revoke 后必须立即失去访问权");
// expires_at 届满(固定时间注入:写入已过期的 expires_at)→ 读路径惰性置 expired
MatchmakerAssignment a3 = assignmentService.create(
leaderA, false, user3, mmB, null, "短期分配",
Instant.now().minusSeconds(3600));
assertTrue(assignmentPolicy.canAccessUser(mmB, user3) == false,
"已过有效期的分配必须被视为失效");
MatchmakerAssignment after = assignmentMapper.findById(a3.getId()).orElseThrow();
assertEquals(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_EXPIRED, after.getStatus(),
"惰性过期必须落库(无定时任务,读路径触发)");
assertNotNull(after.getEndedAt());
assertNotNull(after.getEndReason());
// 终态一律拒绝再转换(D5 状态机矩阵)
assertThrows(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.revoke(a3.getId(), leaderA, false, "对已过期分配撤销"),
"expired 是终态,不允许再转换");
assertThrows(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.end(a1.getId(), leaderA, false, "对已结束分配再结束"),
"ended 是终态,不允许再转换");
}
// ==================== 组长组织边界(负向) ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("负向: 组长A 跨组织分配红娘C(org=Y) → 403 + DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计")
void leaderCannotAssignCrossOrganization() {
long before = countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", leaderA);
assertThrows(AccessDeniedException.class,
() -> assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user2, mmC, null, "跨组织分配", null),
"组长(org=X)不得分配 org=Y 的红娘");
assertEquals(before + 1, countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", leaderA),
"跨组织分配拒绝必须落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计");
assertTrue(assignmentMapper.selectList(new LambdaQueryWrapper<MatchmakerAssignment>()
.eq(MatchmakerAssignment::getUserId, user2)).isEmpty(),
"被拒绝的分配不得留下任何分配记录");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("负向: 平台授权人员(matchmaker.assign)可跨组织分配;组长不可分配 org=NULL 红娘")
void globalAssignScopeAndNullOrgBoundary() {
// matchmaker.assign 持有者不受组织限制(leaderA 只是被用作操作者身份)
assertDoesNotThrow(() ->
assignmentService.create(leaderA, true, user1, mmC, null, "平台授权分配", null),
"matchmaker.assign 持有者不限组织");
// org=NULL 的红娘:平台直属组长只能分配平台直属红娘(NULL=NULL 规则)
String platformLeader = createOperator("平台直属组长", null);
String platformMm = createOperator("平台直属红娘", null);
assertDoesNotThrow(() ->
assignmentService.create(platformLeader, false, user2, platformMm, null, "平台直属互配", null),
"NULL=NULL(平台直属 → 平台直属)必须放行");
assertThrows(AccessDeniedException.class,
() -> assignmentService.create(platformLeader, false, user3, mmB, null, "平台直属分配有组织红娘", null),
"平台直属组长不得分配有组织的红娘(NULL≠org X)");
}
// ==================== /pending 方法级权限(负向) ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("负向: 普通红娘(无分配权限)调 /pending → 403 + AUTHORIZATION_DENIED 审计")
void normalMatchmakerCannotListPendingQueue() {
authenticate(mmB, "matchmaker.view", "matchmaker.service");
long before = countAudits("AUTHORIZATION_DENIED", mmB);
assertThrows(AccessDeniedException.class,
() -> operatorController.getPending(
new OperatorPrincipal(mmB, Set.of("matchmaker.view", "matchmaker.service"))),
"/pending 方法级权限收敛后,普通红娘必须 403");
assertEquals(before + 1, countAudits("AUTHORIZATION_DENIED", mmB),
"方法级授权拒绝必须落 AUTHORIZATION_DENIED 审计");
}
// ==================== QA 验收补充(Edward):边界与异常路径 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("QA补充(负向): 理由为 null/空串/纯空格 → 400 VALIDATION_ERROR,且不落任何分配记录或 CREATE 审计")
void blankReasonMustBeRejectedWithValidationError() {
// null 理由
var ex1 = assertThrows(
com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user1, mmB, null, null, null),
"reason=null 必须被拒绝");
assertEquals(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode.VALIDATION_ERROR, ex1.getCode(),
"理由缺失必须是 400 VALIDATION_ERROR,而非 500/403");
// 空串理由
var ex2 = assertThrows(
com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user1, mmB, null, "", null));
assertEquals(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode.VALIDATION_ERROR, ex2.getCode());
// 纯空格理由(isBlank 语义,防止" "绕过)
var ex3 = assertThrows(
com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user1, mmB, null, " ", null));
assertEquals(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode.VALIDATION_ERROR, ex3.getCode());
// revoke/end/transfer 同口径
assertEquals(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode.VALIDATION_ERROR,
assertThrows(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.transfer("any-id", leaderA, false, mmB, " ")).getCode(),
"转分配理由空白同样必须 VALIDATION_ERROR");
// 三次被拒的 create 不得留下分配记录,也不得落 CREATE 审计
assertTrue(assignmentMapper.selectList(new LambdaQueryWrapper<MatchmakerAssignment>()
.eq(MatchmakerAssignment::getUserId, user1)).isEmpty(),
"被拒绝的分配不得留下任何分配记录");
assertEquals(0, countAudits(Constants.AUDIT_ACTION_ASSIGNMENT_CREATE, leaderA),
"被拒绝的分配不得产生 CREATE 审计");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("QA补充: collaborating 分配与 active+primary 共存,不触发主责部分唯一索引冲突")
void collaboratingAssignmentMustNotConflictWithActivePrimary() {
// 先建立主责分配(组长A → 红娘B)
assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user1, mmB, null, "主责分配", null);
// 直接落一条同用户、同红娘的 collaborating 生效中分配(协同注记不占主责唯一位)
MatchmakerAssignment collab = new MatchmakerAssignment();
collab.setUserId(user1);
collab.setMatchmakerOperatorId(mmB);
collab.setAssignedBy(leaderA);
collab.setAssignmentScope(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_SCOPE_COLLABORATING);
collab.setAssignmentReason("协同服务(组长指派协同)");
collab.setStatus(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE);
collab.setAssignedAt(Instant.now());
assertDoesNotThrow(() -> assignmentMapper.insert(collab),
"collaborating 生效中分配不得触发 uq_mm_assignment_active_primary 冲突");
// 主责仍在、协同也在,两条均为生效中
assertEquals(2, assignmentMapper.selectCount(new LambdaQueryWrapper<MatchmakerAssignment>()
.eq(MatchmakerAssignment::getUserId, user1)
.eq(MatchmakerAssignment::getStatus, Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE)),
"同一用户应同时存在 1 条 active 主责 + 1 条 active 协同");
// 主责唯一性仍然生效:同用户第二条 primary 必须被拒(对照组)
assertThrows(Exception.class,
() -> assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user1, mmD, null, "第二条主责", null),
"同用户第二条 active primary 必须被唯一性约束拒绝");
// 预检路径的 CONFLICT
assertEquals(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode.CONFLICT,
assertThrows(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user1, mmD, null, "第二条主责", null)).getCode());
}
@Test
@DisplayName("QA补充(负向): 有组织组长分配 org=NULL(平台直属)红娘 → 403(Objects.equals 非对称方向的显式覆盖)")
void orgLeaderMustNotAssignPlatformDirectMatchmaker() {
// org=NULL 红娘(平台直属)
String platformMm = createOperator("平台直属红娘-供拒配", null);
long before = countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", leaderA);
// leaderA(org X)→ org=NULL 红娘:Objects.equals(orgX, null)=false,必须拒绝
assertThrows(AccessDeniedException.class,
() -> assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user2, platformMm, null, "有组织组长碰平台直属红娘", null),
"有组织组长不得分配 org=NULL(平台直属)红娘");
assertEquals(before + 1, countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", leaderA),
"拒绝必须落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计");
// 同理 transfer 的范围校验也覆盖该方向(ZC-MM-006 / T04:transfer 404 化)
MatchmakerAssignment a = assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user3, mmB, null, "主责", null);
var transferDenied = assertThrows(
com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.transfer(a.getId(), leaderA, false, platformMm, "转给平台直属红娘"),
"有组织组长不得把分配转给 org=NULL 红娘(404 化拒绝)");
assertEquals(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, transferDenied.getCode(),
"transfer 范围违规必须 404 化(防探测,T04)");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("P2-1补充(负向): org=X 组长转分配 org=Y 红娘持有的分配 → 404 化拒绝 + DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计(原持有人范围校验)")
void leaderCannotTransferAssignmentHeldByCrossOrgMatchmaker() {
// org=Y 红娘C 持有一条分配(由平台授权路径创建,绕过 create 的范围校验以构造前置状态)
MatchmakerAssignment held = assignmentService.create(
leaderA, true, user1, mmC, null, "平台授权分配给C", null);
assertEquals(mmC, held.getMatchmakerOperatorId());
long before = countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", leaderA);
// org=X 组长A 把 C(org=Y)持有的分配转给同组织成员 B:原持有人范围违规,必须拒绝
// (ZC-MM-006 / T04:transfer 为资源寻址写端点,拒绝 404 化,审计仍为 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED)
var denied = assertThrows(
com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.transfer(held.getId(), leaderA, false, mmB, "转回本组织"),
"组长不得处置跨组织红娘持有的分配(原持有人范围校验,404 化)");
assertEquals(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, denied.getCode(),
"transfer 范围违规必须 404 化(防探测,T04)");
assertEquals(before + 1, countAudits("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", leaderA),
"拒绝必须落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计");
// 被转记录必须原样保留:仍 active 且持有人仍是 C,未产生新分配
MatchmakerAssignment after = assignmentMapper.findById(held.getId()).orElseThrow();
assertEquals(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE, after.getStatus(),
"被拒绝的转分配不得改变原分配状态");
assertEquals(mmC, after.getMatchmakerOperatorId(),
"被拒绝的转分配不得改变原持有人");
assertTrue(assignmentMapper.selectList(new LambdaQueryWrapper<MatchmakerAssignment>()
.eq(MatchmakerAssignment::getUserId, user1)
.eq(MatchmakerAssignment::getMatchmakerOperatorId, mmB))
.isEmpty(),
"被拒绝的转分配不得给目标红娘留下任何分配记录");
}
// ==================== 分配同事务联动服务单 ====================
@Autowired
private com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerServiceMapper realServiceMapper;
@Test
@DisplayName("联动: 带 serviceId 的分配同事务把服务单置 assigned 并写回 assigned_operator_id")
void createWithServiceIdLinksServiceRow() {
// 真实落库一条 submitted 服务单
var record = new com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerServiceRecord();
record.setUserId(user1);
record.setServiceType(Constants.MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_TYPE_RECOMMEND_PARTNER);
record.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_SUBMITTED);
realServiceMapper.insert(record);
assignmentService.create(leaderA, false, user1, mmB, record.getId(), "带服务单分配", null);
var updated = realServiceMapper.selectById(record.getId());
assertEquals(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_ASSIGNED, updated.getStatus(),
"分配联动必须把服务单置为 assigned");
assertEquals(mmB, updated.getAssignedOperatorId(),
"服务单 assigned_operator_id 必须写为目标红娘");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.controller.MatchmakerAssignmentController;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.controller.MatchmakerOperatorController;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.core.annotation.AnnotatedElementUtils;
import org.springframework.security.access.prepost.PreAuthorize;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.List;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* ZC-MM-002(A1)权限契约守卫(standalone 反射扫描,无需 Spring 上下文)。
*
* <p>锁定两条不变量:
* <ol>
* <li>{@code MatchmakerAssignmentController} 每个端点都有显式 @PreAuthorize;
* 写操作(create/transfer/revoke/end/assignable)必须同时包含
* {@code matchmaker.assign} 或 {@code matchmaker.team.assign};
* 读自己名下(/my)必须是 {@code matchmaker.service}。</li>
* <li>{@code MatchmakerOperatorController} 无 claim 残留(D3:claim 端点/方法已删除)。</li>
* </ol>
*/
class MatchmakerAssignmentPermissionTest {
@Test
@DisplayName("AssignmentController:全部端点有 @PreAuthorize,写操作限定分配权限")
void assignmentControllerPermissionContract() {
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
for (Method method : MatchmakerAssignmentController.class.getDeclaredMethods()) {
if (paths(method).isEmpty()) {
continue; // 非端点方法
}
PreAuthorize preAuthorize = AnnotatedElementUtils.findMergedAnnotation(method, PreAuthorize.class);
if (preAuthorize == null) {
violations.add(method.getName() + ": 缺少 @PreAuthorize");
continue;
}
String expr = preAuthorize.value();
boolean isReadMy = method.getName().equals("my");
boolean isTeamStatistics = method.getName().equals("teamStatistics");
if (isReadMy) {
if (!expr.contains("matchmaker.service")) {
violations.add("my: 读接口必须要求 matchmaker.service,实际=" + expr);
}
} else if (isTeamStatistics) {
// ZC-MM-005/T03:纯组长数据,只要求 team.assign(更强而非更弱)
if (!expr.contains("matchmaker.team.assign")) {
violations.add("teamStatistics: 必须要求 matchmaker.team.assign,实际=" + expr);
}
} else {
boolean hasAssignPermission = expr.contains("matchmaker.assign")
&& expr.contains("matchmaker.team.assign");
if (!hasAssignPermission) {
violations.add(method.getName()
+ ": 写操作必须同时限定 matchmaker.assign / matchmaker.team.assign,实际=" + expr);
}
}
}
assertEquals(List.of(), violations, "AssignmentController 权限契约被破坏");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("守卫自检:必须真的扫到 AssignmentController 端点(防守卫失效)")
void guardMustActuallySeeEndpoints() {
long endpointCount = Arrays.stream(MatchmakerAssignmentController.class.getDeclaredMethods())
.filter(m -> !paths(m).isEmpty())
.count();
assertTrue(endpointCount >= 5,
"扫描到的端点数异常偏少(" + endpointCount + "),守卫可能失效");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("OperatorController:无 claim 残留(端点路径与方法名均不得含 claim)")
void operatorControllerMustNotHaveClaimResidue() {
List<String> residue = new ArrayList<>();
for (Method method : MatchmakerOperatorController.class.getDeclaredMethods()) {
if (method.getName().toLowerCase().contains("claim")) {
residue.add("方法名残留: " + method.getName());
}
if (paths(method).stream().anyMatch(p -> p.toLowerCase().contains("claim"))) {
residue.add("路径残留: " + method.getName());
}
}
assertEquals(List.of(), residue,
"D3 决策:claim(红娘接单)端点必须彻底删除,归属由 matchmaker_assignments 建模");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("ZC-MM-005/E4:OperatorController 无 my-services 残留(死端点已删除)")
void operatorControllerMustNotHaveMyServicesResidue() {
List<String> residue = new ArrayList<>();
for (Method method : MatchmakerOperatorController.class.getDeclaredMethods()) {
String lower = method.getName().toLowerCase();
if (lower.contains("myservices") || lower.contains("my_services")) {
residue.add("方法名残留: " + method.getName());
}
if (paths(method).stream().anyMatch(p -> p.toLowerCase().contains("my-services"))) {
residue.add("路径残留: " + method.getName());
}
}
assertEquals(List.of(), residue,
"GET /my-services 是死端点(按 C 端 user_id 查 operator 恒空、前后端零调用),"
+ "替代路径为 GET /operator/matchmaker/assignments/my");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("ZC-MM-005/T03:team/statistics 端点必须显式限定 matchmaker.team.assign")
void teamStatisticsMustRequireTeamAssignPermission() {
Method statistics = Arrays.stream(MatchmakerAssignmentController.class.getDeclaredMethods())
.filter(m -> m.getName().equals("teamStatistics"))
.findFirst()
.orElseThrow(() -> new AssertionError("teamStatistics 端点不存在"));
PreAuthorize preAuthorize = AnnotatedElementUtils.findMergedAnnotation(statistics, PreAuthorize.class);
assertNotNull(preAuthorize, "team/statistics 缺少 @PreAuthorize");
assertTrue(preAuthorize.value().contains("matchmaker.team.assign"),
"team/statistics 必须限定 matchmaker.team.assign(纯组长数据),实际="
+ preAuthorize.value());
}
private List<String> paths(java.lang.reflect.AnnotatedElement element) {
RequestMapping mapping = AnnotatedElementUtils.findMergedAnnotation(element, RequestMapping.class);
return mapping == null ? List.of() : Arrays.asList(mapping.path().length > 0
? mapping.path() : mapping.value());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.AuditLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerServiceRecord;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerAssignmentMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerServiceMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerAssignmentService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerServiceService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.OperatorPrincipal;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.entity.User;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.mapper.UserMapper;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.slf4j.MDC;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken;
import org.springframework.security.core.authority.SimpleGrantedAuthority;
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.stream.Stream;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* ZC-MM-006 / T01 验收:audit_logs 扩展字段(V055)写入链路。
*
* <p>覆盖:
* <ul>
* <li>扩展写入(正向):assign / recommend 审计行落 purpose_code + service_assignment_id;</li>
* <li>兼容性(负向·缺省调用):applyService 走旧签名(purposeCode/assignmentId 缺省)仍可写,
* purpose_code 为 null —— 证明扩展列全可空、存量行为不变;</li>
* <li>拒绝路径(负向):无分配 recommend → AccessDeniedException + DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计,
* 且审计行带 actor_role_snapshot(SecurityContext 权限快照)+ request_trace_id(MDC)。</li>
* </ul>
*/
@SpringBootTest
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Transactional
class MatchmakerAuditFieldsTest {
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceService matchmakerServiceService;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentService assignmentService;
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceMapper serviceMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentMapper assignmentMapper;
@Autowired private OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
@Autowired private UserMapper userMapper;
@Autowired private AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
private String matchmakerId;
private String userId;
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
matchmakerId = createOperator();
userId = createUser();
}
@AfterEach
void clearContext() {
SecurityContextHolder.clearContext();
MDC.remove("requestId");
}
// ==================== 数据构造(Phase13 范式) ====================
private String createOperator() {
Operator op = new Operator();
op.setName("审计字段测试红娘");
op.setUsername("audit_fields_" + System.nanoTime());
op.setPasswordHash("test-hash");
op.setStatus("active");
operatorMapper.insert(op);
return op.getId();
}
private String createUser() {
User u = new User();
u.setWechatOpenid("audit_fields_" + System.nanoTime());
u.setAccountStatus(Constants.ACCOUNT_STATUS_NORMAL);
userMapper.insert(u);
return u.getId();
}
private String createService(String operatorId) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord svc = new MatchmakerServiceRecord();
svc.setUserId(userId);
svc.setServiceType(Constants.MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_TYPE_RECOMMEND_PARTNER);
svc.setDescription("审计字段测试服务单");
svc.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_SUBMITTED);
svc.setAssignedOperatorId(operatorId);
serviceMapper.insert(svc);
return svc.getId();
}
private void authenticate(String operatorId, String... permissions) {
Set<String> permSet = Set.of(permissions);
var authorities = Stream.concat(
Stream.of(new SimpleGrantedAuthority("ROLE_OPERATOR")),
permSet.stream().map(SimpleGrantedAuthority::new)).toList();
SecurityContextHolder.getContext().setAuthentication(
UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken.authenticated(
new OperatorPrincipal(operatorId, permSet), null, authorities));
}
private AuditLog latestAudit(String action, String resourceId) {
List<AuditLog> rows = auditLogMapper.selectList(new LambdaQueryWrapper<AuditLog>()
.eq(AuditLog::getAction, action)
.eq(AuditLog::getResourceId, resourceId)
.orderByDesc(AuditLog::getCreatedAt));
return rows.isEmpty() ? null : rows.get(0);
}
// ==================== 正向:扩展写入 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T01 正向: assignService 审计行落 purpose_code=matchmaker.service.assign + service_assignment_id")
void assignAuditCarriesPurposeCodeAndAssignmentId() {
String serviceId = createService(matchmakerId);
matchmakerServiceService.assignService(serviceId, matchmakerId, matchmakerId, "T01 分配审计");
MatchmakerAssignment assignment = assignmentMapper
.findActiveByOperatorAndUser(matchmakerId, userId).orElseThrow();
AuditLog audit = latestAudit("MATCHMAKER_ASSIGN", serviceId);
assertNotNull(audit, "分配审计行必须存在");
assertEquals("matchmaker.service.assign", audit.getPurposeCode(), "purpose_code 必须落库");
assertEquals(assignment.getId(), audit.getServiceAssignmentId(),
"service_assignment_id 必须关联新建分配");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("T01 正向: recommendPartner 审计行落 purpose_code=matchmaker.service.recommend + 分配 ID")
void recommendAuditCarriesPurposeCodeAndAssignmentId() {
String serviceId = createService(matchmakerId);
MatchmakerAssignment assignment = assignmentService.create(matchmakerId, true,
userId, matchmakerId, serviceId, "T01 前置分配", null);
matchmakerServiceService.recommendPartner(serviceId, matchmakerId,
"audit-target-" + System.nanoTime(), "T01 推荐审计");
AuditLog audit = latestAudit("MATCHMAKER_RECOMMEND", serviceId);
assertNotNull(audit, "推荐审计行必须存在");
assertEquals("matchmaker.service.recommend", audit.getPurposeCode());
assertEquals(assignment.getId(), audit.getServiceAssignmentId());
}
// ==================== 负向·兼容性:缺省调用仍可写 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T01 负向(兼容): 旧签名审计调用(applyService)不传 purposeCode/assignmentId 仍成功写入,扩展列为 null")
void legacyAuditCallStillWritableWithNullExtendedFields() {
String serviceId = matchmakerServiceService
.applyService(userId, Constants.MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_TYPE_RECOMMEND_PARTNER, "T01 兼容性申请")
.get("serviceId").toString();
AuditLog audit = latestAudit("MATCHMAKER_APPLY", serviceId);
assertNotNull(audit, "缺省调用(旧签名)审计行必须仍可写入");
assertNull(audit.getPurposeCode(), "缺省调用 purpose_code 必须为 null(全可空)");
assertNull(audit.getServiceAssignmentId(), "缺省调用 service_assignment_id 必须为 null");
}
// ==================== 负向:拒绝路径带快照 + 追踪 ID ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T01 负向: 无分配 recommend → 404 化拒绝(T04)+ DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计含权限快照与追踪 ID")
void deniedAuditCarriesActorRoleSnapshotAndTraceId() {
String serviceId = createService(matchmakerId);
// 无分配的红娘(matchmakerId 对 userId 无生效分配)+ SecurityContext 携带权限 → 快照非空
authenticate(matchmakerId, "matchmaker.service");
MDC.put("requestId", "trace01test0001");
BusinessException denied = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.recommendPartner(serviceId, matchmakerId,
"audit-target-x", "T01 拒绝路径"),
"无生效分配必须拒绝(ZC-MM-006 / T04 起为 404 化拒绝)");
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, denied.getCode(),
"写接口范围违规 404 化(T04 防探测)");
AuditLog audit = latestAudit("DATA_SCOPE_DENIED", serviceId);
assertNotNull(audit, "拒绝路径必须落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计");
assertEquals("matchmaker.service", audit.getActorRoleSnapshot(),
"快照必须来自 SecurityContext 权限(逗号拼接,截断 128)");
assertEquals("trace01test0001", audit.getRequestTraceId(),
"追踪 ID 必须取自 MDC(requestId)");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import java.util.stream.Stream;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* ZC-MM-003(B1 联系规则护栏)+ ZC-MM-004 佐证 —— standalone 源码扫描守卫
* (沿用 {@code MatchmakerFieldPrivacyGuardTest} 范式,无需 Spring 上下文)。
*
* <p>锁定四条不变量(架构师设计 T01):
* <ol>
* <li><b>MM-CONTACT-002</b>:ReferralService 全部响应 put 键 ⊆ 白名单(逐键对照实际代码
* 核定,见 {@link #RESPONSE_KEY_WHITELIST}),且键名不得含 emergencyContact / phone /
* mobile / wechat / address / idNumber 等联系方式字样 —— 锁定「红娘侧零联系方式回显」;
* emergencyContact* 是纯入口 write-only(写入 activity_registration 的紧急联系人字段),
* 连红娘本人都无读回面。</li>
* <li><b>MM-CONTACT-003</b>:matchmaker / referral Controller 无 contact / call / phone /
* channel / offline 类端点;全仓无 ContactAuthorization 类、无
* matchmaker_contact_authorizations 建表迁移 —— 锁定「不存在联系授权机制」。
* 契约:未来新增联系功能必须连同本守卫 + 007 治理登记同步更新,守卫即红。</li>
* <li><b>MM-CONTACT-004</b>:无联系授权机制即无授权到期场景 —— 与 MM-CONTACT-003 同源断言
* 承载(若未来引入 ContactAuthorization / matchmaker_contact_authorizations,
* 003/004 两条守卫同时判红,迫使开发者补「到期 + 审计」语义并过 007 评审)。</li>
* <li><b>ZC-MM-004 佐证</b>:matchmaker / referral 包无 @Scheduled —— 全仓无批处理
* 代操作面(禁止代替用户决定的自动化通道不存在)。</li>
* </ol>
*/
class MatchmakerContactGuardTest {
private static final Path SRC_ROOT = resolveSourceRoot();
private static final Path REFERRAL_SERVICE =
SRC_ROOT.resolve("com/danyang/match/platform/referral/service/ReferralService.java");
private static final List<Path> CONTROLLER_DIRS = List.of(
SRC_ROOT.resolve("com/danyang/match/platform/matchmaker/controller"),
SRC_ROOT.resolve("com/danyang/match/platform/referral/controller"));
private static final List<Path> PACKAGE_DIRS = List.of(
SRC_ROOT.resolve("com/danyang/match/platform/matchmaker"),
SRC_ROOT.resolve("com/danyang/match/platform/referral"));
/**
* ReferralService 响应键白名单(ZC-MM-003 / T01:以实际代码逐键核对后核定):
* <ul>
* <li>referToServiceStation → appointmentId / status / referralType /
* referralFromOperatorId / needsUserConfirmation</li>
* <li>referToActivity → registrationId / activityId / status / referralType /
* referralFromOperatorId / needsUserConfirmation</li>
* <li>confirmReferral → id / status / confirmedAt</li>
* <li>getReferralHistory → type / id / serviceType|activityId / status /
* createdByOperatorId / userConfirmedAt / createdAt|registeredAt</li>
* <li>getReferralHistoryByOperator → 同上 + userId(operator 查看本人发起的
* 转介记录需要 userId 标识服务对象;userId 是内部标识符,非联系方式,
* 不落入 B1 禁放范畴)</li>
* </ul>
*/
private static final Set<String> RESPONSE_KEY_WHITELIST = Set.of(
"appointmentId", "registrationId", "activityId", "id", "status", "type",
"serviceType", "referralType", "referralFromOperatorId", "needsUserConfirmation",
"confirmedAt", "userConfirmedAt", "createdByOperatorId", "createdAt",
"registeredAt", "userId");
/** 联系方式字样(出现在响应键名中即违规;emergencyContact* 仅允许作为入口 write-only 存在) */
private static final List<String> FORBIDDEN_KEY_TOKENS = List.of(
"emergencycontact", "phone", "mobile", "wechat", "weixin", "address",
"idnumber", "id_card");
/** MM-CONTACT-003:联系/触达类禁用端点词 */
private static final List<String> FORBIDDEN_ENDPOINT_TOKENS = List.of(
"contact", "call", "phone", "channel", "offline");
// ==================== MM-CONTACT-002:红娘侧零联系方式回显 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-CONTACT-002: ReferralService 全部响应 put 键 ⊆ 白名单,无任何联系方式回显")
void referralResponseKeysAreWhitelistedWithNoContactEcho() throws IOException {
String src = stripComments(Files.readString(REFERRAL_SERVICE, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
Set<String> keys = new LinkedHashSet<>();
Matcher put = Pattern.compile("\\.put\\(\"([^\"]+)\"").matcher(src);
while (put.find()) {
keys.add(put.group(1));
}
// 防止"装配被搬空后守卫永真":核心语义键必须仍在
assertTrue(keys.contains("needsUserConfirmation"),
"must-confirm 语义键必须存在(守卫非永真自检)");
assertTrue(keys.contains("referralFromOperatorId"),
"来源追溯键必须存在(守卫非永真自检)");
assertTrue(keys.contains("status"), "状态键必须存在(守卫非永真自检)");
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
for (String key : keys) {
if (!RESPONSE_KEY_WHITELIST.contains(key)) {
violations.add("非白名单响应键: " + key);
}
String lower = key.toLowerCase();
for (String token : FORBIDDEN_KEY_TOKENS) {
if (lower.contains(token)) {
violations.add("响应键含联系方式 token: " + key + "(含 " + token + ")");
}
}
}
assertEquals(List.of(), violations,
"B1 联系规则契约被破坏(MM-CONTACT-002):响应键出现白名单外键或联系方式字样。\n"
+ "实际输出键=" + keys + "\n违规项:\n - " + String.join("\n - ", violations));
}
// ==================== MM-CONTACT-003:无联系端点 / 无授权机制 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-CONTACT-003: matchmaker/referral Controller 无 contact 类端点;全仓无 ContactAuthorization 机制")
void noContactEndpointsAndNoContactAuthorizationMechanism() throws IOException {
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
// a) 端点扫描:matchmaker / referral Controller 无联系/触达类路径
for (Path dir : CONTROLLER_DIRS) {
assertTrue(Files.isDirectory(dir), "Controller 目录不存在: " + dir);
try (Stream<Path> files = Files.list(dir)) {
for (Path f : files.filter(p -> p.toString().endsWith(".java")).toList()) {
String src = Files.readString(f, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Matcher mapping = Pattern.compile(
"@(Get|Post|Put|Delete)Mapping\\(([^)]*)\\)", Pattern.DOTALL).matcher(src);
while (mapping.find()) {
String args = mapping.group(2).toLowerCase();
for (String banned : FORBIDDEN_ENDPOINT_TOKENS) {
if (args.contains(banned)) {
violations.add(f.getFileName() + " → " + mapping.group(0)
.replaceAll("\\s+", " ") + " 含联系类端点: " + banned);
}
}
}
}
}
}
// b) 机制扫描:全仓 main 源码无 ContactAuthorization 类;迁移目录无建表
violations.addAll(scanForContactAuthorizationMechanism());
assertEquals(List.of(), violations,
"B1 联系规则契约被破坏(MM-CONTACT-003):出现联系类端点或联系授权机制。\n"
+ "契约:未来新增联系功能必须连同本守卫 + 007 治理登记同步更新。\n违规项:\n - "
+ String.join("\n - ", violations));
}
// ==================== MM-CONTACT-004:无机制即无到期场景 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-CONTACT-004: 无联系授权机制 ⇒ 不存在授权到期场景(同源断言承载)")
void noContactAuthorizationMechanismImpliesNoExpiryScenario() throws IOException {
/*
* ZC-MM-003(B1)「临时授权到期」场景的守卫:授权机制本身不存在(MM-CONTACT-003),
* 因此不存在"到期后权限回收"场景。本用例与 MM-CONTACT-003 共享同一底层断言 ——
* 若未来引入 ContactAuthorizationPolicy / matchmaker_contact_authorizations 表,
* 两条守卫同时判红,迫使实现者补齐「授权期限 + 到期回收 + 审计」语义,
* 并同步 007 治理登记(安全默认 = 不开放完整联系方式 / 未授权线下联系)。
*/
List<String> violations = scanForContactAuthorizationMechanism();
assertEquals(List.of(), violations,
"MM-CONTACT-004:联系授权机制出现 ⇒ 必须同步实现到期回收与审计,并过 007 评审。\n违规项:\n - "
+ String.join("\n - ", violations));
}
// ==================== ZC-MM-004 佐证:无批处理代操作面 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("ZC-MM-004 佐证: matchmaker/referral 包无 @Scheduled(无批处理代操作通道)")
void noScheduledTasksInMatchmakerAndReferralPackages() throws IOException {
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
for (Path dir : PACKAGE_DIRS) {
assertTrue(Files.isDirectory(dir), "包目录不存在: " + dir);
try (Stream<Path> files = Files.walk(dir)) {
for (Path f : files.filter(p -> p.toString().endsWith(".java")).toList()) {
String src = stripComments(Files.readString(f, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
if (src.contains("@Scheduled")) {
violations.add(f.getFileName() + " 含 @Scheduled 定时任务"
+ "(ZC-MM-004:禁止引入代替用户决定/代操作的自动化通道)");
}
}
}
}
assertEquals(List.of(), violations,
"红娘/转介域出现定时任务必须先过「禁止代用户决定」评审(ZC-MM-004)");
}
// ==================== 解析实现 ====================
/** 全仓 main 源码 + 迁移脚本扫描 ContactAuthorization 机制(003/004 共享)。 */
private List<String> scanForContactAuthorizationMechanism() throws IOException {
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
try (Stream<Path> files = Files.walk(SRC_ROOT)) {
for (Path f : files.filter(p -> p.toString().endsWith(".java")).toList()) {
String name = f.getFileName().toString();
if (name.contains("ContactAuthorization")) {
violations.add("出现联系授权类(机制被引入): " + name);
continue;
}
String src = stripComments(Files.readString(f, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
if (src.contains("ContactAuthorization")) {
violations.add("源码引用联系授权机制: " + f.getFileName());
}
}
}
for (Path migrationDir : migrationDirCandidates()) {
if (!Files.isDirectory(migrationDir)) {
continue;
}
try (Stream<Path> files = Files.list(migrationDir)) {
for (Path f : files.filter(p -> p.toString().endsWith(".sql")).toList()) {
String src = Files.readString(f, StandardCharsets.UTF_8).toLowerCase();
if (src.contains("matchmaker_contact_authorizations")) {
violations.add("出现 matchmaker_contact_authorizations 建表迁移: " + f.getFileName()
+ "(安全默认=不开放;仅当产品确认开放联系功能时随 006 评审引入)");
}
}
}
}
return violations;
}
/** 迁移脚本目录(兼容仓库根与单模块两种布局)。 */
private List<Path> migrationDirCandidates() {
Path parent = SRC_ROOT.getParent();
return List.of(
parent != null ? parent.resolve("resources/db/migration") : Path.of("backend/src/main/resources/db/migration"),
Path.of("backend/src/main/resources/db/migration"),
Path.of("src/main/resources/db/migration"));
}
private static String stripComments(String src) {
return src.replaceAll("//[^\\n]*", "").replaceAll("/\\*.*?\\*/", "");
}
/** 定位源码根目录(与 SecurityPathCoverageTest 同款双候选)。 */
private static Path resolveSourceRoot() {
for (String candidate : new String[]{"src/main/java", "backend/src/main/java"}) {
Path path = Path.of(candidate);
if (Files.isDirectory(path)) {
return path;
}
}
throw new IllegalStateException(
"无法定位源码根目录(尝试过 src/main/java 与 backend/src/main/java);当前工作目录="
+ Path.of("").toAbsolutePath());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.AuditLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.controller.MatchmakerAssignmentController;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerRecommendation;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerServiceRecord;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerAssignmentMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerRecommendationMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerServiceMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerAssignmentService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerServiceService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.referral.service.ReferralService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.profile.entity.UserPrivacySettings;
import com.danyang.match.platform.profile.entity.UserProfile;
import com.danyang.match.platform.profile.mapper.UserPrivacySettingsMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.profile.mapper.UserProfileMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.OperatorPrincipal;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.entity.User;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.mapper.UserMapper;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.security.access.AccessDeniedException;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken;
import org.springframework.security.core.authority.SimpleGrantedAuthority;
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.stream.Stream;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* ZC-MM-005(统一数据范围与字段隐私)验收测试 —— 读侧纯化 + 防探测 404 + 字段白名单 + 组长统计。
*
* <p>覆盖:
* <ul>
* <li>MM-PRIVACY-001(负向×3):非持有人读详情 404+审计;查无 serviceId 响应与前者
* 逐字段一致(防探测);撤销后原持有人再读 404;</li>
* <li>MM-AUTH-001 读侧(正向):持分配红娘读完整详情、无 viewerIsOwner 双态残留;</li>
* <li>MM-AUTH-003 读侧(负向):读他人对象 → 404+审计;</li>
* <li>MM-LIFECYCLE-001 读侧:end/revoke/expired 后 404;</li>
* <li>组长团队统计正例 + 普通红娘 403+审计(负向);</li>
* <li>showOccupation 隐私开关:false 隐藏 occupationCode,true/未设置放行。</li>
* </ul>
*/
@SpringBootTest
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Transactional
class MatchmakerDataScope005Test {
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceService matchmakerServiceService;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentService assignmentService;
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceMapper serviceMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentMapper assignmentMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerRecommendationMapper recommendationMapper;
@Autowired private OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
@Autowired private UserMapper userMapper;
@Autowired private UserProfileMapper userProfileMapper;
@Autowired private UserPrivacySettingsMapper userPrivacySettingsMapper;
@Autowired private AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentController assignmentController;
@Autowired private ReferralService referralService;
private String leaderA; // 组长,org X
private String mmB; // 红娘,org X
private String mmC; // 红娘,org Y
private String mmD; // 红娘,org X
private String user1;
private String user2;
private String user3;
private static final String ORG_X = "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333331";
private static final String ORG_Y = "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333332";
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
leaderA = createOperator("组长A-005", ORG_X);
mmB = createOperator("红娘B-005", ORG_X);
mmC = createOperator("红娘C-005", ORG_Y);
mmD = createOperator("红娘D-005", ORG_X);
user1 = createUserWithProfile("ds-user1");
user2 = createUserWithProfile("ds-user2");
user3 = createUserWithProfile("ds-user3");
}
@AfterEach
void clearSecurityContext() {
SecurityContextHolder.clearContext();
}
// ==================== 数据构造 ====================
private String createOperator(String name, String organizationId) {
Operator op = new Operator();
op.setName(name);
op.setOrganizationId(organizationId);
op.setUsername("ds_" + name + "_" + System.nanoTime());
op.setPasswordHash("test-hash");
op.setStatus("active");
operatorMapper.insert(op);
return op.getId();
}
private String createUserWithProfile(String tag) {
User u = new User();
u.setWechatOpenid("ds_" + tag + "_" + System.nanoTime());
u.setAccountStatus(Constants.ACCOUNT_STATUS_NORMAL);
userMapper.insert(u);
UserProfile profile = new UserProfile();
profile.setUserId(u.getId());
profile.setDisplayName(tag);
profile.setGender("female");
profile.setBirthDate(java.time.LocalDate.of(1995, 6, 15));
profile.setRegionName("丹阳市云阳街道");
profile.setEducationCode("bachelor");
profile.setOccupationCode("teacher");
profile.setMaritalStatus("never_married");
profile.setProfileStatus(Constants.PROFILE_STATUS_APPROVED);
userProfileMapper.insert(profile);
return u.getId();
}
private String createService(String userId, String operatorId) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord svc = new MatchmakerServiceRecord();
svc.setUserId(userId);
svc.setServiceType(Constants.MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_TYPE_RECOMMEND_PARTNER);
svc.setDescription("希望找一位本地稳定的伴侣");
// submitted:createAssignment 会联动把服务单置 assigned(A1 同事务联动语义)
svc.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_SUBMITTED);
svc.setAssignedOperatorId(operatorId);
serviceMapper.insert(svc);
return svc.getId();
}
/** 平台授权路径创建分配(绕过组织范围校验以构造前置状态),返回 assignmentId */
private String createAssignment(String operatorId, String userId, String serviceId) {
MatchmakerAssignment a = assignmentService.create(leaderA, true, userId, operatorId,
serviceId, "005 测试前置分配", null);
return a.getId();
}
private void authenticate(String operatorId, String... permissions) {
Set<String> permSet = Set.of(permissions);
var authorities = Stream.concat(
Stream.of(new SimpleGrantedAuthority("ROLE_OPERATOR")),
permSet.stream().map(SimpleGrantedAuthority::new)).toList();
SecurityContextHolder.getContext().setAuthentication(
UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken.authenticated(
new OperatorPrincipal(operatorId, permSet), null, authorities));
}
private long countAudits(String action, String operatorId) {
return auditLogMapper.selectCount(new LambdaQueryWrapper<AuditLog>()
.eq(AuditLog::getAction, action)
.eq(operatorId != null, AuditLog::getOperatorId, operatorId));
}
private long countDeniedAuditsForResource(String operatorId, String resourceId) {
return auditLogMapper.selectCount(new LambdaQueryWrapper<AuditLog>()
.eq(AuditLog::getAction, "DATA_SCOPE_DENIED")
.eq(AuditLog::getOperatorId, operatorId)
.eq(AuditLog::getResourceId, resourceId));
}
private BusinessException notFoundCall(String operatorId, String serviceId) {
try {
matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, operatorId);
} catch (BusinessException e) {
return e;
}
throw new AssertionError("预期抛出 BusinessException(NOT_FOUND),但正常返回了");
}
// ==================== MM-PRIVACY-001(负向×3) ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-PRIVACY-001a(负向): 非持有人读服务单 → 404 + DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计(语义403)")
void mmPrivacy001a_nonHolderReadDetailNotFoundAndAudited() {
String serviceId = createService(user1, mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId);
long before = countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmC, serviceId);
BusinessException e = notFoundCall(mmC, serviceId);
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e.getCode(), "非持有人响应必须是 404(防探测)");
assertEquals("服务不存在", e.getMessage());
assertEquals(before + 1, countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmC, serviceId),
"越权读尝试必须先落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计(语义 403)");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-PRIVACY-001b(负向): 查无 serviceId 的响应与非持有人 404 逐字段一致(防探测)")
void mmPrivacy001b_notFoundResponseIndistinguishableFromDenied() {
String serviceId = createService(user1, mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId);
BusinessException denied = notFoundCall(mmC, serviceId); // 非持有人(真实存在)
BusinessException missing = notFoundCall(mmC, "no-such-service-id"); // 查无
// 全局异常处理器把 BusinessException 映射为 ApiResponse.error(code, message),
// code+message 一致 ⇒ 响应体逐字段一致(success/code/message),无法区分"无权"与"不存在"
assertEquals(denied.getCode(), missing.getCode(), "HTTP/业务码必须一致");
assertEquals(denied.getMessage(), missing.getMessage(), "响应 message 必须一致");
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, missing.getCode());
assertEquals("服务不存在", missing.getMessage());
}
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-PRIVACY-001c(负向): 撤销后原持有人再读详情 → 404(E1:无 assigned_operator_id 回退)")
void mmPrivacy001c_revokedHolderReadDetailNotFound() {
String serviceId = createService(user1, mmB);
String assignmentId = createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId);
// 撤销前持有人可读
Map<String, Object> detail = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, mmB);
assertNotNull(detail);
assignmentService.revoke(assignmentId, leaderA, false, "005 撤销验证");
// E1 核心断言:撤销后服务单仍残留 assigned_operator_id=mmB,但回退分支已删 → 404
assertEquals(mmB, serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId).getAssignedOperatorId(),
"前置确认:服务单 assigned_operator_id 残留(回退分支必须对此免疫)");
long before = countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmB, serviceId);
BusinessException e = notFoundCall(mmB, serviceId);
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e.getCode());
assertEquals(before + 1, countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmB, serviceId),
"原持有人失权后的读取也必须落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计");
}
// ==================== MM-AUTH-001 读侧(正向) ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-AUTH-001 读侧: 持分配红娘读详情 200 语义、完整字段、无 viewerIsOwner 双态残留")
void mmAuth001_readSideHolderGetsFullDetailWithoutDualState() {
String serviceId = createService(user1, mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId);
Map<String, Object> detail = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, mmB);
assertNotNull(detail);
assertEquals(user1, detail.get("userId"));
assertEquals("希望找一位本地稳定的伴侣", detail.get("description"));
assertTrue(detail.containsKey("userProfile"), "持有人可见白名单用户资料");
assertTrue(detail.containsKey("followups"), "持有人可见跟进正文");
assertTrue(detail.containsKey("recommendations"), "持有人可见推荐列表");
// E1:双态残留字段必须消失
assertFalse(detail.containsKey("viewerIsOwner"), "viewerIsOwner 双态字段已删除");
assertFalse(detail.containsKey("followupCount"), "脱敏分支的 followupCount 摘要已随 404 消失");
// E3:userProfile 白名单键集合
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
Map<String, Object> userProfile = (Map<String, Object>) detail.get("userProfile");
Set<String> whitelist = Set.of("displayName", "gender", "age", "regionName",
"educationCode", "occupationCode", "maritalStatus");
assertTrue(whitelist.containsAll(userProfile.keySet()),
"userProfile 键必须落在白名单内,实际=" + userProfile.keySet());
assertEquals("丹阳市云阳街道", userProfile.get("regionName"));
}
// ==================== MM-AUTH-003 读侧(负向) ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-AUTH-003 读侧(负向): B 读 D 的服务对象详情 → 404 + 审计")
void mmAuth003_readSideCrossHolderAccessDeniedAndAudited() {
String serviceId = createService(user3, mmD);
createAssignment(mmD, user3, serviceId);
long before = countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmB, serviceId);
BusinessException e = notFoundCall(mmB, serviceId);
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e.getCode());
assertEquals(before + 1, countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmB, serviceId));
}
// ==================== MM-LIFECYCLE-001 读侧 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-LIFECYCLE-001 读侧: end 后 404;expires_at 届满惰性置 expired 后 404")
void mmLifecycle001_readSideTerminalStatesAllNotFound() {
// end 后 404
String serviceId1 = createService(user1, mmB);
String a1 = createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId1);
assignmentService.end(a1, leaderA, false, "005 服务完结");
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND,
notFoundCall(mmB, serviceId1).getCode(), "end 后读详情必须 404");
// expires_at 届满(固定时间注入:写入已过期的 expires_at)→ 惰性 expired → 404
String serviceId2 = createService(user2, mmB);
MatchmakerAssignment a2 = assignmentService.create(leaderA, true, user2, mmB,
serviceId2, "短期分配", Instant.now().minusSeconds(3600));
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND,
notFoundCall(mmB, serviceId2).getCode(), "已过期分配读详情必须 404");
assertEquals(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_EXPIRED,
assignmentMapper.findById(a2.getId()).orElseThrow().getStatus(),
"惰性过期必须落库");
}
// ==================== E1 边界:active 分配 × completed 服务单 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("E1 边界: active 分配 + completed 服务单 → 持有人可读详情(200);分配终态(end)后同单再读→404")
void activeAssignmentWithCompletedServiceStillReadableThen404AfterEnd() {
String serviceId = createService(user1, mmB);
String assignmentId = createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId);
// 推进服务单到 in_service 并完成。completeService 仅改服务单状态、不结束分配
// (服务单与分配是两条独立生命周期)
MatchmakerServiceRecord svc = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
svc.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_IN_SERVICE);
serviceMapper.updateById(svc);
matchmakerServiceService.completeService(serviceId, mmB);
assertEquals(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_COMPLETED,
serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId).getStatus());
// 分配仍处于 active → mmB 在该用户数据范围内,读 completed 单应放行(200,非 404)。
// 说明:决策"completed 服务单 404"语义实为"分配已终态则 404"(代码 L348 注释"分配已终态"),
// 本用例锁定"分配仍 active"时 completed 单仍属本人数据范围、可正常回看。
Map<String, Object> detail = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, mmB);
assertNotNull(detail, "active 分配持有人读 completed 服务单应放行(200),不应 404");
assertEquals(user1, detail.get("userId"));
// 对照:分配 end(终态)后,同一 completed 单再读 → 404(E1:防 assigned_operator_id 回退)
assignmentService.end(assignmentId, leaderA, false, "005 边界:服务完结后结束分配");
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, notFoundCall(mmB, serviceId).getCode(),
"分配终态后读 completed 服务单详情必须 404");
}
// ==================== 组长团队统计(T03) ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("组长统计: 以组长 org 为边界(跨组织不计入);NULL 组长统计平台直属")
void teamStatisticsScopedByLeaderOrganization() {
createAssignment(mmB, user1, null);
createAssignment(mmD, user3, null);
createAssignment(mmC, user2, null); // org Y,不应计入 org X 组长的统计
Map<String, Object> stats = assignmentService.teamStatistics(leaderA);
assertEquals(ORG_X, stats.get("organizationId"));
assertEquals(2L, stats.get("activeAssignmentCount"), "跨组织分配不得计入");
assertEquals(2L, stats.get("activeMatchmakerCount"));
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
List<Map<String, Object>> perMatchmaker = (List<Map<String, Object>>) stats.get("perMatchmakerCounts");
assertEquals(2, perMatchmaker.size());
assertTrue(perMatchmaker.stream().allMatch(row ->
Set.of("operatorId", "operatorName", "activeCount").equals(row.keySet())
|| row.keySet().containsAll(Set.of("operatorId", "operatorName", "activeCount"))),
"分组行键必须为 operatorId/operatorName/activeCount(脱敏,无联系方式),实际=" + perMatchmaker);
// NULL 组长 → 平台直属边界(IS NOT DISTINCT FROM NULL)
String platformLeader = createOperator("平台直属组长-005", null);
String platformMm = createOperator("平台直属红娘-005", null);
String platformUser = createUserWithProfile("ds-platform-user");
assignmentService.create(platformLeader, true, platformUser, platformMm, null,
"平台直属分配", null);
Map<String, Object> platformStats = assignmentService.teamStatistics(platformLeader);
assertNull(platformStats.get("organizationId"));
assertEquals(1L, platformStats.get("activeAssignmentCount"),
"NULL 组长统计平台直属(IS NOT DISTINCT FROM NULL)");
// 该平台直属分配不得计入 orgX 组长的统计
assertEquals(2L, assignmentService.teamStatistics(leaderA).get("activeAssignmentCount"),
"平台直属分配不得计入有组织组长的统计");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("负向: 普通红娘(无 team.assign)调 team/statistics → 403 + AUTHORIZATION_DENIED 审计")
void normalMatchmakerCannotReadTeamStatistics() {
// 必须走 Spring 注入的代理 Bean(@PreAuthorize 方法级安全在代理上生效)
authenticate(mmB, "matchmaker.view", "matchmaker.service");
long before = countAudits("AUTHORIZATION_DENIED", mmB);
assertThrows(AccessDeniedException.class,
() -> assignmentController.teamStatistics(
new OperatorPrincipal(mmB, Set.of("matchmaker.view", "matchmaker.service"))),
"team/statistics 仅组长(team.assign)可读");
assertEquals(before + 1, countAudits("AUTHORIZATION_DENIED", mmB),
"授权拒绝必须落 AUTHORIZATION_DENIED 审计");
}
// ==================== showOccupation 隐私开关(E3) ====================
// ==================== P1-1:推荐列表切判定器(读路径) ====================
private MatchmakerRecommendation createRecommendation(String serviceId, String userId,
String targetUserId, String operatorId) {
MatchmakerRecommendation rec = new MatchmakerRecommendation();
rec.setId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
rec.setServiceId(serviceId);
rec.setUserId(userId);
rec.setTargetUserId(targetUserId);
rec.setOperatorId(operatorId);
rec.setReason("005 收口测试推荐");
rec.setStatus(Constants.RECOMMENDATION_STATUS_PENDING_VIEW);
recommendationMapper.insert(rec);
return rec;
}
@Test
@DisplayName("P1-1: 推荐列表按生效分配过滤 —— revoke 后不再可见 assigned_operator_id 残留列放行的推荐")
void recommendationsFollowActiveAssignmentsNotResidualColumn() {
String serviceId = createService(user1, mmB);
String assignmentId = createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId);
MatchmakerRecommendation rec = createRecommendation(serviceId, user1, user2, mmB);
// 正向:active 分配持有人可见本人分配对象名下服务的推荐
List<Map<String, Object>> visible = matchmakerServiceService.getRecommendationsByOperator(mmB);
assertEquals(1, visible.size(), "active 分配持有人应看到该推荐");
assertEquals(rec.getId(), visible.get(0).get("id"));
// 横向:无分配的红娘不可见
assertTrue(matchmakerServiceService.getRecommendationsByOperator(mmC).isEmpty(),
"无生效分配的红娘不得看到他人对象的推荐");
// 负向:revoke 后服务单残留 assigned_operator_id=mmB(前置确认),推荐列表必须不再含该条
assignmentService.revoke(assignmentId, leaderA, false, "005 P1-1 撤销验证");
assertEquals(mmB, serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId).getAssignedOperatorId(),
"前置确认:残留列仍在(回退式过滤必须对此免疫)");
assertTrue(matchmakerServiceService.getRecommendationsByOperator(mmB).isEmpty(),
"撤销后推荐列表必须不再包含已失联对象的推荐");
}
// ==================== P1-2:dashboard 三计数切判定器(读路径) ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("P1-2: dashboard inProgress/today/completed 按生效分配口径 —— end 后全部归零(他人接手的单不再计入)")
void dashboardCountsFollowActiveAssignments() {
String serviceId = createService(user1, mmB);
String assignmentId = createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId);
Map<String, Object> d0 = matchmakerServiceService.getDashboard(mmB);
assertEquals(1L, d0.get("todayCount"), "分配创建时服务单 assigned_at=今天 → today=1");
assertEquals(0L, d0.get("inProgressCount"));
assertEquals(0L, d0.get("completedCount"));
// 服务单推进到 in_service → 进行中 +1
MatchmakerServiceRecord svc = serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId);
svc.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_IN_SERVICE);
serviceMapper.updateById(svc);
assertEquals(1L, matchmakerServiceService.getDashboard(mmB).get("inProgressCount"));
// 完成 → inProgress 归零、completed +1
matchmakerServiceService.completeService(serviceId, mmB);
Map<String, Object> d1 = matchmakerServiceService.getDashboard(mmB);
assertEquals(0L, d1.get("inProgressCount"));
assertEquals(1L, d1.get("completedCount"), "分配仍生效时历史 completed 计入本人");
// 分配 end(终态)→ 三项计数全部归零(DEC-002 规则7:服务结束失去访问权)
assignmentService.end(assignmentId, leaderA, false, "005 P1-2 结束验证");
Map<String, Object> d2 = matchmakerServiceService.getDashboard(mmB);
assertEquals(0L, d2.get("inProgressCount"));
assertEquals(0L, d2.get("todayCount"), "分配 end 后该用户服务单不再计入本人今日数");
assertEquals(0L, d2.get("completedCount"), "分配 end 后历史 completed 不再计入本人");
}
// ==================== P1-3:转介授权切判定器(写路径) ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("P1-3: 转介授权走判定器 —— 有效分配内正常转介(正向);revoke/无分配 → 404 化拒绝 + DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计(负向)")
void referralAuthorizationFollowsActiveAssignments() {
String serviceId = createService(user1, mmB);
String assignmentId = createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId);
// 正向:有效分配内红娘可转介
Map<String, Object> ok = referralService.referToActivity(mmB, user1, "act-005-p13", "紧急联系人", "enc");
assertNotNull(ok.get("registrationId"), "有效分配内转介必须成功落库");
// 负向①:无任何分配的用户 → 404 化拒绝(T04 防探测)+ 审计
long before = countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmB, user2);
BusinessException denied1 = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> referralService.referToActivity(mmB, user2, "act-005-p14", "紧急联系人", "enc"),
"无生效分配的红娘不得对任意用户发起转介");
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, denied1.getCode(), "拒绝必须 404 化(防探测)");
assertEquals("服务不存在", denied1.getMessage());
assertEquals(before + 1, countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmB, user2),
"越权转介必须先落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计");
// 负向②:revoke 后原对象转介 → 404 化拒绝 + 审计(残留 assigned_operator_id 不再构成转介凭据)
assignmentService.revoke(assignmentId, leaderA, false, "005 P1-3 撤销验证");
assertEquals(mmB, serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId).getAssignedOperatorId(),
"前置确认:服务单残留 assigned_operator_id");
long beforeRevoked = countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmB, user1);
BusinessException denied2 = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> referralService.referToServiceStation(mmB, user1, "loc-005-p13",
"counselor_consultation", null, "备注"),
"撤销分配后红娘对原对象发起服务站转介必须拒绝");
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, denied2.getCode());
assertEquals(beforeRevoked + 1, countDeniedAuditsForResource(mmB, user1));
}
@Test
@DisplayName("E3 showOccupation: false→无 occupationCode;true/未设置→有(缺省全放行)")
void showOccupationPrivacySwitch() {
String serviceId = createService(user1, mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, user1, serviceId);
// 未设置(无隐私记录)→ 放行
Map<String, Object> detail = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, mmB);
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
Map<String, Object> profileDefault = (Map<String, Object>) detail.get("userProfile");
assertTrue(profileDefault.containsKey("occupationCode"), "未设置隐私记录时缺省放行");
// false → 隐藏 occupationCode,其余白名单字段不受影响
UserPrivacySettings privacyOff = new UserPrivacySettings();
privacyOff.setUserId(user1);
privacyOff.setShowOccupation(false);
userPrivacySettingsMapper.insert(privacyOff);
Map<String, Object> detailOff = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, mmB);
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
Map<String, Object> profileOff = (Map<String, Object>) detailOff.get("userProfile");
assertFalse(profileOff.containsKey("occupationCode"), "showOccupation=false 必须隐藏职业");
assertTrue(profileOff.containsKey("displayName") && profileOff.containsKey("educationCode"),
"其他白名单字段不受影响");
// true → 放行
privacyOff.setShowOccupation(true);
userPrivacySettingsMapper.updateById(privacyOff);
Map<String, Object> detailOn = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, mmB);
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
Map<String, Object> profileOn = (Map<String, Object>) detailOn.get("userProfile");
assertTrue(profileOn.containsKey("occupationCode"), "showOccupation=true 放行");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.nio.file.Paths;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import java.util.stream.Stream;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* ZC-MM-005 / E3+MM-PRIVACY-002 字段级隐私守卫(standalone 源码扫描,无需 Spring 上下文)。
*
* <p>锁定两条不变量:
* <ol>
* <li>红娘侧 userProfile 装配(MatchmakerServiceService#assembleMatchmakerUserProfile)
* 的输出键集合 ⊆ §5.2 白名单 {displayName, gender, age, regionName, educationCode,
* occupationCode, maritalStatus};方法体内不得出现 phone/mobile/wechat/idNumber/
* birthDate/address/id_card 等禁放字段的 getter 调用(birthDate 仅允许作为
* calculateAge 的输入存在,绝不能成为输出键);</li>
* <li>MM-PRIVACY-002:matchmaker / referral 运营端 Controller 不存在
* export / download / batch 类端点(锁定"不存在"——导出能力引入时守卫即红)。</li>
* </ol>
*/
class MatchmakerFieldPrivacyGuardTest {
private static final Path SERVICE_SOURCE =
Paths.get("backend/src/main/java/com/danyang/match/platform/matchmaker/service/MatchmakerServiceService.java");
private static final Path CONTROLLER_DIRS = Paths.get("backend/src/main/java/com/danyang/match/platform");
/** §5.2 红娘侧用户资料白名单(与 assembleMatchmakerUserProfile 一一对照) */
private static final Set<String> WHITELIST = Set.of(
"displayName", "gender", "age", "regionName", "educationCode", "occupationCode", "maritalStatus");
/** §5.2 禁放字段(作为输出键或 getter 调用出现即违规) */
private static final List<String> FORBIDDEN_KEY_TOKENS = List.of(
"phone", "mobile", "wechat", "idNumber", "birthDate", "address", "id_card");
private static final List<String> FORBIDDEN_GETTERS = List.of(
"getPhone", "getMobile", "getWechat", "getIdNumber", "getAddress", "getIdCard");
// ==================== E3:userProfile 白名单 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("E3 守卫:userProfile 装配键 ⊆ §5.2 白名单,禁放字段不得出现")
void userProfileAssemblyKeysAreWhitelisted() throws IOException {
String body = extractMethodBody("assembleMatchmakerUserProfile");
assertTrue(body != null && !body.isBlank(), "未能从源码提取 assembleMatchmakerUserProfile 方法体");
// 输出键白名单
Set<String> keys = new LinkedHashSet<>();
Matcher put = Pattern.compile("userProfile\\.put\\(\"([^\"]+)\"").matcher(body);
while (put.find()) {
keys.add(put.group(1));
}
assertFalse(keys.isEmpty(), "装配方法必须显式输出字段(防止装配被搬空后守卫永真)");
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
for (String key : keys) {
if (!WHITELIST.contains(key)) {
violations.add("非白名单输出键: " + key);
}
String lower = key.toLowerCase();
for (String token : FORBIDDEN_KEY_TOKENS) {
if (lower.contains(token.toLowerCase())) {
violations.add("输出键含禁放字段 token: " + key + "(含 " + token + ")");
}
}
}
// 禁放字段的 getter 调用(birthDate 仅允许经 calculateAge 派生,无独立 getter 白名单问题)
for (String getter : FORBIDDEN_GETTERS) {
if (body.contains(getter + "(")) {
violations.add("装配方法调用了禁放字段 getter: " + getter);
}
}
assertEquals(List.of(), violations,
"userProfile 字段级隐私契约被破坏(§5.2):\n - " + String.join("\n - ", violations)
+ "\n实际输出键=" + keys);
}
@Test
@DisplayName("守卫自检:装配方法必须包含 showOccupation 开关逻辑(防装配被改回无隐私开关)")
void assemblyMustKeepOccupationPrivacySwitch() throws IOException {
String body = extractMethodBody("assembleMatchmakerUserProfile");
assertTrue(body.contains("showOccupation"),
"装配方法必须读取隐私开关 showOccupation(E3)");
assertTrue(body.contains("Boolean.FALSE.equals"),
"缺省=全放行的语义必须保留(仅显式 false 隐藏)");
}
// ==================== MM-PRIVACY-002:无导出端点 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("MM-PRIVACY-002: matchmaker/referral Controller 无 export/download/batch 端点")
void noExportDownloadBatchEndpoints() throws IOException {
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
List<Path> controllerDirs = List.of(
CONTROLLER_DIRS.resolve("matchmaker/controller"),
CONTROLLER_DIRS.resolve("referral/controller"));
for (Path dir : controllerDirs) {
assertTrue(Files.isDirectory(dir), "Controller 目录不存在: " + dir);
try (Stream<Path> files = Files.list(dir)) {
for (Path f : files.filter(p -> p.toString().endsWith(".java")).toList()) {
String src = Files.readString(f, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Matcher mapping = Pattern.compile(
"@(Get|Post|Put|Delete)Mapping\\(([^)]*)\\)", Pattern.DOTALL).matcher(src);
while (mapping.find()) {
String args = mapping.group(2).toLowerCase();
for (String banned : List.of("export", "download", "batch")) {
if (args.contains(banned)) {
violations.add(f.getFileName() + " → " + mapping.group(0)
.replaceAll("\\s+", " ") + " 含禁用能力: " + banned);
}
}
}
}
}
}
assertEquals(List.of(), violations,
"红娘/转介域引入导出/批量能力必须先过隐私评审(§5.2 + MM-PRIVACY-002)");
}
// ==================== 解析实现 ====================
/** 按花括号配对提取指定方法的方法体(去注释后匹配)。 */
private String extractMethodBody(String methodName) throws IOException {
String src = Files.readString(SERVICE_SOURCE, StandardCharsets.UTF_8)
.replaceAll("//[^\\n]*", "")
.replaceAll("/\\*.*?\\*/", "");
int sig = src.indexOf(methodName);
if (sig < 0) {
return null;
}
int open = src.indexOf('{', sig);
if (open < 0) {
return null;
}
int depth = 0;
for (int i = open; i < src.length(); i++) {
char ch = src.charAt(i);
if (ch == '{') depth++;
else if (ch == '}') {
depth--;
if (depth == 0) {
return src.substring(open + 1, i);
}
}
}
return null;
}
}
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ class MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test {
@Autowired private com.danyang.match.platform.verification.mapper.UserIdentityMapper userIdentityMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceMapper matchmakerServiceMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerRecommendationMapper recommendationMapper;
@Autowired private com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerAssignmentMapper matchmakerAssignmentMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerService matchmakerService;
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceService matchmakerServiceService;
@Autowired private ReferralService referralService;
@@ -73,6 +74,19 @@ class MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test {
target = createUser("mm-target");
// 一条归属 MATCHMAKER_OWNER 的红娘服务
serviceId = createService(user, MATCHMAKER_OWNER, Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_ASSIGNED);
// ZC-MM-005(E1):归属判定切纯判定器(无 assigned_operator_id 回退)后,
// 服务层归属断言只认 matchmaker_assignments —— 前置补一条生效分配
com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment assignment =
new com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment();
assignment.setUserId(user);
assignment.setMatchmakerOperatorId(MATCHMAKER_OWNER);
assignment.setServiceId(serviceId);
assignment.setAssignedBy(MATCHMAKER_OWNER);
assignment.setAssignmentScope(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_SCOPE_PRIMARY);
assignment.setAssignmentReason("Phase13 前置分配");
assignment.setStatus(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE);
assignment.setAssignedAt(java.time.Instant.now());
matchmakerAssignmentMapper.insert(assignment);
}
/**
@@ -289,24 +303,29 @@ class MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test {
@DisplayName("D5: 非服务负责人的红娘不能转介该用户(转介须挂在真实服务关系上)")
void otherMatchmakerCannotReferUser() {
// MATCHMAKER_OTHER 与该用户之间没有任何服务关系
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class,
// ZC-MM-005 收口(P1-3):转介授权切换为 ServiceAssignmentPolicy 判定器;
// ZC-MM-006 / T04:转介为资源寻址写端点,拒绝 404 化(先 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计,
// 再抛 404「服务不存在」,与"查无"逐字段一致,防探测)
assertThrows(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> referralService.referToActivity(
MATCHMAKER_OTHER, user, "act-p13-004", "联系人", "enc"),
"非该用户服务负责人的红娘不得发起转介");
"非该用户服务负责人的红娘不得发起转介(404 化拒绝)");
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class,
assertThrows(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> referralService.referToServiceStation(
MATCHMAKER_OTHER, user, "loc-p13-003", "counselor_consultation", null, null),
"非该用户服务负责人的红娘不得发起服务站转介");
"非该用户服务负责人的红娘不得发起服务站转介(404 化拒绝)");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("D3: 非服务负责人的红娘不能向该服务添加推荐(归属校验)")
void otherMatchmakerCannotRecommend() {
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class,
// ZC-MM-002(D4):归属判定切换到 ServiceAssignmentPolicy;
// ZC-MM-006 / T04:写接口拒绝 404 化(DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计 + BusinessException 404)
assertThrows(com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.recommendPartner(
serviceId, MATCHMAKER_OTHER, target, "越权推荐"),
"非服务负责人不得添加推荐");
"非服务负责人不得添加推荐(404 化拒绝)");
assertTrue(recommendationMapper.findByService(serviceId).isEmpty(),
"越权推荐失败后不得留下任何推荐记录");
@@ -337,21 +356,15 @@ class MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test {
// ==================== 计划项 3:红娘只读摘要,不读敏感正文 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("计划项3/D4: 非负责人的 operator 读详情只得到脱敏视图(无 userProfile / 无 followup 正文)")
void nonOwnerSeesSanitizedDetail() {
Map<String, Object> detail = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, MATCHMAKER_OTHER);
assertNotNull(detail);
assertEquals(Boolean.FALSE, detail.get("viewerIsOwner"),
"非负责人必须被标记为非 owner");
assertFalse(detail.containsKey("userProfile"),
"INV-013 同类口径:非负责人不得读取服务对象的用户资料");
assertFalse(detail.containsKey("followups"),
"非负责人不得读取跟进正文");
assertFalse(detail.containsKey("userId"),
"非负责人不需要知道申请人 userId");
assertEquals(0, ((Number) detail.getOrDefault("followupCount", 0)).intValue(),
"非负责人只能拿到跟进条数摘要");
@DisplayName("计划项3/D4+ZC-MM-005 E2: 非持有人读详情 → 防探测 404(与「查无」一致,无脱敏双态)")
void nonOwnerReadsDetailIsRejectedAsNotFound() {
// ZC-MM-005(E1+E2):002 的"非负责人脱敏详情"双态已删除;
// 非持有人读任意 serviceId 得到与"查无"逐字段一致的 404,防枚举探测。
// 读侧不再走 403(写接口维持 403,见 assertServiceAccess 口径)。
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows(
com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, MATCHMAKER_OTHER),
"非持有人读详情必须被拒(防探测 404)");
}
@Test
@@ -360,7 +373,8 @@ class MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test {
Map<String, Object> detail = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, MATCHMAKER_OWNER);
assertNotNull(detail);
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, detail.get("viewerIsOwner"));
// ZC-MM-005(E1):viewerIsOwner 双态字段已删除,持有人语义由"能拿到完整视图"表达
assertFalse(detail.containsKey("viewerIsOwner"), "双态字段已随读侧纯化删除");
assertTrue(detail.containsKey("userId"), "负责人应能看到申请人 userId");
assertTrue(detail.containsKey("followups"), "负责人应能看到跟进记录");
}
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.AuditLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.SensitiveAccessLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.SensitiveAccessLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerServiceRecord;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerAssignmentMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerServiceMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerAssignmentService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerServiceService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.entity.User;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.mapper.UserMapper;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* ZC-MM-006 / T03 验收:SensitiveAccessLog 接入红娘服务对象详情。
*
* <p>语义(AGENTS.md #8:敏感数据默认拒绝,查看动作本身必须可溯源):
* <ul>
* <li>持有人读 GET /operator/matchmaker/services/{id}(getServiceDetail)→
* sensitive_access_logs 落 success 行(dataType=matchmaker_service_detail);</li>
* <li>拒绝路径维持 audit_logs DATA_SCOPE_DENIED(判定器写入),<b>不重复写</b>
* SensitiveAccessLog —— 双记录互斥;</li>
* <li>/my 与 /team/statistics 不接入敏感访问日志(无服务对象敏感明细)。</li>
* </ul>
*
* <p>覆盖:正例 success 行;负例(非持有人)无 SensitiveAccessLog 行且 audit_logs 有
* DATA_SCOPE_DENIED;连读 N 次落 N 行(幂等逐次记录,不聚合去重)。
*/
@SpringBootTest
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Transactional
class MatchmakerSensitiveAccessAuditTest {
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceService matchmakerServiceService;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentService assignmentService;
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceMapper serviceMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentMapper assignmentMapper;
@Autowired private OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
@Autowired private UserMapper userMapper;
@Autowired private SensitiveAccessLogMapper sensitiveAccessLogMapper;
@Autowired private AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
private String holderId; // 分配持有人(红娘 B)
private String outsiderId; // 无分配红娘 C
private String userId;
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
holderId = createOperator("敏感审计持有人");
outsiderId = createOperator("敏感审计外人");
userId = createUser();
}
// ==================== 数据构造(Phase13 范式) ====================
private String createOperator(String name) {
Operator op = new Operator();
op.setName(name);
op.setUsername("sa_" + name + "_" + System.nanoTime());
op.setPasswordHash("test-hash");
op.setStatus("active");
operatorMapper.insert(op);
return op.getId();
}
private String createUser() {
User u = new User();
u.setWechatOpenid("sa_user_" + System.nanoTime());
u.setAccountStatus(Constants.ACCOUNT_STATUS_NORMAL);
userMapper.insert(u);
return u.getId();
}
private String createServiceWithAssignment() {
MatchmakerServiceRecord svc = new MatchmakerServiceRecord();
svc.setUserId(userId);
svc.setServiceType(Constants.MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_TYPE_RECOMMEND_PARTNER);
svc.setDescription("敏感访问审计测试服务单");
svc.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_SUBMITTED);
svc.setAssignedOperatorId(holderId);
serviceMapper.insert(svc);
assignmentService.create(holderId, true, userId, holderId, svc.getId(),
"T03 前置分配", null);
return svc.getId();
}
private List<SensitiveAccessLog> accessRows(String operatorId, String serviceId) {
return sensitiveAccessLogMapper.selectList(new LambdaQueryWrapper<SensitiveAccessLog>()
.eq(SensitiveAccessLog::getOperatorId, operatorId)
.eq(SensitiveAccessLog::getDataType, Constants.SENSITIVE_DATA_TYPE_MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_DETAIL)
.eq(SensitiveAccessLog::getAccessTarget, serviceId));
}
// ==================== 正例:持有人读详情落 success 行 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T03 正例: 持有人读服务详情 → sensitive_access_logs 落 success 行(dataType/target/reason 齐全)")
void holderReadDetailWritesSensitiveAccessSuccessRow() {
String serviceId = createServiceWithAssignment();
Map<String, Object> detail = matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, holderId);
assertNotNull(detail);
List<SensitiveAccessLog> rows = accessRows(holderId, serviceId);
assertEquals(1, rows.size(), "持有人读详情必须落恰好 1 行敏感访问日志");
SensitiveAccessLog row = rows.get(0);
assertEquals(Constants.SENSITIVE_DATA_TYPE_MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_DETAIL, row.getDataType());
assertEquals(Constants.SENSITIVE_ACCESS_RESULT_SUCCESS, row.getAccessResult());
assertEquals(Constants.SENSITIVE_ACCESS_REASON_MATCHMAKER_DETAIL, row.getReason());
assertEquals(userId, row.getUserId());
assertEquals(serviceId, row.getAccessTarget());
}
// ==================== 负例:非持有人读 → 双记录互斥 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T03 负例: 非持有人读详情 404 → 无 SensitiveAccessLog 行,audit_logs 有 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED")
void outsiderReadDetailWritesNoSensitiveAccessRowButDeniedAudit() {
String serviceId = createServiceWithAssignment();
BusinessException e = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, outsiderId),
"非持有人读详情必须 404(防探测口径)");
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e.getCode());
// 双记录互斥:拒绝路径只写 audit_logs,不写 sensitive_access_logs
assertTrue(accessRows(outsiderId, serviceId).isEmpty(),
"拒绝路径不得写 SensitiveAccessLog(与 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 互斥)");
Long deniedAudits = auditLogMapper.selectCount(new LambdaQueryWrapper<AuditLog>()
.eq(AuditLog::getAction, "DATA_SCOPE_DENIED")
.eq(AuditLog::getOperatorId, outsiderId)
.eq(AuditLog::getResourceId, serviceId));
assertEquals(1L, deniedAudits, "拒绝路径必须落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计");
}
// ==================== 幂等逐次记录:连读 N 次落 N 行 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T03 幂等: 持有人连读 3 次 → 落 3 行(逐次记录,不聚合去重)")
void repeatedReadsWriteRowPerAccess() {
String serviceId = createServiceWithAssignment();
matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, holderId);
matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, holderId);
matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail(serviceId, holderId);
assertEquals(3, accessRows(holderId, serviceId).size(),
"每次查看必须逐次记录(可溯源,不允许聚合去重)");
}
// ==================== 边界:查无 serviceId 不写敏感日志 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T03 边界: 查无 serviceId → 404,不落任何敏感访问行")
void missingServiceWritesNoSensitiveAccessRow() {
assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail("sa-no-such-service", holderId));
assertTrue(accessRows(holderId, "sa-no-such-service").isEmpty(),
"查无资源不构成敏感访问,不得落行");
}
}
@@ -185,4 +185,29 @@ class MatchmakerServiceTest {
() -> assertTrue(whitelist.contains(Constants.REFERRAL_SOURCE_OPERATOR_ASSISTED), whitelist.toString())
);
}
@Test
@DisplayName("ZC-MM-002 守卫:assignment 状态常量必须落在 chk_mm_assignment_status 白名单内")
void assignmentStatusConstantsAreWithinProductionWhitelist() {
Set<String> whitelist = resolveCheckValues("chk_mm_assignment_status");
assertAll(
() -> assertTrue(whitelist.contains(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE), whitelist.toString()),
() -> assertTrue(whitelist.contains(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ENDED), whitelist.toString()),
() -> assertTrue(whitelist.contains(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_REVOKED), whitelist.toString()),
() -> assertTrue(whitelist.contains(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_TRANSFERRED), whitelist.toString()),
() -> assertTrue(whitelist.contains(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_EXPIRED), whitelist.toString())
);
}
@Test
@DisplayName("ZC-MM-002 守卫:assignment scope 常量必须落在 chk_mm_assignment_scope 白名单内")
void assignmentScopeConstantsAreWithinProductionWhitelist() {
Set<String> whitelist = resolveCheckValues("chk_mm_assignment_scope");
assertAll(
() -> assertTrue(whitelist.contains(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_SCOPE_PRIMARY), whitelist.toString()),
() -> assertTrue(whitelist.contains(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_SCOPE_COLLABORATING), whitelist.toString())
);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.AuditLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerAssignment;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerFollowup;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.entity.MatchmakerServiceRecord;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerAssignmentMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerFollowupMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerRecommendationMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.mapper.MatchmakerServiceMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerAssignmentService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.matchmaker.service.MatchmakerServiceService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.referral.service.ReferralService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.entity.User;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.mapper.UserMapper;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* ZC-MM-006 / T04 验收:写接口 404 统一(防探测)。
*
* <p>语义:带资源寻址的写端点(transfer / revoke / end / recommend / followup / complete /
* 转介)范围校验失败时,先落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计,再抛 404「服务不存在」——
* 响应与"资源不存在"(读详情 404)逐字段一致,调用方无法区分"无权"与"不存在",
* 杜绝按资源 ID 枚举探测写端点。create / assign 类无资源寻址端点维持 403(不在本测试面)。
*
* <p>覆盖:负向×5(跨组织 transfer / 无分配 recommend / followup / complete / 非负责人转介)
* + 正向×2(持有人 recommend / followup 正常)+ 五个拒绝响应与读详情 404 逐字段一致。
*/
@SpringBootTest
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Transactional
class MatchmakerWriteDenyUniformityTest {
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceService matchmakerServiceService;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentService assignmentService;
@Autowired private ReferralService referralService;
@Autowired private MatchmakerServiceMapper serviceMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerAssignmentMapper assignmentMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerRecommendationMapper recommendationMapper;
@Autowired private MatchmakerFollowupMapper followupMapper;
@Autowired private OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
@Autowired private UserMapper userMapper;
@Autowired private AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
private String leaderA; // 组长,org X
private String mmB; // 红娘,org X(持有人)
private String mmC; // 红娘,org Y(跨组织)
private String userId;
private static final String ORG_X = "44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444441";
private static final String ORG_Y = "44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444442";
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
leaderA = createOperator("组长A-006", ORG_X);
mmB = createOperator("红娘B-006", ORG_X);
mmC = createOperator("红娘C-006", ORG_Y);
userId = createUser();
}
// ==================== 数据构造(Phase13 范式) ====================
private String createOperator(String name, String organizationId) {
Operator op = new Operator();
op.setName(name);
op.setOrganizationId(organizationId);
op.setUsername("wu_" + name + "_" + System.nanoTime());
op.setPasswordHash("test-hash");
op.setStatus("active");
operatorMapper.insert(op);
return op.getId();
}
private String createUser() {
User u = new User();
u.setWechatOpenid("wu_user_" + System.nanoTime());
u.setAccountStatus(Constants.ACCOUNT_STATUS_NORMAL);
userMapper.insert(u);
return u.getId();
}
private String createService(String operatorId) {
MatchmakerServiceRecord svc = new MatchmakerServiceRecord();
svc.setUserId(userId);
svc.setServiceType(Constants.MATCHMAKER_SERVICE_TYPE_RECOMMEND_PARTNER);
svc.setDescription("写接口 404 统一测试服务单");
svc.setStatus(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_SUBMITTED);
svc.setAssignedOperatorId(operatorId);
serviceMapper.insert(svc);
return svc.getId();
}
/** 平台授权路径创建分配(绕过组织范围校验以构造前置状态) */
private String createAssignment(String operatorId, String serviceId) {
MatchmakerAssignment a = assignmentService.create(leaderA, true, userId, operatorId,
serviceId, "006 测试前置分配", null);
return a.getId();
}
private long deniedAudits(String operatorId, String resourceId) {
return auditLogMapper.selectCount(new LambdaQueryWrapper<AuditLog>()
.eq(AuditLog::getAction, "DATA_SCOPE_DENIED")
.eq(AuditLog::getOperatorId, operatorId)
.eq(AuditLog::getResourceId, resourceId));
}
/** 读详情 404 基准("查无"路径)—— 五个写拒绝必须与其逐字段一致 */
private BusinessException readDetailNotFoundBaseline() {
try {
matchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail("wu-no-such-service", mmB);
} catch (BusinessException e) {
return e;
}
throw new AssertionError("预期读详情 404 基准异常");
}
// ==================== 负向×5:写拒绝 404 化 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T04 负向①: 跨组织 transfer → 404「服务不存在」+ DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计")
void crossOrgTransferDeniedAsNotFound() {
String serviceId = createService(mmB);
String assignmentId = createAssignment(mmB, serviceId);
long before = deniedAudits(leaderA, assignmentId);
BusinessException e = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.transfer(assignmentId, leaderA, false, mmC, "跨组织转分配"),
"跨组织 transfer 必须拒绝");
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e.getCode());
assertEquals("服务不存在", e.getMessage());
assertEquals(before + 1, deniedAudits(leaderA, assignmentId), "必须先落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计");
// 被转记录原样保留
assertEquals(Constants.ASSIGNMENT_STATUS_ACTIVE,
assignmentMapper.findById(assignmentId).orElseThrow().getStatus(),
"被拒绝的转分配不得改变原分配状态");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("T04 负向②: 无分配 recommend → 404「服务不存在」+ 审计")
void recommendWithoutAssignmentDeniedAsNotFound() {
String serviceId = createService(mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, serviceId);
long before = deniedAudits(mmC, serviceId);
BusinessException e = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.recommendPartner(serviceId, mmC, "wu-target", "无权推荐"));
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e.getCode());
assertEquals("服务不存在", e.getMessage());
assertEquals(before + 1, deniedAudits(mmC, serviceId));
assertTrue(recommendationMapper.findByService(serviceId).isEmpty(),
"拒绝的推荐不得落库");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("T04 负向③: 无分配 followup → 404「服务不存在」+ 审计")
void followupWithoutAssignmentDeniedAsNotFound() {
String serviceId = createService(mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, serviceId);
long before = deniedAudits(mmC, serviceId);
BusinessException e = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.addFollowup(serviceId, mmC, "note", "越权跟进", null));
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e.getCode());
assertEquals("服务不存在", e.getMessage());
assertEquals(before + 1, deniedAudits(mmC, serviceId));
assertTrue(followupMapper.findByServiceId(serviceId).isEmpty(),
"拒绝的跟进不得落库");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("T04 负向④: 无分配 complete → 404「服务不存在」+ 审计")
void completeWithoutAssignmentDeniedAsNotFound() {
String serviceId = createService(mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, serviceId);
long before = deniedAudits(mmC, serviceId);
BusinessException e = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.completeService(serviceId, mmC));
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e.getCode());
assertEquals("服务不存在", e.getMessage());
assertEquals(before + 1, deniedAudits(mmC, serviceId));
assertNotEquals(Constants.MATCHMAKER_STATUS_COMPLETED,
serviceMapper.selectById(serviceId).getStatus(),
"拒绝的完成动作不得改变服务单状态");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("T04 负向⑤: 非负责人转介 → 404「服务不存在」+ 审计(含裸异常消灭回归)")
void referralWithoutAssignmentDeniedAsNotFound() {
String serviceId = createService(mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, serviceId);
long before = deniedAudits(mmC, userId);
BusinessException e1 = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> referralService.referToActivity(mmC, userId, "act-006-t04", "紧急联系人", "enc"));
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e1.getCode());
assertEquals("服务不存在", e1.getMessage());
BusinessException e2 = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> referralService.referToServiceStation(mmC, userId, "loc-006-t04",
"counselor_consultation", null, null));
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, e2.getCode());
assertEquals(before + 2, deniedAudits(mmC, userId), "两次越权转介各落一条审计");
}
// ==================== 正向×2:持有人正常 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T04 正向①: 持有人 recommend 正常(200 语义)")
void holderRecommendSucceeds() {
String serviceId = createService(mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, serviceId);
Map<String, Object> result = matchmakerServiceService.recommendPartner(
serviceId, mmB, "wu-target-ok", "T04 持有人推荐");
assertNotNull(result.get("recommendationId"));
}
@Test
@DisplayName("T04 正向②: 持有人 followup 正常(200 语义)")
void holderFollowupSucceeds() {
String serviceId = createService(mmB);
createAssignment(mmB, serviceId);
MatchmakerFollowup followup = matchmakerServiceService.addFollowup(
serviceId, mmB, "note", "T04 持有人跟进", null);
assertNotNull(followup.getId());
}
// ==================== 逐字段一致:五个写拒绝 ≡ 读详情 404 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T04 统一性: 五个写拒绝的 code+message 与读详情 404(查无基准)逐字段一致")
void writeDeniesIndistinguishableFromReadNotFound() {
String serviceId = createService(mmB);
String assignmentId = createAssignment(mmB, serviceId);
BusinessException baseline = readDetailNotFoundBaseline();
BusinessException transferDenied = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> assignmentService.transfer(assignmentId, leaderA, false, mmC, "跨组织"));
BusinessException recommendDenied = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.recommendPartner(serviceId, mmC, "wu-t", "r"));
BusinessException followupDenied = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.addFollowup(serviceId, mmC, "note", "f", null));
BusinessException completeDenied = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> matchmakerServiceService.completeService(serviceId, mmC));
BusinessException referralDenied = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> referralService.referToActivity(mmC, userId, "act-006-u", "联系人", "enc"));
List<BusinessException> denies = List.of(transferDenied, recommendDenied,
followupDenied, completeDenied, referralDenied);
for (BusinessException denied : denies) {
assertEquals(baseline.getCode(), denied.getCode(),
"业务码必须与读详情 404 一致(逐字段防探测)");
assertEquals(baseline.getMessage(), denied.getMessage(),
"message 必须与读详情 404 一致(逐字段防探测)");
}
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.NOT_FOUND, baseline.getCode());
assertEquals("服务不存在", baseline.getMessage());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.photo;
import com.amazonaws.services.s3.AmazonS3;
import com.danyang.match.platform.photo.entity.UserPhoto;
import com.danyang.match.platform.photo.mapper.UserPhotoMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.photo.service.PhotoService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.config.FeatureFlagConfig;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.constant.Constants;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.policy.ProfilePolicy;
import com.danyang.match.platform.user.mapper.UserMapper;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.*;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.*;
/**
* 回归守卫:照片直传落库(此前「传了白传」——upload-token 之后没有任何端点写 user_photos)。
* <ul>
* <li>非法的 fileKey(不归属本人)必须被归属护栏拒绝;</li>
* <li>对象尚未上传完成(存储不存在)必须被存在性护栏拒绝;</li>
* <li>合法且已上传的直传必须真正落库(写入 user_photos 记录)。</li>
* </ul>
*/
class PhotoServiceConfirmUploadTest {
private final UserPhotoMapper photoMapper = mock(UserPhotoMapper.class);
private final AmazonS3 amazonS3 = mock(AmazonS3.class);
private final FeatureFlagConfig featureFlags = mock(FeatureFlagConfig.class);
private final ProfilePolicy profilePolicy = mock(ProfilePolicy.class);
private final UserMapper userMapper = mock(UserMapper.class);
private final AmazonS3 amazonS3Signer = mock(AmazonS3.class);
private final PhotoService photoService =
new PhotoService(photoMapper, amazonS3, featureFlags, profilePolicy, userMapper, amazonS3Signer);
@Test
void illegalFileKeyRejected() {
BusinessException ex = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> photoService.confirmDirectUpload("u1", "evil/key.jpg", "avatar"));
assertEquals("非法的文件标识", ex.getMessage());
}
@Test
void missingObjectRejected() {
when(amazonS3.doesObjectExist(any(), eq("photos/u1/x.jpg"))).thenReturn(false);
BusinessException ex = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> photoService.confirmDirectUpload("u1", "photos/u1/x.jpg", "lifestyle"));
assertEquals("文件尚未上传完成", ex.getMessage());
}
@Test
void validUploadPersistsPhoto() {
when(amazonS3.doesObjectExist(any(), eq("photos/u1/p.jpg"))).thenReturn(true);
when(photoMapper.countActiveProfilePhotos("u1")).thenReturn(0L);
when(profilePolicy.getMaxPhotoCount()).thenReturn(6);
when(photoMapper.insert(any())).thenReturn(1);
UserPhoto photo = photoService.confirmDirectUpload("u1", "photos/u1/p.jpg", "lifestyle");
assertNotNull(photo, "直传必须真实落库,不得白传");
assertEquals("u1", photo.getUserId());
assertEquals("photos/u1/p.jpg", photo.getFileKey());
assertEquals("lifestyle", photo.getPhotoType());
assertEquals(Constants.REVIEW_STATUS_PENDING, photo.getReviewStatus());
verify(photoMapper).insert(any(UserPhoto.class));
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.review.controller;
import com.danyang.match.platform.review.dto.ReviewResultDTO;
import com.danyang.match.platform.review.service.ReviewService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.OperatorPrincipal;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.mockito.Mockito;
import org.springframework.core.MethodParameter;
import org.springframework.http.MediaType;
import org.springframework.test.web.servlet.MockMvc;
import org.springframework.test.web.servlet.setup.MockMvcBuilders;
import org.springframework.web.bind.support.WebDataBinderFactory;
import org.springframework.web.context.request.NativeWebRequest;
import org.springframework.web.method.support.HandlerMethodArgumentResolver;
import org.springframework.web.method.support.ModelAndViewContainer;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.eq;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.request.MockMvcRequestBuilders.post;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.result.MockMvcResultMatchers.jsonPath;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.result.MockMvcResultMatchers.status;
/**
* ReviewController 请求体契约测试 —— 锁定 HTTP / JSON 反序列化层。
*
* <p>背景(2026-10-09 实测缺陷):admin-web 的审核决策统一发送
* {@code {comment, reasonCodes}},其中 {@code reasonCodes} 是**数组**。而 ReviewController 的
* {@code approve} / {@code need-evidence} / {@code approve-local-eligibility} /
* {@code reject-local-eligibility} 等端点此前把 {@code @RequestBody} 声明为
* {@code Map<String,String>},数组值无法反序列化成 String → Jackson 抛
* {@code HttpMessageNotReadableException} → 400「请求体格式错误」。表现为
* 「小程序提交资料后,管理员点『通过』直接报错」。
*
* <p><b>为什么用 standalone MockMvc 而不是 {@code @SpringBootTest}</b>:本缺陷发生在
* **参数解析 / 反序列化层**。先例 {@code BannerOperatorPhase19IntegrationTest} 直接
* {@code new} 控制器再调方法,**绕过了该层**,因此天然抓不到这类缺陷。standalone MockMvc
* 走真实 DispatcherServlet + 消息转换器 + ControllerAdvice,又无需 DB / Redis / 安全链,
* 确定性强、可离线跑。
*
* <p><b>判别力自证</b>:若有人把端点改回 {@code Map<String,String>},本测试立即变红(400)。
* 已用负向注入验证过(见提交说明)。
*/
class ReviewControllerRequestBodyContractTest {
private static final String OPERATOR_ID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002";
private static final String TASK_ID = "t-0001";
/** 与 admin-web {@code ReviewView.vue#runDecision} 的实际请求体完全一致(含 reasonCodes 数组)。 */
private static final String FRONTEND_PAYLOAD = "{\"comment\":\"已核验\",\"reasonCodes\":[]}";
private ReviewService reviewService;
private MockMvc mockMvc;
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
reviewService = Mockito.mock(ReviewService.class);
mockMvc = MockMvcBuilders.standaloneSetup(new ReviewController(reviewService))
.setControllerAdvice(new GlobalExceptionHandler())
.setCustomArgumentResolvers(new OperatorPrincipalResolver())
.build();
}
private ReviewResultDTO stubResult(String result) {
ReviewResultDTO dto = new ReviewResultDTO();
dto.setTaskId(TASK_ID);
dto.setResult(result);
return dto;
}
@Test
void approveAcceptsCommentAndReasonCodesArray() throws Exception {
Mockito.when(reviewService.approve(eq(TASK_ID), eq(OPERATOR_ID), any())).thenReturn(stubResult("approved"));
mockMvc.perform(post("/operator/reviews/{taskId}/approve", TASK_ID)
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content(FRONTEND_PAYLOAD))
.andExpect(status().isOk())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.success").value(true))
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.data.result").value("approved"));
}
@Test
void approveLocalEligibilityAcceptsCommentAndReasonCodesArray() throws Exception {
Mockito.when(reviewService.approveLocalEligibility(eq(TASK_ID), eq(OPERATOR_ID), any()))
.thenReturn(stubResult("approved"));
mockMvc.perform(post("/operator/reviews/{taskId}/approve-local-eligibility", TASK_ID)
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content(FRONTEND_PAYLOAD))
.andExpect(status().isOk())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.success").value(true))
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.data.result").value("approved"));
}
@Test
void rejectLocalEligibilityAcceptsCommentAndReasonCodesArray() throws Exception {
Mockito.when(reviewService.rejectLocalEligibility(eq(TASK_ID), eq(OPERATOR_ID), any()))
.thenReturn(stubResult("rejected"));
mockMvc.perform(post("/operator/reviews/{taskId}/reject-local-eligibility", TASK_ID)
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content(FRONTEND_PAYLOAD))
.andExpect(status().isOk())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.success").value(true))
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.data.result").value("rejected"));
}
@Test
void needEvidenceAcceptsCommentAndReasonCodesArray() throws Exception {
Mockito.when(reviewService.needEvidence(eq(TASK_ID), eq(OPERATOR_ID), any()))
.thenReturn(stubResult("need_evidence"));
mockMvc.perform(post("/operator/reviews/{taskId}/need-evidence", TASK_ID)
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content(FRONTEND_PAYLOAD))
.andExpect(status().isOk())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.success").value(true))
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.data.result").value("need_evidence"));
}
/** 只带 comment、不带 reasonCodes 也必须可用(前端未选原因标签时的实际载荷)。 */
@Test
void approveWithoutReasonCodesStillWorks() throws Exception {
Mockito.when(reviewService.approve(eq(TASK_ID), eq(OPERATOR_ID), any())).thenReturn(stubResult("approved"));
mockMvc.perform(post("/operator/reviews/{taskId}/approve", TASK_ID)
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content("{\"comment\":\"通过\"}"))
.andExpect(status().isOk())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.success").value(true));
}
/** 提供 {@code @AuthenticationPrincipal OperatorPrincipal} 的解析器(standalone 无安全链)。 */
private static final class OperatorPrincipalResolver implements HandlerMethodArgumentResolver {
@Override
public boolean supportsParameter(MethodParameter parameter) {
return OperatorPrincipal.class.isAssignableFrom(parameter.getParameterType());
}
@Override
public Object resolveArgument(MethodParameter parameter, ModelAndViewContainer mavContainer,
NativeWebRequest webRequest, WebDataBinderFactory binderFactory) {
return new OperatorPrincipal(OPERATOR_ID);
}
}
}
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import com.danyang.match.platform.user.controller.UserController;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.core.annotation.AnnotatedElementUtils;
import org.springframework.security.access.prepost.PreAuthorize;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PatchMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
@@ -97,6 +98,117 @@ class OperatorEndpointPermissionCoverageTest {
"扫描到的运营端接口数量异常偏少(" + operatorEndpointCount + "),守卫可能已失效");
}
// ==================== ZC-MM-006 / T05 守卫补强 ====================
/**
* T05-a:类级 @RequestMapping 前缀合成完整路径后再判 /operator/** 归属。
*
* <p>防护场景:运营端控制器普遍用类级 @RequestMapping("/operator/xxx") + 方法级
* @GetMapping("/yyy") —— 单看方法路径不含 /operator 前缀。若后续把路径从类级挪到
* 方法级(或新增控制器时前缀写错),本用例通过「类前缀 + 方法路径」合成完整路径逐条
* 判定,保证归属判定不因 mapping 写法迁移而漂移。
*/
@Test
void classLevelPrefixMustComposeIntoFullOperatorPath() {
int composedCount = 0;
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
for (Class<?> controller : CONTROLLERS) {
List<String> classPaths = paths(controller);
if (classPaths.isEmpty() || classPaths.stream().noneMatch(this::isOperatorPath)) {
continue;
}
for (Method method : controller.getDeclaredMethods()) {
List<String> methodPaths = paths(method);
if (methodPaths.isEmpty()) {
continue; // 非端点
}
for (String methodPath : methodPaths) {
String fullPath = composePath(classPaths.get(0), methodPath);
composedCount++;
if (!isOperatorPath(fullPath)) {
violations.add(controller.getSimpleName() + " → " + fullPath);
}
}
}
}
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue(composedCount >= 10,
"合成路径样本过少(" + composedCount + "),守卫可能已失效");
assertEquals(List.of(), violations,
"类级 /operator 前缀 + 方法路径合成的完整路径必须仍判为运营端归属");
}
/**
* T05-b:裸 @PreAuthorize 检查 —— 缺类级 @PreAuthorize 的控制器,其运营端接口
* 必须逐方法显式授权(未全覆盖 → 红)。
*
* <p>防护场景:带类级 @PreAuthorize 的控制器(如 MatchmakerOperatorController)允许
* 个别方法不重复标注;但若有人日后删掉类级注解,这些"裸"方法即失去权限粒度 ——
* 本用例在"类级已缺失"的状态下强制逐方法覆盖,删注解动作立即变红。
*/
@Test
void controllerWithoutClassLevelPreAuthorizeMustCoverEveryOperatorEndpoint() {
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
for (Class<?> controller : CONTROLLERS) {
boolean classLevel = AnnotatedElementUtils.hasAnnotation(controller, PreAuthorize.class);
for (Method method : controller.getDeclaredMethods()) {
List<String> methodPaths = paths(method);
if (methodPaths.isEmpty()) {
continue; // 非端点
}
boolean operatorFacing = paths(controller).stream().anyMatch(this::isOperatorPath)
|| methodPaths.stream().anyMatch(this::isOperatorPath)
|| Arrays.stream(method.getParameterTypes()).anyMatch(OperatorPrincipal.class::equals);
if (!operatorFacing) {
continue;
}
if (!classLevel && !AnnotatedElementUtils.hasAnnotation(method, PreAuthorize.class)) {
violations.add(controller.getSimpleName() + "." + method.getName());
}
}
}
assertEquals(List.of(), violations,
"缺类级 @PreAuthorize 的控制器,其每个运营端接口必须自带方法级 @PreAuthorize");
}
/**
* T05-c:matchmaker / referral 包禁止 @PatchMapping。
*
* <p>背景(ZC-MM-003/004 治理口径):红娘域全部状态迁移走显式语义端点
* (accept/pass/confirm/transfer/revoke/end 等),每个动作独立审计与状态机校验。
* PATCH 部分更新语义会绕过「动作 → 状态机 + 审计」链路,出现即视为架构违规。
*/
@Test
void matchmakerAndReferralPackagesMustNotUsePatchMapping() {
List<String> violations = new ArrayList<>();
for (Class<?> controller : CONTROLLERS) {
String pkg = controller.getPackageName();
if (!pkg.contains(".matchmaker.") && !pkg.contains(".referral.")) {
continue;
}
if (AnnotatedElementUtils.findMergedAnnotation(controller, PatchMapping.class) != null) {
violations.add(controller.getSimpleName() + " (class-level)");
}
for (Method method : controller.getDeclaredMethods()) {
if (AnnotatedElementUtils.findMergedAnnotation(method, PatchMapping.class) != null) {
violations.add(controller.getSimpleName() + "." + method.getName());
}
}
}
assertEquals(List.of(), violations,
"matchmaker/referral 包禁止 @PatchMapping(部分更新绕过状态机+审计链路)");
}
/** 类级前缀 + 方法路径合成完整路径(Spring mapping 拼接语义)。 */
private String composePath(String classPath, String methodPath) {
if (methodPath == null || methodPath.isEmpty()) {
return classPath;
}
if (methodPath.startsWith("/")) {
return classPath + methodPath;
}
return classPath + "/" + methodPath;
}
private List<String> paths(java.lang.reflect.AnnotatedElement element) {
RequestMapping mapping = AnnotatedElementUtils.findMergedAnnotation(element, RequestMapping.class);
return mapping == null ? List.of() : Arrays.asList(mapping.path().length > 0
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.security;
import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.entity.AuditLog;
import com.danyang.match.platform.audit.mapper.AuditLogMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.token.JwtTokenService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.token.TokenBlacklistService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Permission;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.PermissionMapper;
import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.autoconfigure.web.servlet.AutoConfigureMockMvc;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.boot.test.mock.mockito.MockBean;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.web.servlet.MockMvc;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.UUID;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.request.MockMvcRequestBuilders.get;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.request.MockMvcRequestBuilders.post;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.result.MockMvcResultMatchers.status;
/**
* ZC-MM-006 / T02 验收:JWT 权限回收(实时查库路线,不建撤销名单)。
*
* <p>语义:operator token 每请求实时查库 —— ① operators.status 非 active(含账号删除)
* → 401、不建 principal;② 权限由 PermissionMapper join role_permissions/operator_roles
* 实时装载,DB 撤销权限后已签发 token 立即失去对应能力(403 + AUTHORIZATION_DENIED 审计)。
* token claims 中的 permissions 仅为登录时刻快照,不是授权事实源(只写不读)。
*
* <p>覆盖:
* <ul>
* <li>正例:DB 授权(role_permissions)→ token 调 dashboard 200;</li>
* <li>负向①:DB UPDATE status='disabled' → 同一 token → 401;</li>
* <li>负向②:DB 删 role_permissions 行 → 同一 token 调 recommend → 403
* + AUTHORIZATION_DENIED 审计(含 actor_role_snapshot 权限快照);</li>
* <li>负向③(回归):用户 token 打 operator 路径 → 403(USER fallback 语义不回归)。</li>
* </ul>
*/
@SpringBootTest
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Transactional
@AutoConfigureMockMvc
class OperatorPermissionRevocationTest {
@Autowired private MockMvc mockMvc;
@Autowired private JwtTokenService jwtTokenService;
@Autowired private OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
@Autowired private PermissionMapper permissionMapper;
@Autowired private JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate;
@Autowired private AuditLogMapper auditLogMapper;
/** 测试环境无 Redis:黑名单查询打桩为"未拉黑"(ChatPhase09IntegrationTest 同款) */
@MockBean private TokenBlacklistService tokenBlacklistService;
private String operatorId;
private String operatorToken;
private String servicePermissionId;
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
// 真实 DB 授权链:operator → operator_roles → role → role_permissions → permissions
operatorId = createOperator();
String roleId = createRole("rev_role_" + System.nanoTime());
String viewPermissionId = createPermission("matchmaker.view");
servicePermissionId = createPermission("matchmaker.service");
grant(roleId, viewPermissionId);
grant(roleId, servicePermissionId);
bindOperatorRole(operatorId, roleId);
operatorToken = jwtTokenService.generateOperatorToken(operatorId,
Map.of("permissions", java.util.List.of("matchmaker.view", "matchmaker.service")));
}
@AfterEach
void clearSecurityContext() {
org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder.clearContext();
}
// ==================== 数据构造 ====================
private String createOperator() {
Operator op = new Operator();
op.setName("权限回收测试运营");
op.setUsername("revoke_" + System.nanoTime());
op.setPasswordHash("test-hash");
op.setStatus("active");
operatorMapper.insert(op);
return op.getId();
}
private String createRole(String code) {
String roleId = UUID.randomUUID().toString();
jdbcTemplate.update("INSERT INTO roles (id, code, name, system_role) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
roleId, code, "权限回收测试角色", false);
return roleId;
}
private String createPermission(String code) {
Permission p = new Permission();
p.setCode(code);
p.setName("权限回收测试权限 " + code);
p.setModule("matchmaker");
permissionMapper.insert(p);
return p.getId();
}
private void grant(String roleId, String permissionId) {
jdbcTemplate.update(
"INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id) VALUES (?, ?)",
roleId, permissionId);
}
private void bindOperatorRole(String operatorId, String roleId) {
jdbcTemplate.update(
"INSERT INTO operator_roles (operator_id, role_id) VALUES (?, ?)",
operatorId, roleId);
}
// ==================== 正例 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T02 正例: DB 授权运营持 token 调 dashboard → 200")
void dbAuthorizedOperatorCanCallDashboard() throws Exception {
mockMvc.perform(get("/operator/matchmaker/dashboard")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + operatorToken))
.andExpect(status().isOk());
}
// ==================== 负向①:禁用账号即时 401 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T02 负向①: DB UPDATE status='disabled' 后同一 token → 401(实时查库,零缓存)")
void disabledOperatorTokenImmediatelyUnauthorized() throws Exception {
// 前置:禁用前可正常调用
mockMvc.perform(get("/operator/matchmaker/dashboard")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + operatorToken))
.andExpect(status().isOk());
Operator op = operatorMapper.findById(operatorId).orElseThrow();
op.setStatus("disabled");
operatorMapper.updateById(op);
// 同一 token(未过期、无撤销名单)→ 过滤器实时查库拒绝
mockMvc.perform(get("/operator/matchmaker/dashboard")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + operatorToken))
.andExpect(status().isUnauthorized());
}
// ==================== 负向②:DB 撤权即时 403 + 审计 ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T02 负向②: DB 撤销 role_permissions 后同一 token 调 recommend → 403 + AUTHORIZATION_DENIED 审计(含快照)")
void revokedPermissionImmediatelyForbiddenWithAudit() throws Exception {
// 撤销 matchmaker.service 授权(matchmaker.view 保留 → 类级 @PreAuthorize 仍过、方法级拒绝)
jdbcTemplate.update("DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE permission_id = ?", servicePermissionId);
long deniedCount = auditLogMapper.selectCount(new LambdaQueryWrapper<AuditLog>()
.eq(AuditLog::getAction, "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED"));
assertTrue(deniedCount <= 1, "前置确认:本测试事务内拒绝审计至多前置 1 条");
mockMvc.perform(post("/operator/matchmaker/services/{id}/recommend", "rev-no-such-svc")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + operatorToken)
.contentType("application/json")
.content("{\"targetUserId\":\"rev-target\",\"reason\":\"T02 撤权验证\"}"))
.andExpect(status().isForbidden());
AuditLog denied = auditLogMapper.selectList(new LambdaQueryWrapper<AuditLog>()
.eq(AuditLog::getAction, "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED")
.eq(AuditLog::getOperatorId, operatorId)
.orderByDesc(AuditLog::getCreatedAt))
.stream().findFirst().orElseThrow(() ->
new AssertionError("权限回收后的调用必须落 AUTHORIZATION_DENIED 审计"));
// actor_role_snapshot:来自实时查库装载的权限集合(matchmaker.view 仍在)
assertEquals("matchmaker.view", denied.getActorRoleSnapshot(),
"拒绝审计必须携带落库时刻的权限快照(实时查库口径,不含已撤销的 matchmaker.service)");
}
// ==================== 负向③:用户 token 打 operator 路径(回归) ====================
@Test
@DisplayName("T02 负向③: 用户 token 打 operator 路径 → 403(USER fallback 语义不回归)")
void userTokenCannotReachOperatorPath() throws Exception {
String userToken = jwtTokenService.generateAccessToken(
"rev-user-" + UUID.randomUUID(), Map.of());
mockMvc.perform(get("/operator/matchmaker/dashboard")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + userToken))
.andExpect(status().isForbidden());
}
}
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.shared.filter;
import com.danyang.match.platform.auth.token.JwtTokenService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.entity.Operator;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.mapper.OperatorMapper;
import com.danyang.match.platform.permission.service.PermissionService;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.OperatorPrincipal;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.security.principal.UserPrincipal;
@@ -16,6 +18,7 @@ import org.springframework.mock.web.MockHttpServletRequest;
import org.springframework.mock.web.MockHttpServletResponse;
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder;
import jakarta.servlet.http.Cookie;
import java.util.List;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -26,9 +29,19 @@ class JwtAuthFilterTest {
@Mock private JwtTokenService jwtTokenService;
@Mock private PermissionService permissionService;
/** ZC-MM-006 / T02:运营分支新增实时查库(operators.status),单测同步打桩 */
@Mock private OperatorMapper operatorMapper;
@Mock private Claims claims;
@InjectMocks private JwtAuthFilter filter;
private Operator activeOperator(String id) {
Operator op = new Operator();
op.setId(id);
op.setName("单测运营");
op.setStatus("active");
return op;
}
@AfterEach
void clearSecurityContext() {
SecurityContextHolder.clearContext();
@@ -41,6 +54,7 @@ class JwtAuthFilterTest {
when(jwtTokenService.getUserIdFromToken(token)).thenReturn("operator-1");
when(jwtTokenService.parseToken(token)).thenReturn(claims);
when(claims.get("type", String.class)).thenReturn("operator_access");
when(operatorMapper.findById("operator-1")).thenReturn(java.util.Optional.of(activeOperator("operator-1")));
when(permissionService.getPermissions("operator-1"))
.thenReturn(List.of("content.edit", "content.publish"));
@@ -98,4 +112,78 @@ class JwtAuthFilterTest {
request.addHeader("Authorization", "Bearer " + token);
return request;
}
// ===== 本轮修复回归:管理端 HttpOnly Cookie(dy_op_at)兜底鉴权 =====
@Test
void cookieFallbackAuthenticatesOperatorWhenNoHeader() throws Exception {
String token = "cookie-op-token";
when(jwtTokenService.validateToken(token)).thenReturn(true);
when(jwtTokenService.getUserIdFromToken(token)).thenReturn("operator-1");
when(jwtTokenService.parseToken(token)).thenReturn(claims);
when(claims.get("type", String.class)).thenReturn("operator_access");
when(operatorMapper.findById("operator-1")).thenReturn(java.util.Optional.of(activeOperator("operator-1")));
when(permissionService.getPermissions("operator-1")).thenReturn(List.of("content.edit"));
filter.doFilter(cookieRequest(token), new MockHttpServletResponse(), new MockFilterChain());
var authentication = SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication();
assertNotNull(authentication);
assertInstanceOf(OperatorPrincipal.class, authentication.getPrincipal());
assertEquals("operator-1", ((OperatorPrincipal) authentication.getPrincipal()).id());
}
@Test
void cookieFallbackAuthenticatesUserWhenNoHeader() throws Exception {
String token = "cookie-user-token";
when(jwtTokenService.validateToken(token)).thenReturn(true);
when(jwtTokenService.getUserIdFromToken(token)).thenReturn("user-1");
when(jwtTokenService.parseToken(token)).thenReturn(claims);
when(claims.get("type", String.class)).thenReturn("access");
filter.doFilter(cookieRequest(token), new MockHttpServletResponse(), new MockFilterChain());
var authentication = SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication();
assertNotNull(authentication);
assertInstanceOf(UserPrincipal.class, authentication.getPrincipal());
}
@Test
void cookieWithInvalidTokenReturns401() throws Exception {
String token = "bad-cookie-token";
when(jwtTokenService.validateToken(token)).thenReturn(false);
MockHttpServletResponse response = new MockHttpServletResponse();
filter.doFilter(cookieRequest(token), response, new MockFilterChain());
assertEquals(401, response.getStatus());
assertNull(SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication());
}
@Test
void headerTakesPrecedenceOverCookie() throws Exception {
// Authorization 头里是有效 user token;Cookie 里是无效 token,应被忽略(Cookie 仅作兜底)
String headerToken = "header-token";
when(jwtTokenService.validateToken(headerToken)).thenReturn(true);
when(jwtTokenService.getUserIdFromToken(headerToken)).thenReturn("user-1");
when(jwtTokenService.parseToken(headerToken)).thenReturn(claims);
when(claims.get("type", String.class)).thenReturn("access");
MockHttpServletRequest request = new MockHttpServletRequest("GET", "/api/v1/content/operator/articles");
request.addHeader("Authorization", "Bearer " + headerToken);
request.setCookies(new Cookie("dy_op_at", "bad-cookie"));
filter.doFilter(request, new MockHttpServletResponse(), new MockFilterChain());
var authentication = SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication();
assertNotNull(authentication);
assertInstanceOf(UserPrincipal.class, authentication.getPrincipal());
assertEquals("user-1", ((UserPrincipal) authentication.getPrincipal()).id());
}
private MockHttpServletRequest cookieRequest(String token) {
MockHttpServletRequest request = new MockHttpServletRequest("GET", "/api/v1/content/operator/articles");
request.setCookies(new Cookie("dy_op_at", token));
return request;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
package com.danyang.match.platform.verification.provider;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.enums.ApiResponseCode;
import com.danyang.match.platform.shared.exception.GlobalExceptionHandler.BusinessException;
import com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpServer;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.net.InetSocketAddress;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* RealIdentityVerificationProvider 回归守卫:
* <ul>
* <li>伪造身份证号(校验位不符)必须在发起任何外部调用前被本地强校验拦截;</li>
* <li>配置缺失(apiUrl / apiKey 为空)必须 fail-fast,绝不静默放行任意证件;</li>
* <li>第三方核验 fail-closed:响应未明确「通过」一律视为未通过。</li>
* </ul>
*
* <p>使用 JDK 内置 {@link HttpServer} 模拟第三方核验端点,无需任何额外依赖。
*/
class RealIdentityVerificationProviderTest {
// 按 GB 11643-1999 手工计算得到的合法校验位身份证(前 17 位 + 校验位 '8')
private static final String VALID_ID = "110101199003073458";
// 校验位应为 '8',此处写成 'X' → 非法
private static final String INVALID_ID = "11010119900307345X";
private HttpServer server;
@AfterEach
void tearDown() {
if (server != null) {
server.stop(0);
}
}
private RealIdentityVerificationProvider newProvider(String apiUrl, String apiKey) throws Exception {
RealIdentityVerificationProvider p = new RealIdentityVerificationProvider();
setField(p, "apiUrl", apiUrl);
setField(p, "apiKey", apiKey);
return p;
}
private void setField(Object target, String name, String value) throws Exception {
Field f = RealIdentityVerificationProvider.class.getDeclaredField(name);
f.setAccessible(true);
f.set(target, value);
}
/** 启动本地模拟端点,返回其 URL。 */
private String startServer(int statusCode, String body) throws Exception {
server = HttpServer.create(new InetSocketAddress(0), 0);
server.createContext("/verify", exchange -> {
byte[] resp = body.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
exchange.getResponseHeaders().add("Content-Type", "application/json");
exchange.sendResponseHeaders(statusCode, resp.length);
exchange.getResponseBody().write(resp);
exchange.close();
});
server.start();
return "http://localhost:" + server.getAddress().getPort() + "/verify";
}
@Test
void forgedIdRejectedBeforeAnyNetworkCall() throws Exception {
// apiUrl / apiKey 仅作占位(非空,避免误触 fail-fast 分支);
// 校验位不符应直接判未通过,且不应发起任何外部请求
RealIdentityVerificationProvider provider = newProvider("http://localhost:1/verify", "k");
Map<String, Object> result = provider.verify("张三", INVALID_ID);
assertFalse((Boolean) result.get("verified"), "校验位不符的伪造证件号必须被本地强校验判定为未通过");
}
@Test
void missingConfigFailsFast() throws Exception {
RealIdentityVerificationProvider provider = newProvider("", "");
BusinessException ex = assertThrows(BusinessException.class,
() -> provider.verify("张三", VALID_ID));
assertEquals(ApiResponseCode.SERVER_ERROR, ex.getCode(),
"缺第三方配置时必须 fail-fast 而非放行任意证件");
}
@Test
void validIdWithThirdPartySuccessVerified() throws Exception {
String url = startServer(200, "{\"success\":true}");
RealIdentityVerificationProvider provider = newProvider(url, "k");
Map<String, Object> result = provider.verify("张三", VALID_ID);
assertTrue((Boolean) result.get("verified"), "校验位合法 + 第三方明确通过 = 通过");
}
@Test
void validIdWithThirdPartyFailureNotVerified() throws Exception {
String url = startServer(200, "{\"success\":false}");
RealIdentityVerificationProvider provider = newProvider(url, "k");
Map<String, Object> result = provider.verify("张三", VALID_ID);
assertFalse((Boolean) result.get("verified"), "第三方未明确「通过」 = 未通过(fail-closed)");
}
@Test
void validIdWithThirdPartyErrorNotVerified() throws Exception {
String url = startServer(500, "{\"message\":\"internal\"}");
RealIdentityVerificationProvider provider = newProvider(url, "k");
Map<String, Object> result = provider.verify("张三", VALID_ID);
assertFalse((Boolean) result.get("verified"), "第三方非 2xx 响应 = 未通过(fail-closed)");
}
}
+88 -1
View File
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ CREATE TABLE audit_logs (
id VARCHAR(36) PRIMARY KEY, operator_id VARCHAR(36), organization_id VARCHAR(36), action VARCHAR(128),
resource_type VARCHAR(64), resource_id VARCHAR(128), before_data CLOB, after_data CLOB, ip VARCHAR(64),
user_agent VARCHAR(500), created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE,
updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE, deleted_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE
updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE, deleted_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE,
-- V055(ZC-MM-006 / T01):扩展审计字段,全可空,与生产对齐
purpose_code VARCHAR(64), service_assignment_id VARCHAR(36),
actor_role_snapshot VARCHAR(128), request_trace_id VARCHAR(64)
);
CREATE TABLE notifications (
id VARCHAR(36) PRIMARY KEY, user_id VARCHAR(36), type VARCHAR(32), title VARCHAR(200), content VARCHAR(2000),
@@ -492,6 +495,90 @@ CREATE TABLE matchmaker_followups (
deleted_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE
);
-- V053: matchmaker_assignments 服务对象分配表(ZC-MM-002 / A1)
-- 生产为部分唯一索引 uq_mm_assignment_active_primary WHERE status='active' AND scope='primary';
-- H2 不支持部分索引,用「生成列 + 唯一索引」等价替代:
-- active_primary_key 仅在 (active, primary) 时取 user_id,否则为 NULL,
-- 标准唯一索引对多行 NULL 互不冲突 → 终态历史行可共存,语义与生产一致。
-- 注:H2 无 operators 表(见 Phase 17 注),去掉生产 DDL 的外键;CHECK 白名单保留。
CREATE TABLE matchmaker_assignments (
id VARCHAR(36) PRIMARY KEY,
user_id VARCHAR(36) NOT NULL,
matchmaker_operator_id VARCHAR(36) NOT NULL,
service_id VARCHAR(36),
assigned_by VARCHAR(36) NOT NULL,
assignment_scope VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'primary',
assignment_reason VARCHAR(500) NOT NULL,
status VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
assigned_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE,
expires_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE,
ended_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE,
end_reason VARCHAR(500),
created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
deleted_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE,
CONSTRAINT chk_mm_assignment_status CHECK (status IN (
'active', 'ended', 'revoked', 'transferred', 'expired'
)),
CONSTRAINT chk_mm_assignment_scope CHECK (assignment_scope IN ('primary', 'collaborating')),
active_primary_key VARCHAR(36) GENERATED ALWAYS AS (
CASE WHEN status = 'active' AND assignment_scope = 'primary' THEN user_id END
)
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX uq_mm_assignment_active_primary_h2 ON matchmaker_assignments(active_primary_key);
CREATE INDEX idx_mm_assignment_operator_h2 ON matchmaker_assignments(matchmaker_operator_id, status);
CREATE INDEX idx_mm_assignment_user_h2 ON matchmaker_assignments(user_id, status);
CREATE INDEX idx_mm_assignment_service_h2 ON matchmaker_assignments(service_id);
-- V054 配套:operators 运营人员表(ZC-MM-002 A1 测试需要:组长/红娘按 organization_id
-- 划定团队边界;此前 operators 一直在 EntityMigrationParityTest 可选白名单里 = 零覆盖)。
-- 注意:与生产 V001 对齐但去掉 REFERENCES organizations(id) 外键(organizations 本表已存在,
-- 保留外键亦可;为与既有「去外键」惯例一致,不建外键)。
CREATE TABLE operators (
id VARCHAR(36) PRIMARY KEY,
organization_id VARCHAR(36),
name VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
phone_enc CLOB,
phone_hash VARCHAR(128),
username VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
password_hash VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
status VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
last_login_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE,
created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
deleted_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX uk_operator_username_h2 ON operators(username);
-- V001 配套(ZC-MM-006 / T02):权限四表 —— JwtAuthFilter 运营分支实时查库
-- (PermissionMapper join role_permissions/operator_roles)在 H2 上的真实 DB 路径支撑;
-- 此前缺失导致所有 operator token 测试只能 @MockBean PermissionService 绕过。
-- 与生产 V001 对齐、按惯例去外键。
CREATE TABLE roles (
id VARCHAR(36) PRIMARY KEY, code VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL, name VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
description VARCHAR(500), system_role BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
deleted_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX uk_role_code_h2 ON roles(code);
CREATE TABLE permissions (
id VARCHAR(36) PRIMARY KEY, code VARCHAR(128) NOT NULL, name VARCHAR(200) NOT NULL,
module VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL, description VARCHAR(500),
created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
deleted_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX uk_permission_code_h2 ON permissions(code);
CREATE TABLE role_permissions (
role_id VARCHAR(36) NOT NULL, permission_id VARCHAR(36) NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (role_id, permission_id)
);
CREATE TABLE operator_roles (
operator_id VARCHAR(36) NOT NULL, role_id VARCHAR(36) NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (operator_id, role_id)
);
-- Phase 17:举报与风控三表(与 V012__add_risk_and_report_tables.sql 生产 DDL 对齐)。
-- 此前完全缺失 → ReportService / RiskReferralService 整条真实 DB 路径零覆盖,
-- 且 ReportServiceTest 只能写 assertTrue(true) 假绿。已补入并移出 TEST_SCHEMA_OPTIONAL_TABLES 白名单。
+18 -1
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,22 @@
|--------|------|------|
| 申诉是否V1.1首发 | 否(Feature Flag 预留) | ✅ 已完成 |
### 红娘角色权限(ZC-MM-001~007,2026-10-10 回写)
> 正式决策与开发规则见《善缘丹阳 V1.1 红娘角色权限正式决策与开发规则》V1.1;
> 治理登记以 `docs/governance/decision-register.md`「红娘角色权限专项」与 `open-questions.md` OQ-MATCHMAKER-003~008 为准。
| 决策项 | 确认值 | 状态 |
|--------|--------|------|
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-001 红娘角色定位与权限边界 | 受授权、受范围限制的公益服务角色 | ✅ 已完成(LOCKED;落地 2d60f78 审计 → 861c78e/3caf5f8/5e484d0/1be0d98 全链路) |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-002 / A1 服务对象分配 | 平台授权人员或红娘组长分配;普通红娘仅访问本人有效分配对象;禁止认领 | ✅ 已完成(LOCKED;V053/V054 + ServiceAssignmentPolicy,861c78e) |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-003 / B1 联系用户渠道 | 默认平台内渠道;电话/线下不默认开放 | ✅ 已完成(LOCKED;守卫锁定 5e484d0;开放前置确认见 OQ-MATCHMAKER-003【LEGAL_VERIFY】) |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-004 不得代替用户决定 | Like/Pass/活动意向/开启聊天等用户本人操作 | ✅ 已完成(LOCKED;5e484d0 锁定) |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-005 数据最小必要 | RBAC + 数据范围 + 字段隐私 + 服务授权 | ✅ 已完成(LOCKED;3caf5f8 + 1be0d98) |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-006 全程留痕 | 分配/受限查看/越权拒绝等审计 + 第八节字段 | ✅ 已完成(LOCKED;V055 + 1be0d98) |
| 受控联系(电话/线下)授权机制 | 未立项;ContactAuthorizationPolicy DEFERRED | ⏳ 待产品/法务确认(OQ-MATCHMAKER-003;MatchmakerContactGuardTest 机械锁强制复审) |
| C 端死代码退役 3 项 | MatchmakerServiceService.getCandidates / cancelService / getRecommendationsForUser(grep 全仓零调用已核,2026-10-10) | ⏳ 待产品确认:是否批准专项治理批次执行(与 ZC-MM-006 G6 评估清单合并为一个退役 PR,不混入功能提交) |
---
## 已确认决策列表(不得再放 Pending)
@@ -70,6 +86,7 @@
| 类别 | 确认项 |
|------|--------|
| 品牌 | 善缘丹阳品牌正式启用 |
| 红娘权限 | DEC-MATCHMAKER-001~006 全部 LOCKED(A1 服务对象分配 / B1 平台内联系 / 不得代用户决定 / 数据最小必要 / 全程留痕;详见 decision-register「红娘角色权限专项」与 open-questions OQ-MATCHMAKER-003~008) |
| 首页 | Banner运营 + 8个核心入口 + 固定顺序 |
| 数据保留 | **注销后用户数据保留不得低于 36 个月**(2026-09-19 产品确认;到期后经人工审核匿名化清除;保留期配置化 `account.data-retention-months`,默认 36;已落地 V049 `users.closed_at` + `DataRetentionService` + `account.retention.purge` 权限。隐私政策 §3.3 与 PIA §8 原文「30 天内删除」已同步修订) |
| 服务站 | 万善公园婚姻登记处为固定阵地 |
@@ -129,5 +146,5 @@
---
*最后更新: 2026-09-20 — V1.0.1 配置与规则纠偏:消解「推荐阈值 60 已确认 / 待定」矛盾(60 为技术默认,OQ-MATCH-001);照片上限 6 由「已确认」降级为「技术默认 / 未确认」(OQ-PROFILE-001);活体核验补 CONFIG/TBD 并接 IdentityPolicy 真实判定点(OQ-IDENTITY-001);拆分出 docs/governance/(config-register / open-questions / decision-register)。*
*最后更新: 2026-10-10 — 红娘角色权限专项回写:DEC-MATCHMAKER-001~006 全部 LOCKED 且已落地(ZC-MM-001~007 全链路,验证 mvn verify 884/884 / UI 24/24 / 后端契约 198 / 负向注入 7 处);新增待产品确认:受控联系授权机制开放(OQ-MATCHMAKER-003,LEGAL_VERIFY)与 C 端死代码退役 3 项专项治理批次。此前:2026-09-20 V1.0.1 配置与规则纠偏(消解「推荐阈值 60 已确认 / 待定」矛盾等)。*
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
# 红娘角色权限差距审计(ZC-MM-001)
> **审计基准**:《善缘丹阳 V1.1 红娘角色权限正式决策与开发规则》V1.1(DEC-MATCHMAKER-001~006 全部 LOCKED,A1/B1 已确认)
> **审计日期**:2026-10-09
> **审计执行**:架构师(高见远)· software-danyang-mm 团队 · 只读走查,未修改任何业务代码
> **审计方式**:backend matchmaker/referral/audit/security/auth 模块、Flyway V001~V052、admin-web 红娘相关页面、现有测试与治理文档。所有结论均给出文件路径+行号或 SQL/代码证据。
---
## 0. 审计范围与方法
- 后端:`backend/src/main/java/com/danyang/match/platform/` 下 `matchmaker/`(controller 2、service 2、entity 3、mapper 3)、`referral/`(controller 1、service 1)、`audit/`、`shared/security/`、`auth/`、`counseling/`(对照 INV-012)、`review/`(对照敏感访问日志范式)。
- 数据库:`backend/src/main/resources/db/migration/` V001~V052 全量中 matchmaker 相关 8 个迁移(V001/V002/V009/V019/V021/V037/V038/V044/V052)。
- 前端:`admin-web/src/modules/matchmaker/MatchmakerManagementView.vue`、`modules/referral/ReferralManagementView.vue`、`router/index.ts`、`layouts/MainLayout.vue`。
- 测试:`backend/src/test` 中 matchmaker/referral/权限相关 6 个测试类。
- 治理文档:`docs/governance/decision-register.md`、`open-questions.md`、`docs/PENDING_DECISIONS.md`。
- 全局检索:`matchmaker_assignments`、`ServiceAssignment`、`matchmaker_leader`、`ContactAuthorization` 等关键词。
状态标注:【已实现】/【部分实现】/【缺失】/【无法确定】。
---
## 1. 现状总览
**一句话结论**:当前仓库的"红娘"只是一个挂在 `matchmaker_services` 服务单上的 `assigned_operator_id` 工单负责人概念——没有独立的服务对象分配关系、没有红娘组长角色、没有统一的数据范围/字段级隐私策略层;工单维度上已做过多轮越权修补(推荐/转介/详情归属校验),但**认领、跟进、完结等写接口仍缺归属校验,未分配队列与全局统计对全体红娘可见,审计与权限回收存在系统性缺口**。A1 核心未建模,B1 现状上"侥幸安全"(接口本就不返回联系方式)而非"设计安全"。
### 决策要求 vs 现状对照表
| # | 决策要求 | 现状 | 状态 | 关键证据 |
|---|---------|------|------|---------|
| 1 | DEC-002/A1:服务对象由平台授权人员或红娘组长分配,普通红娘仅访问本人有效分配对象 | 分配仅体现在 `matchmaker_services.assigned_operator_id`(服务单指派),无独立分配实体、无 assigned_by/理由/有效期/结束语义;`/pending` 全局队列对任何 `matchmaker.view` 持有者可见 | **缺失(核心)** | V009 L5-20;`MatchmakerOperatorController` L32-36;`MatchmakerServiceMapper.findSubmitted()` |
| 2 | DEC-002 规则2:禁止普通红娘认领未分配/他人对象 | `POST /operator/matchmaker/services/{id}/claim` 任何 `matchmaker.service` 持有者可对任何 assigned 服务接单,无归属校验 | **缺失** | `MatchmakerOperatorController` L49-56;`MatchmakerServiceService.claimService` L109-122 |
| 3 | DEC-002 规则3/6:分配、转分配、撤销、结束留痕;状态机覆盖 | 仅有 assign/complete/cancel(cancel 无 HTTP 入口,死代码);无转分配、无撤销、无结束原因;分配人(assigned_by)不记录 | **缺失** | `MatchmakerServiceService` L87-104、L229-237;V009 L11-14 |
| 4 | DEC-003/B1:默认平台内联系,不暴露完整手机号/微信号/详细地址 | 红娘侧 DTO/VO 与前端页面均无 phone/wechat/address/idNumber 字段;但也**不存在**任何联系授权机制(无表、无策略类) | **部分实现(结果安全、机制缺失)** | `MatchmakerServiceService.getServiceDetail` L329-348;`ReferralService` 全文;全局检索 ContactAuthorization 无结果 |
| 5 | DEC-004:红娘不得代替用户 Like/Pass/确认开启聊天/接受活动意向 | 设计与实现均贯彻"推荐≠Like":推荐仅建 `pending_view` 记录,Like/Pass 由用户本人端点(UserPrincipal+`findByIdAndUser` 归属校验)触发;转介确认须用户本人 | **已实现** | `MatchmakerService` L97-142、L213-258;`ReferralService.confirmReferral` L139-184;测试 `MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test` L132-296 |
| 6 | DEC-005:最小必要 + 数据范围 + 字段隐私 + 有效分配 | 无 Policy 层;数据范围校验散落且口径不一:recommend/转介有归属校验,claim/followup/complete 无;`matchmaker.assign` 与 `matchmaker.service` 语义即"工单指派/工单执行",不是"分配服务对象" | **缺失** | `MatchmakerServiceService` L142-151(有)vs L109-122、L186-203、L208-224(无) |
| 7 | DEC-006:全程留痕(分配、敏感查看、越权拒绝等) | 有 audit 基础设施且授权拒绝有全局监听;但 claim 不审计、敏感详情查看不记 SensitiveAccessLog、模块内归属拒绝不走 DataScopeGuard、分配审计不记 assigned_by/理由 | **部分实现** | `AuthorizationAuditListener` L25-49;`DataScopeGuard` 使用方仅 activity/counseling/service_appointment;`MatchmakerServiceService.saveAuditLog` L395-403(before/after 恒 null) |
| 8 | 功能权限矩阵:红娘无全站检索/导出/敏感字段 | matchmaker 角色仅授 3 权限(view/service/assign),无 user.view、无 data.export;全仓未发现导出端点 | **已实现(现状合规)** | V052 L24-28;grep `data.export` 使用方为 0 |
| 9 | 红娘组长角色 | 全仓(迁移+代码+前端)无 matchmaker_leader/team_lead | **缺失** | grep 无结果 |
| 10 | 测试基线 MM-AUTH/CONTACT/ACTION/PRIVACY/AUDIT | 仅有"红娘不代替用户操作"(MM-ACTION 方向)与状态白名单守卫测试;无数据范围/联系方式/审计/生命周期场景测试 | **缺失** | `MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test`、`MatchmakerServiceTest`(仅常量白名单校验) |
---
## 2. 分项审计
### 2.1 当前红娘角色及权限实现
**角色与权限定义**【部分实现】:
- `matchmaker` 角色定义于 V001:`('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000005', 'matchmaker', '公益红娘', '提供人工婚恋服务', TRUE)`(V001 L145)。
- 三条红娘权限定义于 V001 L161-163:`matchmaker.view`(020)、`matchmaker.assign`(021)、`matchmaker.service`(022)。
- **角色-权限授权缺口曾真实存在**:V052 迁移注释自证——"创建红娘运营账号后发现该角色在 role_permissions 中零条授权,登录后台 403"(V052 L4-12);V052 仅补授 3 条权限(L24-28)。
- 其余角色授权同样残缺:V044 注释承认"permissions 共 48 条,role_permissions 里 super_admin 只有 18 条;matchmaker 角色为 0 条"(V044 L5-11),V044 只回补了 super_admin,**platform_admin/organization_admin 等角色的红娘权限授予状态无法从迁移中确认**【无法确定,需查实际库】。注意 `PermissionMatrixTest` L57-59 期望 platform_admin 拥有 matchmaker.view/assign/service,但迁移中未见对应 INSERT【测试期望与 DB 授权可能漂移】。
- **红娘组长角色不存在**:迁移与代码 grep `leader|team_lead` 均无结果。
**后端接口面**【部分实现】:
- 运营端 `MatchmakerOperatorController`(`/operator/matchmaker`,类级 `@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('matchmaker.view')")` L19):dashboard(L25)、pending(L32)、assign(L38,`matchmaker.assign`)、claim(L49,`matchmaker.service`)、my-services(L58)、recommendations(L69)、services/{id} 详情(L75)、recommend(L87)、followup(L99)、complete(L112)。
- 用户端 `MatchmakerController`(`/matchmaker`):提交申请(L48-58)、我的服务(L60)、推荐列表(L67)、viewed/accept/pass(L73-96)。
- 转介 `ReferralController`(`/referrals`):service-station(L33)/activity(L53) 均 `matchmaker.service`;confirm(L70)/my-history(L85) 用户本人;operator/history(L99) 按 `matchmaker.service`。
**关键发现:`matchmaker.assign` 的语义**——它是"把服务工单指派给某红娘"(`assignService(serviceId, operatorId, organizationId)`,`MatchmakerServiceService` L87-104),即**工单分派**而非决策文档意义上的"服务对象分配"(对用户建立服务关系)。当前系统里"服务对象"就是服务单上的 `user_id`,分配关系与工单合一,无法表达"同一用户多次/多任务分配、分配历史、到期、撤销"。
**已知实现缺陷(非权限但影响验收)**:
- `countInProgressByOperator` 统计 `status='processing'`(`MatchmakerServiceMapper` L28-30),而 DB CHECK 白名单只有 `in_service`(V009 L30-32),工作台 inProgress 恒为 0。
- `cancelService`(`MatchmakerServiceService` L229-237)无任何 Controller 入口,死代码。
### 2.2 服务对象分配建模
**结论:未建模**【缺失】。
- 全仓(backend main + admin-web src + 全部迁移)grep `matchmaker_assignments|service_assignment|ServiceAssignment` 无结果。
- 唯一的"分配"载体是 `matchmaker_services.assigned_operator_id`(V009 L12),字段只有 `assigned_operator_id / assigned_at / organization_id`,**没有** assigned_by、assignment_reason、assignment_scope、expires_at、ended_at、end_reason、status(分配关系状态与服务单状态混用)。
- `/operator/matchmaker/my-services` 返回该红娘名下全部服务含历史(`MatchmakerServiceMapper.findByOperatorId` L36-38,`MatchmakerServiceService.getMyServices` L68-82),即"我的服务对象 = 工单负责人",非独立分配关系。
- **认领入口存在**:`POST /services/{id}/claim` 仅需 `matchmaker.service`(`MatchmakerOperatorController` L49-56),`claimService` 只校验状态=assigned,不校验该单是否分配给本人,也不把 assigned_operator_id 改成自己(`MatchmakerServiceService` L109-122)——任何红娘可以把任何红娘的 assigned 单推进到 in_service。直接违反 DEC-002 规则 2(不能自行认领)。
- **转分配/撤销/结束**:无 transfer/revoke 接口;`cancelService` 无入口;`completeService` 无归属校验(L208-224)。
### 2.3 列表/搜索/详情/导出数据范围一致性
| 接口 | 数据范围 | 判定 |
|------|---------|------|
| `GET /pending`(L32-36 → `findSubmitted` Mapper L17-18) | **全局**:任何 `matchmaker.view` 持有者可见全库 submitted 申请,含申请人 userId + 需求描述(Service L245-258) | ❌ 违反 DEC-002 规则1(不能浏览未分配对象库)、DEC-005 |
| `GET /dashboard`(L25-30 → L260-276) | pendingCount/todayCount/completedCount 为**全局统计**,inProgress 按本人 | ❌ 信息泄露(全局量级)+ 状态口径 bug |
| `GET /my-services`(L58-63 → `findByOperatorId`) | 按本人过滤 | ✅ |
| `GET /recommendations`(L69-73 → `findByOperatorId`) | 按本人过滤 | ✅ |
| `GET /services/{id}` 详情(L75-85 → `getServiceDetail` L301-351) | 负责人→完整(含 userProfile 8 字段 + followup 正文);非负责人→**仍返回**状态、assignedOperatorId、以及**该服务的推荐列表(含他人服务的 targetUserId 与推荐理由)**(L317-327 对所有调用者装配) | ⚠️ 部分修复:比 Phase 13 D4 前好,但非负责人仍可探测任意 serviceId 的存在性与他人推荐内容(违反"响应不得泄露目标用户是否存在");推荐理由是红娘对候选对象的自由文本,可能含隐私 |
| `POST /services/{id}/recommend`(L87-97 → L142-181) | 归属校验(L148-151)+ 不能推给申请人(L153-155) | ✅(但推荐对象 targetUserId 由红娘手输,无候选来源,见 2.4) |
| `POST /followup`(L99-110 → L186-203) | **无归属校验**:任何 `matchmaker.service` 持有者可对任意 serviceId 写跟进正文 | ❌ 违反 DEC-005;跟进正文为自由文本敏感写面 |
| `POST /complete`(L112-118 → L208-224) | **无归属校验** | ❌ |
| `POST /claim`(L49-56 → L109-122) | **无归属校验** | ❌(见 2.2) |
| 转介 `POST /referrals/*` | `assertMatchmakerServesUser`(`ReferralService` L45-52 → `findActiveByOperatorAndUser` Mapper L48-54)要求存在本人名下、该用户的进行中服务 | ✅(Phase 13 D5 修复,注释自证修复前可代任意用户创建报名/预约) |
| 导出 | 全仓未发现任何导出端点(grep `data.export|export` 在 main 源码无结果) | ✅ 现状无导出面 |
按 userId/查询参数越权形态:matchmaker 角色无 `user.view`(V052 仅 3 权限),无法触达用户管理接口,全站用户检索面关闭;但上述服务单维度参数越权真实存在。
### 2.4 联系方式暴露(B1)
**现状结果层面安全**【已实现(被动)】:
- 红娘侧所有返回 DTO 均为手工 Map 装配:服务详情 userProfile 仅 displayName/gender/age/regionName/educationCode/occupationCode/maritalStatus(`MatchmakerServiceService` L333-343),无手机号/微信号/详细地址/身份证。
- 前端 `MatchmakerManagementView.vue` 表格列仅 userId/serviceType/description/status/createdAt(L7-25)与推荐 userId/targetUserId/reason/status(L29-39);`ReferralManagementView.vue` 无联系方式字段。grep phone/mobile/wechat/身份证/地址 在两个 view 中均无命中。
- 转介活动时的 `emergencyContactPhoneEnc` 是**红娘录入**的紧急联系人信息(`ReferralController` L62、`ReferralService` L111-112),非读取用户联系方式。
- 无导出接口可绕道获取联系方式(2.3)。
**机制层面缺失**【缺失】:
- 全仓无 ContactAuthorization/contact_authorization/线下联系 相关表、实体、策略(grep 无结果)——DEC-003 要求的"电话/线下联系须专项授权"完全没有机制承载,目前是"没有功能所以没有漏洞"。若后续有人补电话/线下功能,无任何护栏。
- 平台内联系渠道:现有通知仅是单向 notification(`notificationService.send/sendAsync`),无红娘↔用户平台内会话通道;B1 的"平台内服务申请/回应"仅覆盖转介确认流。
**功能缺口**:推荐弹窗要求红娘手输 targetUserId(前端 L62"输入被推荐对象的用户ID")——红娘既无全站检索权(正确),也没有任何"从用户已提供的择偶需求/公开池中获取候选"的受控途径,主流程实际不可用【部分实现】。
### 2.5 红娘代替用户操作(DEC-004)
**未发现代替用户决策的接口**【已实现】:
- 红娘推荐只建 `MatchmakerRecommendation(status=pending_view)`,明确注释"这不是替用户 Like!""红娘点创建 Match → 不允许!"(`MatchmakerService` L97-105),并且有归属校验(L117-121)。
- Like/Pass 仅由用户本人端点触发:`POST /matchmaker/recommendations/{id}/accept|pass`(`MatchmakerController` L81-96)→ `acceptRecommendation` 用 `findByIdAndUser(recommendationId, userId)` 归属校验(`MatchmakerService` L213-222),Pass 同理(L246-255)。
- 红娘无法以用户身份调用:用户端点走 `UserPrincipal`,运营端走 `OperatorPrincipal`(两套 principal 体系,`shared/security/principal/`),且测试锁定"红娘无法用别人的用户身份接受推荐"(`MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test` L158-171)。
- 转介确认(活动/预约)须用户本人 `confirmReferral`,校验 `userId.equals(appt.getUserId())`(`ReferralService` L145-146、L166-167),非本人确认被拒并有测试(`MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test` L255-269)。
- 无修改用户择偶条件、同意公开资料的红娘入口(matchmaker 角色无 user 相关权限)。
- `matchmaker.assign` 的实际用途 = 指派工单给红娘,**不是**"代替分配对象做操作";其风险在于指派时 `organizationId` 参数恒传 null(Controller L46 传 `null`),且前端弹窗是硬编码假数据(见 2.8)。
⚠️ 唯一灰色点:转介会**代替用户创建** `activity_registration(status=pending)` / `service_appointment(status=submitted)` 记录(`ReferralService` L74、L114),但带 `source=matchmaker_referral` 标记且必须用户本人确认后生效(`needsUserConfirmation=true`),语义上是"代填草稿、用户确认",与 DEC-004 底线可兼容,但建议在 ZC-MM-004 复核其与"代填关键个人信息"边界的表述。
### 2.6 审计日志覆盖(DEC-006)
**基础设施**【已实现】:
- `audit_logs` 表 + `AuditLog` 实体(operatorId/organizationId/action/resourceType/resourceId/beforeData/afterData/ip/userAgent)。
- `sensitive_access_logs` + `SensitiveAccessLog`(operatorId/userId/dataType/reason/accessTarget/accessResult/ip)。
- `AuthorizationAuditListener`(L25-49):`@PreAuthorize` 拒绝自动写 `AUTHORIZATION_DENIED`(含 IP/UA)→ **@PreAuthorize 层的越权拒绝已覆盖**。
- `DataScopeGuard.deny`(L21-36):写 `DATA_SCOPE_DENIED` 后抛 403。
**matchmaker 模块实际覆盖**【部分实现,缺口明确】:
| 操作 | 审计现状 |
|------|---------|
| 分配 assign | ✅ `MATCHMAKER_ASSIGN`(L102),但 beforeData/afterData 恒 null(saveAuditLog L395-403),**不记录分配人以外信息(谁指派=principal.id 即 assignOperatorId=被指派红娘,见 Controller L44-46 的参数命名混乱:body.operatorId 是"被分配红娘",操作者是 principal,审计里存的是前者)** |
| 认领 claim | ❌ 无审计(L109-122 无 saveAuditLog) |
| 推荐 recommend | ✅ `MATCHMAKER_RECOMMEND`(L174) |
| 跟进 followup | ✅ `MATCHMAKER_FOLLOWUP`(L201) |
| 完成 complete | ✅ `MATCHMAKER_COMPLETE` 但 operatorId 传 null(L222)——审计丢失操作者 |
| 取消 cancel | ❌ 死代码且无审计 |
| 查看敏感详情 getServiceDetail | ❌ 不写 SensitiveAccessLog、不调 recordSensitiveAccess(对照:ReviewService L470-477 访问本地资格佐证时写 SensitiveAccessLog;AuditLogService.recordSensitiveAccess L74-88 已有现成方法) |
| 模块内归属拒绝(recommend/followup 的 IllegalStateException、ReferralService 的 IllegalStateException) | ❌ 不走 DataScopeGuard,不产生 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED;仅裸抛异常 → **服务层越权拒绝不落审计**,违反 MM-AUDIT-002 |
| 缺失字段 | 审计无 purpose_code/service_assignment_id/actor_role_snapshot/request_trace_id(DEC-006 第八节字段要求),AuditLog 实体不含这些列 |
### 2.7 可复用模块
| 组件 | 位置 | 与 A1/B1 的关系 |
|------|------|----------------|
| **CounselingService 的 INV-012 判定链路** | `counseling/service/CounselingService.java` L181-200(assign 用条件更新 assignIfPending 防并发)、assertAssigned 模式(L205/232/242 各写接口前置)、`GET /counseling/services/operator/assigned`(Controller L141-145 → assignedTo) | **与 A1 最接近**:"只有被分配人可见/可操作" 的完整范式,含权限矩阵注释(L38-48 定义 6 种角色的列表/脱敏/全文视图)。红娘"本人有效分配对象"可直接套此模式 |
| **DataScopeGuard** | `shared/security/DataScopeGuard.java` L21-36 | 拒绝+审计一体,activity/counseling/service_appointment 已用;红娘模块的归属拒绝应统一接入 |
| **AuthorizationAuditListener** | `shared/security/AuthorizationAuditListener.java` | @PreAuthorize 拒绝自动审计,MM-AUDIT-002 的 403 层已覆盖 |
| **AuditLogService.recordSensitiveAccess + SensitiveAccessLog** | `audit/service/AuditLogService.java` L74-88;使用范例 `review/service/ReviewService.java` L470-477 | 受限字段/资料查看审计现成方法(matchmaker 详情接口应调用) |
| **MatchmakerServiceMapper.findActiveByOperatorAndUser** | `matchmaker/mapper/MatchmakerServiceMapper.java` L48-54 | 现成的"本人名下+该用户+有效状态"判定 SQL,是未来 ServiceAssignmentPolicy 判定的雏形(状态集含 submitted 待收紧) |
| **OperatorAuthService 权限装载** | `auth/service/OperatorAuthService.java` L98-108(权限集合仅登录时装载进 JWT claims) | 权限事实来源;同时是权限回收的**风险点**(见 P1-7) |
| 用户端归属校验范式 | `MatchmakerRecommendationMapper.findByIdAndUser` + `MatchmakerService.acceptRecommendation` L213-222 | "资源归属=当前主体"校验样板 |
### 2.8 前端现状
- `MatchmakerManagementView.vue`:服务请求队列 tab 对所有 `matchmaker.view` 用户展示全库 pending(userId+需求说明,L7-25);**分配弹窗红娘下拉是硬编码假数据** `operator_wang/operator_chen`(L47-50)——分配功能前端不可真实使用;推荐弹窗需手输 targetUserId(L62)。
- 路由/菜单:`router/index.ts` L40-41、`MainLayout.vue` L177-178 权限码已与后端对齐(matchmaker.view / matchmaker.service,V052 注释所述错配已修复)。
- `ReferralManagementView.vue` L35 已改走 `/referrals/operator/history`(契约缺口已修)。
### 2.9 治理文档现状
- `docs/governance/decision-register.md`:grep `DEC-MATCHMAKER|matchmaker` 无结果【缺失】。
- `docs/governance/open-questions.md`:无 matchmaker/电话/线下联系条目【缺失】。
- `docs/PENDING_DECISIONS.md`:无 A1/B1/matchmaker 条目【缺失】。
- `docs/audits/` 目录不存在(本报告即首次建立)。
### 2.10 现有测试
| 测试 | 覆盖 | 缺口 |
|------|------|------|
| `MatchmakerReferralPhase13Test` | MM-ACTION 方向较完整:推荐不产生 Like/Match(L132-141)、只有用户能 Like(L143)、红娘不能代用户接受(L158-171)、转介归属校验(L288-296)、用户本人确认(L225-269) | 不含数据范围/联系方式/审计断言 |
| `MatchmakerServiceTest` | 仅校验常量与 DB CHECK 白名单一致(L94-177),**纯守卫测试,无权限断言** | — |
| `PermissionMatrixTest` | 静态 Map 自断言(L25-224 + L229 起),**不连接 DB/迁移文件**,且期望值(matchmaker 有 user.view=true,L119)与 V052 实际授权(无 user.view)漂移 | 矩阵不校验真实授权,是"看起来有保护"的假阳性 |
| `OperatorEndpointPermissionCoverageTest` | 机械守卫:确保运营端 Controller 方法有 @PreAuthorize(L10、L43) | 只查注解存在性,不校验权限码正确性 |
| SecurityTests / V11InvariantsTest | 通用授权拒绝、INV 守卫 | 无 MM-AUTH/CONTACT/PRIVACY/AUDIT/LIFECYCLE 专属场景 |
**测试基线覆盖判定**:MM-ACTION ≈ 部分覆盖;MM-AUTH/MM-CONTACT/MM-PRIVACY/MM-AUDIT/MM-LIFECYCLE ≈ 全部缺失。
---
## 3. 可复用模块清单
(按建议采用优先级)
1. **CounselingService INV-012 范式**(`CounselingService` L181-200 条件更新分配、assertAssigned 写接口前置、Controller L141-145 assigned 列表)——A1"本人有效分配对象"的直接模板。
2. **DataScopeGuard**(`shared/security/DataScopeGuard.java`)——归属拒绝统一走 deny()=审计+403。
3. **AuthorizationAuditListener**——已有,无需新建。
4. **AuditLogService.recordSensitiveAccess + SensitiveAccessLog**(ReviewService L470-477 为使用范例)——受限字段查看审计。
5. **MatchmakerServiceMapper.findActiveByOperatorAndUser**——分配有效性判定 SQL 雏形。
6. **OperatorAuthService/JwtAuthFilter 权限装载链**——若做权限回收需改造此链路(JWT claims 快照问题)。
7. 无 MatchmakerPolicy/PrivacyPolicy/ContactAuthorizationPolicy 任何现存实现——需新建。
---
## 4. 差距与风险清单(按优先级)
### P0(违反 LOCKED 决策,阻断 DoD)
| # | 差距 | 违反 | 影响 | 证据 |
|---|------|------|------|------|
| P0-1 | 服务对象分配未建模:无 matchmaker_assignments/独立分配实体,分配=工单指派且无 assigned_by/理由/有效期/结束语义/分配历史 | DEC-002 规则6/7、5.1 概念模型 | A1 无法落地;分配不可追溯、不可回收、不可过期 | V009 L5-20;全仓 grep 无 assignment 实体 |
| P0-2 | 普通红娘认领入口开放且无归属校验:claim 任意 assigned 单;followup/complete 对任意 serviceId 可写/可完结 | DEC-002 规则1/2;DEC-005;MM-AUTH-004 | 任何红娘可干预他人服务对象、写入跟进内容、变更服务状态 | MatchmakerOperatorController L49-56、L99-118;MatchmakerServiceService L109-122、L186-203、L208-224 |
| P0-3 | 未分配申请队列+全局统计对全体红娘可见(含申请人 userId 与诉求描述) | DEC-002 规则1;DEC-005;MM-AUTH-002/PRIVACY-001 精神 | 普通红娘可浏览"待分配用户库"挑选对象,正面违反 A1 | MatchmakerOperatorController L32-36;MatchmakerServiceService L245-258、L260-276;Mapper findSubmitted L17-18 |
| P0-4 | 无红娘组长角色与团队管理范围概念,assign 权限无范围约束(谁能 assign 只有权限码、无组织/团队边界;organizationId 恒传 null) | DEC-002 规则4/5/8 | 分配权无法收敛到"平台授权人员或组长";跨团队数据范围无依据 | MatchmakerOperatorController L38-47(organizationId=null);全仓无 leader 角色 |
| P0-5 | 服务层归属/范围拒绝不产生审计(不走 DataScopeGuard),claim 无审计、complete 审计丢操作者、分配审计字段残缺 | DEC-006;MM-AUDIT-001/002 | 分配与越权链条不可追溯 | MatchmakerServiceService L102/L109-122/L222/L395-403;DataScopeGuard 使用方不含 matchmaker |
### P1(安全机制缺口,DoD 必补)
| # | 差距 | 违反 | 影响 | 证据 |
|---|------|------|------|------|
| P1-6 | 非负责人可读任意服务单脱敏详情+他人推荐列表(targetUserId、推荐理由),泄露存在性与他人服务内容 | DEC-005(响应不得泄露目标用户是否存在);MM-PRIVACY-001 | 横向探测面 | MatchmakerServiceService L301-351(L317-327 对非 owner 装配 recommendations) |
| P1-7 | 运营权限是登录时 JWT claims 快照(JwtAuthFilter L90-99 直接取 claims),停用/调岗/权限回收后旧 token 有效期内仍放行 | DEC-005/006(权限及时回收);MM-LIFECYCLE-001 | 权限回收延迟=token 剩余有效期 | OperatorAuthService L98-108;JwtAuthFilter L90-99 |
| P1-8 | 受限资料查看无 SensitiveAccessLog(服务详情 userProfile 属受限资料但零记录) | DEC-006;MM-AUDIT 方向 | 敏感读取不可溯源 | MatchmakerServiceService L329-348;对照 ReviewService L470-477 |
| P1-9 | 无统一 Policy 层(MatchmakerPolicy/DataScopePolicy/PrivacyPolicy),范围校验散落且口径不一 | DEC-005 判定链要求 | 后续每加一个接口都可能漏校验(现状已证明) | §2.3 表格 |
| P1-10 | B1 联系授权机制完全缺失(无表无策略无审批流),当前安全是"功能不存在"而非"有护栏" | DEC-003 规则7 | 一旦有人新增电话/线下功能即裸奔;DoD "无授权电话/线下联系被拒绝" 无承载 | grep ContactAuthorization 无结果 |
| P1-11 | 测试基线缺口:MM-AUTH/CONTACT/PRIVACY/AUDIT/LIFECYCLE 无场景测试;PermissionMatrixTest 与真实授权漂移且自引用 | 决策文档第十节 | 回归无保护网 | §2.10 |
### P2(质量/体验/治理)
| # | 差距 | 影响 | 证据 |
|---|------|------|------|
| P2-12 | 分配弹窗硬编码假红娘(operator_wang/chen),分配功能前端不可用 | 主流程断裂 | MatchmakerManagementView.vue L47-50 |
| P2-13 | 推荐对象需手输 userId,无受控候选来源,推荐主流程实际不可用 | 业务不可用(但不可用方向是安全的) | 同上 L62 |
| P2-14 | dashboard inProgress 统计用 'processing' 与 DB 白名单 'in_service' 不符,恒为 0 | 数据失真 | MatchmakerServiceMapper L28-30 vs V009 L30-32 |
| P2-15 | cancelService 死代码;matchmaker.assign 的 organizationId 参数恒 null | 代码卫生 | MatchmakerServiceService L229-237;Controller L46 |
| P2-16 | 治理文档无 DEC-MATCHMAKER/A1/B1 条目;docs/audits 目录此前不存在 | 治理不同步(ZC-MM-007 范围) | §2.9 |
| P2-17 | PermissionMatrixTest 期望 platform_admin/reviewer 等角色矩阵,但迁移未定义这些角色的 matchmaker 授权,实际库状态无法确定 | 授权事实不清 | V052 仅授 role 005;V044 仅补 super_admin |
---
## 5. 仍需后续确认的实现细节(对应决策文档第十一节,仓库现状)
| 待确认项 | 仓库现状 |
|---------|---------|
| 电话/线下联系例外批准岗位 | 无任何授权机制/审批流/岗位模型(grep 无结果);需产品确认后从零建 |
| 例外授权是否需用户单独同意及记录方式 | 无载体;`activity_registration`/`service_appointment` 已有 `user_confirmed_at`+`source=matchmaker_referral` 的用户确认范式(ReferralService L151-152)可作参考 |
| 临时授权有效期限 | 无 expires_at/有效期字段于任何红娘相关表(matchmaker_services 也没有);`matchmaker_recommendations` 无过期机制 |
| 审计日志/服务摘要保留周期 | 迁移中未见 audit_logs 的保留/清理策略;account 模块有 DataRetentionService(`account/service/DataRetentionService.java`)可参考但未覆盖审计日志【保留周期无法确定】 |
| 红娘组长可分配的组织/团队边界 | `organizations` 表与 `matchmaker_services.organization_id` 存在(V009 L11),operator 与组织的关联关系存在于 operator 体系,但"团队/红娘组"概念不存在,边界配置无从谈起 |
| platform_admin/organization_admin 的 matchmaker 权限实际授权 | 迁移不可证【无法确定,需查演示库】 |
| 转介代建 pending 报名/预约与"代填关键信息"边界 | 见 §2.5 灰色点,建议 ZC-MM-004 复核时与产品确认表述 |
---
## 6. 对 ZC-MM-002~007 实施顺序的建议(仅顺序与依赖)
1. **ZC-MM-002(A1 分配)先行且作为一切的地基**:必须先落 `matchmaker_assignments` 独立分配关系(含 assigned_by/reason/status/expires/ended)+ 红娘组长角色 + 分配状态机。理由:P0-1~P0-4 全部依赖此建模;后续所有数据范围判定都以"有效分配"为事实源。
2. **ZC-MM-005(统一数据范围与字段隐私)紧跟 002**:把 claim/followup/complete/pending/dashboard/详情统一接入范围判定(复用 CounselingService INV-012 + DataScopeGuard)。依赖 002 的分配事实源;不先做会继续在旧工单模型上打补丁。
3. **ZC-MM-003(B1 联系规则)与 004(禁止代操作复核)可并行**:003 当前主要是"补护栏+固化现状"(关闭暴露面+建立联系授权的拒绝默认),004 主要是复核与测试锁定(现状已基本合规)。两者都不依赖 002 的表结构,但 003 的"平台内服务通知渠道"若要做成会话类功能,建议在 005 稳定后做。
4. **ZC-MM-006(审计与权限回收)在 002/005 之后收口**:分配/转交审计、SensitiveAccessLog 接入、模块内拒绝走 DataScopeGuard 都依赖 002 的新实体与 005 的判定点;JWT 权限回收(P1-7)涉及 auth 链路改造,放在业务语义稳定之后风险最小。
5. **ZC-MM-007(治理文档)最后**:登记 DEC-MATCHMAKER-001~006 与 A1/B1、open-questions(第十一节五项)、本报告归档于 docs/audits。
6. **贯穿性建议**:每阶段同步补 MM-AUTH/CONTACT/ACTION/PRIVACY/AUDIT/LIFECYCLE 测试基线(当前几乎为零),并把 PermissionMatrixTest 从静态自引用改为对迁移/真实授权的校验——否则 P1-11 的假阳性会掩盖回归。
---
*(审计完毕。本报告由架构师产出、主理人汇编落盘。后续实施需 Owner 授权后按 ZC-MM-002~007 分阶段进行。)*
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## 6. 合并准入(Definition of Done / 合并门槛)
### 6.1 硬性门槛(全部满足才可合并)
1. CI 7 道门禁全绿(backend / admin-web / miniapp / migration / test-shell-guard / ui-contracts / e2e)。
1. CI 7 道门禁全绿(backend / admin-web / miniapp / migration / test-shell-guard / ui-contracts / e2e)。其中 backend 门禁在 `mvn verify` 之外,额外由 `scripts/run-backend-contracts.mjs`(与 `run-ui-contracts.mjs` 同级)固化一组关键后端契约/回归测试,并校验这些测试源文件的存在性下限(防静默删除/改名后门禁假绿)。
2. PR 模板所有 **T 级对应清单项**已逐项打勾并附验证说明。
3. 无未闭环的 Blocker/Major(或已书面转移到 `known-risks.md` 并取得 owner 确认)。
4. 新增/修改的测试已做负向注入。
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
### 6.2 与现有 CI 门禁的分工(人审补 CI 之不能)
| CI job | 它验证了什么 | 它验证不了的(必须由人审) |
|--------|--------------|----------------------------|
| Backend Build & Test | `mvn verify` 编译+单测 | 断言是否有判别力、是否直连绕过、业务不变量是否被逻辑绕过 |
| Backend Build & Test | `mvn verify` 编译+单测;`run-backend-contracts.mjs` 固化关键回归/契约测试并校验源文件下限 | 断言是否有判别力、是否直连绕过、业务不变量是否被逻辑绕过 |
| Admin Web Build | `pnpm build` 通过 | 运行时渲染正确性、token 是否补全色阶、响应式是否真重渲染 |
| Mini Program Compile Check | 仅 `tsc --noEmit` | **真编译** WXML/WXSS、资源是否被 `ignoreDevUnusedFiles` 吞、胶囊安全区 |
| Migration Validation | 序列/命名/非空 | CHECK 与枚举语义一致、向后兼容、可逆性 |
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@
合并(保护分支)──▶ 合并后回读 + 轮询 CI
```
- **作者自检**:提交前本地跑对应测试 + 契约守卫(`scripts/run-ui-contracts.mjs`),自认 T 级。
- **作者自检**:提交前本地跑对应测试 + 契约守卫(`scripts/run-ui-contracts.mjs`、`scripts/run-backend-contracts.mjs`),自认 T 级。
- **提 PR**:必须填 PR 模板,含"改了什么 / 怎么验证的(命令+输出)/ 风险级别 / 相关决策或已知风险"。
- **Reviewer**:先判 T 级,再走清单;对 Blocker/Major 给**可执行**的修改建议(具体到文件:行),不只写"这里有问题"。
- **CI 回退**:CI 红必须修复或证明是环境问题(如 KR-07 的 `docker` PATH、KR-08 的镜像源),不得"重试蒙过"。
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| 活动规则 | 需审核 / 男女名额独立配置 / 互选最大 3 人 / 截止后 48 小时 | LOCKED | activity 模块 |
| 关系状态 | searching / getting_to_know / paused / matched_successfully / service_exited | LOCKED | 关系状态枚举 |
| 推荐重置 | 每日 00:00 Asia/Shanghai | LOCKED | 时区统一 Asia/Shanghai |
| 红娘权限 | DEC-MATCHMAKER-001 红娘角色定位与权限边界(受授权、受范围限制的公益服务角色,非管理员/裁决者/风控) | LOCKED | 见下方「红娘角色权限专项」 |
| 红娘权限 | DEC-MATCHMAKER-002 / A1 服务对象由平台授权人员或红娘组长分配,普通红娘仅访问本人有效分配对象 | LOCKED | 见下方「红娘角色权限专项」 |
| 红娘权限 | DEC-MATCHMAKER-003 / B1 红娘联系用户默认平台内渠道,不默认开放电话/线下/完整联系方式 | LOCKED | 见下方「红娘角色权限专项」 |
| 红娘权限 | DEC-MATCHMAKER-004 红娘不得代替用户执行交友决策(Like/Pass/活动意向/开启聊天/修改择偶条件/同意公开资料) | LOCKED | 见下方「红娘角色权限专项」 |
| 红娘权限 | DEC-MATCHMAKER-005 红娘数据访问最小必要(角色权限∧有效分配∧范围∧字段隐私∧服务目的,五条件同时满足) | LOCKED | 见下方「红娘角色权限专项」 |
| 红娘权限 | DEC-MATCHMAKER-006 红娘操作全程留痕(分配/受限查看/授权/越权拒绝等审计事件 + 第八节字段要求) | LOCKED | 见下方「红娘角色权限专项」 |
---
### 红娘角色权限专项(ZC-MM-001~007,2026-10-10 登记)
> 决策基准:《善缘丹阳 V1.1 红娘角色权限正式决策与开发规则》V1.1(A1/B1 均标记 LOCKED)。
> 实施全链路:审计先行 → A1 建模 → 数据范围/字段隐私 → B1/代操作护栏 → 审计与权限回收 → 本登记。
| 决策 | 实施摘要 | 落地提交 | 验证 |
|------|---------|---------|------|
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-001~006 差距审计 | 全仓只读走查(角色/分配建模/数据范围/联系方式/代操作/审计/测试/治理 9 项),产出 P0×5 / P1×6 / P2×6 差距清单 | 2d60f78(ZC-MM-001 审计报告) | — |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-002 / A1 | `matchmaker_assignments` 五态状态机(V053 部分唯一索引防多主责 + 存量回填)、`matchmaker_leader` 角色 + `matchmaker.team.assign`(V054)、`ServiceAssignmentPolicy` 唯一判定器、claim 端点删除、/pending 权限收敛 | 861c78e(ZC-MM-002) | 定向 38/38、UI 24/24、小程序真编译通过 |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-005 / §5.2 | 读侧纯判定器(删除 assigned_operator_id 回退)、非持有人 404 防探测、字段白名单 7 键 + showOccupation 接入、组长团队脱敏统计 | 3caf5f8(ZC-MM-005) | mvn verify 884/884、UI 契约 24/24、后端契约 198 |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-003 / B1 | 纯护栏(零生产代码改动):MM-CONTACT-001~004 守卫锁定(无联系端点/无授权机制/零联系方式回显,含紧急联系人 write-only);受控联系机制 DEFERRED(见 OQ-MATCHMAKER-003) | 5e484d0(ZC-MM-003) | MatchmakerContactGuardTest(负向注入) |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-004 | 代操作核查 + 锁定:红娘可调写端点逐一无代用户意思表示;operator 主体调用户决策端点认证层 403(SecurityConfig 身份类型防线);转介 must-confirm 语义测试锁死 | 5e484d0(ZC-MM-004) | MatchmakerActionGuardTest(负向注入) |
| DEC-MATCHMAKER-005/006 | V055 audit_logs 补 purpose_code/service_assignment_id/actor_role_snapshot/request_trace_id;JWT 权限实时查库回收(零缓存);SensitiveAccessLog 接入服务详情;写接口 404 化防探测统一 | 1be0d98(ZC-MM-006) | mvn verify 884/884、后端契约 198 |
**专项验证汇总**:mvn verify 全量 **884/884**、UI 契约 **24/24**、后端契约 **198**、守卫负向注入变异验证 **7 处判红→还原**(守卫有效性自证)。
---
@@ -40,4 +64,4 @@
---
*最后更新: 2026-09-20 — 登记 15 项已确认决策;照片 6 / 阈值 60 / 活体 / Banner / 报送口径 明确划为非确认项,转入 open-questions。*
*最后更新: 2026-10-10 — 登记红娘角色权限专项 DEC-MATCHMAKER-001~006 全部 LOCKED(ZC-MM-001~007 全链路:审计 2d60f78 → A1 建模 861c78e → 数据范围/字段隐私 3caf5f8 → B1/代操作护栏 5e484d0 → 审计与权限回收 1be0d98);受控联系开放前置确认项在 open-questions OQ-MATCHMAKER-003,ContactAuthorizationPolicy 标记 DEFERRED。此前:2026-09-20 登记 15 项已确认决策。*
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- **当前实现**:`match.effective` 为 `PROVISIONAL` 保守近似(`min(有真人消息会话, Match 总数)`),
文档已标「禁止对外」。建议口径(Mutual Match + Two-Way Chat)未实现;升 `OFFICIAL` 前需产品裁决。
## OQ-MATCHMAKER-002 · 组长团队统计 perMatchmakerCounts 的 operatorName 是否脱敏?
- **状态**:RESOLVED(ZC-MM-005 收口 P2-4,team-lead 裁定 2026-10-10)
- **裁定**:红娘姓名(operatorName)**保留、不脱敏**。依据:
1. 对照《决策》§5.2 字段分类:红娘姓名属「本人/团队范围内的工作人员标识」,**非用户 PII**
(§5.2 禁放的是 phone/mobile/wechat/idNumber 等用户敏感数据);
2. 功能权限矩阵「查看脱敏服务统计:组长=团队范围」+ DEC-MATCHMAKER-002 红娘组长职责
(团队内进度与工作量管理)—— 组长统计本团队工作量属管理职责;
3. 组长已可经 `GET /assignable-matchmakers` 拿到同批红娘姓名,此字段**非新增泄露面**
(管理范围 ≠ 用户敏感数据)。
- **代码落点**:`MatchmakerAssignmentService#teamStatistics` 方法注释已写明该决策依据;
本登记防止后人误判「统计含姓名=越权」。产品如日后要求组长统计姓名脱敏(如仅显示昵称/工号),
需回到本项重新裁决并同步改 `countActiveGroupByOperator` 查询与前端渲染。
## OQ-MATCHMAKER-003 · 受控联系(电话/线下)开放前的产品/法务确认项【LEGAL_VERIFY】
- **状态**:TBD(受控联系功能未立项;安全默认 = 不开放)
- **背景**:DEC-MATCHMAKER-003 / B1 已 LOCKED——默认平台内渠道联系,电话/线下联系须专项授权。当前系统**不存在**任何电话/线下联系功能与授权机制(守卫锁定,见下)。
- **开放前必须逐项确认(①②标 LEGAL_VERIFY,需产品 + 法务共同裁决)**:
1. 电话/线下联系例外由**哪个岗位批准**【LEGAL_VERIFY】;
2. 例外授权是否需要**用户单独同意**、如何记录【LEGAL_VERIFY】;
3. 临时授权的**有效期限**(expires_at 语义);
4. 联系授权记录/联系结果摘要的**保留周期**;
5. 授权审批与用户同意的**审计字段与查询面**。
- **DEFERRED**:`ContactAuthorizationPolicy`(形态已预置:`assertContactAllowed(operatorId, userId, channel, purpose)` → `DataScopeGuard.deny`)与 `matchmaker_contact_authorizations` 表**仅在产品确认开放受控联系时立项**。
- **机械锁**:`MatchmakerContactGuardTest`(ZC-MM-003 落地)断言全仓无 ContactAuthorization 类、无 matchmaker_contact_authorizations 迁移、无联系端点——**未来任何人引入受控联系必先触红,强制回到本项复审**,不存在静默绕过路径。
- **关联**:DEC-MATCHMAKER-003 规则 7、《决策》§十一;提交 5e484d0(守卫)、1be0d98(DEFERRED 登记)。
## OQ-MATCHMAKER-004 · 红娘组长组织边界的 NULL=NULL「平台直属」规则
- **状态**:TBD(技术默认安全值,宁窄勿宽,待产品确认)
- **当前技术默认**:`matchmaker.team.assign` 的范围校验按 `operators.organization_id` 相等判定,**NULL 视为「平台直属」**:平台直属组长(org=NULL)只能分配/管理平台直属红娘;有组织组长不能分配 org=NULL 的红娘;org=NULL 的普通红娘只能由平台授权人员(`matchmaker.assign`)分配。判定实现用 IS NOT DISTINCT FROM / Objects.equals 语义(NULL 与 NULL 相等,不落 SQL `=` 的 NULL 陷阱)。
- **说明**:demo 账号 wanghongniang 即 org=NULL 情况。若产品要求「平台直属红娘由平台授权人员统一管理、组长不得触碰」或相反(NULL 归某默认组织),需改范围校验并回归 ZC-MM-002 测试基线。
- **关联**:DEC-MATCHMAKER-002 规则 4/8;提交 861c78e(ZC-MM-002 D2 决策)。
## OQ-MATCHMAKER-005 · JWT 权限实时查库零缓存的压测复议条件
- **状态**:TBD(技术默认:零缓存;非性能问题不复议)
- **当前实现**:`JwtAuthFilter` 运营分支每请求查 `operators.status` + 查库权限(claims 权限快照降级为只写不读),停用/调岗/权限变更**即时生效**(ZC-MM-006,提交 1be0d98)。未加缓存的依据:运营端为内部后台、流量低,且《决策》§七明确「不得依赖长期缓存继续放行」。
- **复议条件**:仅当运营端压测显示鉴权查询成为瓶颈时复议;届时优先考虑**超短 TTL 缓存(秒级)+ 复效事件主动失效**,并在本项登记缓存窗口期与 MM-LIFECYCLE-001 的回归影响。禁止以技术默认值冒充产品决策。
## OQ-MATCHMAKER-006 · 写接口 404 化防探测的语义边界
- **状态**:RESOLVED(2026-10-10,ZC-MM-006 G4 评估表裁定,此处留痕)
- **裁定**:凡**以资源 ID 寻址**且调用者具备权限码的写端点(assignments transfer/revoke/end、services recommend/followup/complete、referrals 转介创建),「不存在」与「范围违规」统一 404(先落 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 审计再 404,与读详情同范式);**无资源寻址的创建类端点**(POST /assignments 创建、POST /services/{id}/assign)维持 403——它们不构成存在性枚举面,且需要明确的权限反馈。
- **留痕原因**:后续新增写端点时按此边界执行;如产品要求创建类也 404 化(牺牲前端错误提示精度换一致性),需回到本项重裁。
- **关联**:DEC-MATCHMAKER-005「越权响应不得泄露目标用户是否存在」;提交 1be0d98;`MatchmakerWriteDenyUniformityTest` 锁定。
## OQ-MATCHMAKER-007 · purpose_code 取值 matchmaker.service.view 已定义未使用(口径漂移)
- **状态**:TBD(QA P2 移交,2026-10-10)
- **现状**:V055/审计写入点的 purpose_code 取值表中定义了 `matchmaker.service.view`,但实际**无写入点**——受限资料查看走 `sensitive_access_logs`(dataType=matchmaker_service_detail,不含 purpose_code),拒绝路径 purpose_code 传 null(audit_logs 已有 DATA_SCOPE_DENIED 语义)。
- **待产品/架构确认**:二选一——(a) 为服务详情成功查看的 audit_logs 补一条带 purpose_code=matchmaker.service.view 的写入(与 SensitiveAccessLog 双写,有噪音成本);(b) 从取值表删除该定义(登记即口径收敛)。当前行为与 ZC-MM-006 G2 设计一致(拒绝不双写),不构成缺陷,仅口径漂移登记。
## OQ-MATCHMAKER-008 · JwtAuthFilter 运营域与用户域账号状态口径差
- **状态**:TBD(记录性登记,两域状态字段固有差异)
- **现状**:JWT 权限实时回收(ZC-MM-006)后,运营域仅认 `operators.status='active'`,用户域账号状态口径为 `users.account_status='normal'`(含 suspended/banned/closed 等多态)。两域字段模型不同,状态枚举不一一对应。
- **说明**:不构成越权(两域独立判定、各自从严),但若未来要求「统一账号生命周期模型」(如运营也需 suspended 中间态),需产品出统一口径后重构。当前按各自域内语义执行即安全默认。
## OQ-THIRD-PARTY-* · 第三方开放 / 平台化遗留(7 项)
- **状态**:TBD(范围扩张,需产品决策,本轮未擅自实施)
@@ -73,4 +133,4 @@
---
*最后更新: 2026-09-20 — 登记 OQ-IDENTITY/PROFILE/MATCH-001 及本地资格保留期、服务站时间、咨询资质、Banner 数量、报送口径、第三方开放遗留。*
*最后更新: 2026-10-10 — 红娘专项新增 OQ-MATCHMAKER-003(受控联系开放前 5 项确认,①②LEGAL_VERIFY;ContactAuthorizationPolicy DEFERRED + MatchmakerContactGuardTest 机械锁)/004(NULL=NULL 平台直属)/005(零缓存压测复议)/006(写接口 404/403 语义边界,RESOLVED)/007(purpose_code matchmaker.service.view 未使用口径漂移)/008(运营域 active 与用户域 normal 状态口径差)。此前:2026-09-20 登记 OQ-IDENTITY/PROFILE/MATCH-001 及本地资格保留期、服务站时间、咨询资质、Banner 数量、报送口径、第三方开放遗留。*
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ module.exports = {
// 部署前必须替换为真实域名,并到小程序后台「开发管理 → 开发设置 → 服务器域名」配置 request 合法域名。
// 注意:本文件不得再出现散落的硬编码地址,统一改这里即可。
API_BASE_URL: isDev
? 'http://localhost:8085/api/v1'
? 'http://127.0.0.1:8085/api/v1'
: 'https://api.danyang-match.example.com/api/v1', // TODO(部署): 替换为真实生产域名
IS_DEV: isDev,
};
+1 -1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const PROD_API_BASE_URL: string =
|| 'https://api.danyang-match.example.com/api/v1'; // TODO(部署): 替换为真实生产域名
export const API_BASE_URL: string = isDev()
? 'http://localhost:8085/api/v1'
? 'http://127.0.0.1:8085/api/v1'
: PROD_API_BASE_URL;
export const IS_DEV: boolean = isDev();
@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
/**
* 红娘工作台主页
*
*
* ZC-MM-002(A1 / DEC-MATCHMAKER-002 锁定决策):
* - 普通红娘禁止认领(原 POST /services/{id}/claim 端点已删除),本页不再有任何接单逻辑;
* - 列表数据源从 GET /operator/matchmaker/pending(现仅分配权持有者可调,普通红娘 403)
* 改为 GET /operator/matchmaker/assignments/my(仅返回本人生效中的服务对象分配)。
* 响应为 assignment 字段(userId/assignmentReason/status/assignedAt/serviceId 等),
* 无服务类型/诉求描述字段,故按实际字段精简展示,不前端拼空值。
*
* 展示待处理服务、工作台数据概览
*/
const api = require('../../utils/api');
const { serviceTypeLabel } = require('../../constants/profileLabels');
Page({
data: {
@@ -13,7 +19,8 @@ Page({
inProgressCount: 0,
todayCount: 0,
completedCount: 0,
pendingServices: [],
myAssignments: [],
assignmentCount: 0,
loading: true,
currentDate: '',
},
@@ -23,12 +30,12 @@ Page({
// 获取操作员信息
const operatorName = wx.getStorageSync('operatorName') || '红娘';
this.setData({ operatorName });
// 设置当前日期
const now = new Date();
const dateStr = `${now.getFullYear()}年${now.getMonth() + 1}月${now.getDate()}日`;
this.setData({ currentDate: dateStr });
this.loadDashboard();
},
@@ -46,10 +53,10 @@ Page({
return;
}
// 加载工作台数据
const [dashRes, pendingRes] = await Promise.all([
// 加载工作台数据 + 本人服务对象分配(ZC-MM-002:不再调用 /pending,普通红娘无该权限)
const [dashRes, assignmentRes] = await Promise.all([
api.get('/operator/matchmaker/dashboard', {}, { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }),
api.get('/operator/matchmaker/pending', {}, { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }),
api.get('/operator/matchmaker/assignments/my', {}, { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }),
]);
if (dashRes.success) {
@@ -61,9 +68,11 @@ Page({
});
}
if (pendingRes.success) {
if (assignmentRes.success) {
const assignments = assignmentRes.data || [];
this.setData({
pendingServices: pendingRes.data || [],
myAssignments: assignments,
assignmentCount: assignments.length,
});
}
} catch (err) {
@@ -75,30 +84,29 @@ Page({
onViewService(e) {
const serviceId = e.currentTarget.dataset.id;
if (!serviceId) {
// 纯用户级分配(无关联服务单)无处可跳,不拼空参数
return;
}
wx.navigateTo({ url: `/pages/matchmaker-service-detail/matchmaker-service-detail?id=${serviceId}` });
},
onClaimService(e) {
const serviceId = e.currentTarget.dataset.id;
wx.showLoading({ title: '接单中...' });
const token = wx.getStorageSync('operatorToken');
// 注意:api.post 签名为 (url, data, headers, idempotencyKey),Authorization 必须放第 3 参(headers),
// 此前误放到第 4 参(idempotencyKey),导致实际请求不携带任何鉴权头、接单必 401。
api.post(`/operator/matchmaker/services/${serviceId}/claim`, {}, { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` })
.then(res => {
wx.hideLoading();
if (res.success) {
wx.showToast({ title: '接单成功', icon: 'success' });
this.loadDashboard();
} else {
wx.showToast({ title: res.message || '接单失败', icon: 'none' });
}
})
.catch(err => {
wx.hideLoading();
wx.showToast({ title: '网络错误', icon: 'none' });
});
// 分配状态 → 中文(避免枚举码直接上屏,见 profileLabels 铁律)
assignmentStatusLabel(code) {
const labels = {
active: '生效中',
ended: '已结束',
revoked: '已撤销',
transferred: '已转分配',
expired: '已过期',
};
return labels[code] || code || '';
},
// 分配范围 → 中文
assignmentScopeLabel(code) {
const labels = { primary: '主责', collaborating: '协同' };
return labels[code] || code || '';
},
formatTime(timeStr) {
@@ -115,11 +123,6 @@ Page({
return m + '月' + d + '日';
},
// 红娘服务类型 → 中文(避免枚举码直接上屏,见 profileLabels 铁律)
serviceTypeLabel(code) {
return serviceTypeLabel(code);
},
onLogout() {
wx.showModal({
title: '退出登录',
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
<!-- 红娘工作台 -->
<!-- 红娘工作台(ZC-MM-002:普通红娘仅见本人有效分配,无接单) -->
<view class="page">
<!-- 欢迎区 -->
<view class="header">
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
<view class="stat-card" hover-class="stat-hover">
<view class="stat-icon pending">📋</view>
<view class="stat-value">{{pendingCount}}</view>
<view class="stat-label">待处理</view>
<view class="stat-label">待分配</view>
</view>
<view class="stat-card" hover-class="stat-hover">
<view class="stat-icon progress">⏳</view>
@@ -36,39 +36,39 @@
</view>
</view>
<!-- 待处理列表 -->
<!-- 我的服务对象分配 -->
<view class="section" wx:if="{{!loading}}">
<view class="section-header">
<view class="section-title-wrap">
<text class="section-dot"></text>
<text class="section-title">待处理服务</text>
<text class="section-title">我的服务对象分配</text>
</view>
<text class="section-count" wx:if="{{pendingCount > 0}}">共{{pendingCount}}件</text>
<text class="section-count" wx:if="{{assignmentCount > 0}}">共{{assignmentCount}}人</text>
</view>
<view class="service-list" wx:if="{{pendingServices.length > 0}}">
<view
wx:for="{{pendingServices}}"
wx:key="serviceId"
<view class="service-list" wx:if="{{myAssignments.length > 0}}">
<view
wx:for="{{myAssignments}}"
wx:key="id"
class="service-card"
data-id="{{item.serviceId}}"
bindtap="onViewService"
>
<view class="service-left">
<view class="service-header">
<view class="service-tag">{{serviceTypeLabel(item.serviceType)}}</view>
<view class="service-time">{{formatTime(item.createdAt)}}</view>
<view class="service-tag">{{assignmentScopeLabel(item.assignmentScope)}}</view>
<view class="service-tag">{{assignmentStatusLabel(item.status)}}</view>
<view class="service-time">{{formatTime(item.assignedAt)}}</view>
</view>
<view class="service-desc">{{item.description}}</view>
<view class="service-desc">{{item.assignmentReason}}</view>
</view>
<button class="btn-claim" catchtap="onClaimService" data-id="{{item.serviceId}}" hover-class="btn-hover">接单</button>
</view>
</view>
<view class="empty-state" wx:else>
<view class="empty-illustration">📭</view>
<view class="empty-text">暂无待处理服务</view>
<view class="empty-hint">用户申请的服务将在这里展示</view>
<view class="empty-text">暂无服务对象分配</view>
<view class="empty-hint">分配给你的服务对象将在这里展示</view>
</view>
</view>
+235
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
// 后端契约门禁统一执行器(本地 + CI 共用入口)
//
// 背景:run-ui-contracts.mjs 固化了一组「源码结构与关键行为断言」守卫(ui-tests/*.mjs,纯 node、零依赖),
// 但后端回归/契约测试是 Java/Maven,无法用 node 直接跑。此前它们只随 CI 的 `mvn verify` 全量执行,
// 没有「curated + 下限硬校验」这层保护 —— 即:有人把关键回归测试类**改名/删除**后,
// `mvn verify` 只会少跑几个测试、照样 SUCCESS,门禁假绿。
//
// 本脚本把「固化关键后端契约测试 + 文件存在性下限 + 真跑并解析 surefire 汇总 + 非零退出」固化下来,
// 作为 run-ui-contracts.mjs 的**同级后端门禁**:
//
// node scripts/run-backend-contracts.mjs # 跑 CURATED 列表(默认)
// node scripts/run-backend-contracts.mjs --list # 只打印 curated 列表,不执行
//
// 三条约定(对应 run-ui-contracts.mjs 的同名纪律):
// 1) **文件存在性下限硬校验**:CURATED 中的每个测试类源文件必须存在于 backend/src/test/java,
// 缺一个即拒绝报绿(防止「测试被静默删除/改名」后门禁仍然全绿)。
// 新增契约测试请上调 CURATED 列表;有意删减则下调并说明原因。
// 可用环境变量 BACKEND_GUARDS_MIN 覆盖(仅用于让「数量下限」这条分支可被自检)。
// 2) 真跑:用 `mvn test -Dtest=<列表>` 执行(CI 的 backend job 已装好 JDK/Maven 且刚跑过 verify,
// 复用编译产物与依赖缓存,仅重跑指定测试,开销很小)。任一测试失败/报错 → 非零退出。
// 3) **本地无 JDK/Maven 时绝不谎报通过**:探测 mvn/mvnw → Docker 测试镜像 → 都不行则明确退出码 2
// (区别于 0 / 1),提示走 CI 或 Docker,绝不假装绿。
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
import { existsSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs'
import { basename, dirname, resolve } from 'node:path'
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
const root = resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..')
const backendTestRoot = resolve(root, 'backend', 'src', 'test', 'java')
// ── curated 后端契约/回归测试 ────────────────────────────────────────────────
// 第 1~4 项:本轮(2026-09-30)为 v1.1.0 修复补的回归测试 + 扩展断言
// AuthServiceRefreshTtlTest —— refresh token TTL 须用 refresh 过期(14天) 而非 access(4h)
// PhotoServiceConfirmUploadTest —— 照片直传 confirm 落库护栏(归属前缀 + 对象存在性)
// RealIdentityVerificationProviderTest —— 生产实名核验走真实校验位 + 可配置第三方 + fail-closed
// JwtAuthFilterTest —— Authorization 头优先、缺失回退 dy_op_at Cookie
// 第 5~13 项:核心不变量/契约守卫(持续盯防,改坏会漏)
// CoreInvariantsTest / V11InvariantsTest / PermissionMatrixTest
// MeRouteContractTest / CanonicalRouteContractTest
// PhotoLimitGuardTest / PhotoLimitConcurrencyGuardTest / PhotoUploadValidationTest
// OperatorAuthServiceTest
// 第 14 项(2026-10-09):审核决策端点的「请求体契约」守卫 —— 前端统一发送 {comment, reasonCodes[]},
// 若 @RequestBody 被再度收窄为 Map<String,String>,数组值反序列化失败即 400
// (现象:「小程序提交资料后,管理员点通过直接报错」)。
// ReviewControllerRequestBodyContractTest
// 第 15~18 项(2026-10-11,ZC-MM-006):
// MatchmakerAuditFieldsTest —— audit_logs 扩展审计字段(V055)写入/兼容/拒绝快照
// OperatorPermissionRevocationTest —— JWT 权限回收实时查库(禁用 401 / 撤权 403+审计)
// MatchmakerSensitiveAccessAuditTest —— 服务详情敏感访问日志(success 行 / 双记录互斥)
// MatchmakerWriteDenyUniformityTest —— 写接口 404 统一防探测(5 拒绝 ≡ 读详情 404)
// 新增/删减请同步修改本数组(下限随之变化)。
const CURATED = [
'AuthServiceRefreshTtlTest',
'PhotoServiceConfirmUploadTest',
'RealIdentityVerificationProviderTest',
'JwtAuthFilterTest',
'CoreInvariantsTest',
'V11InvariantsTest',
'PermissionMatrixTest',
'MeRouteContractTest',
'CanonicalRouteContractTest',
'PhotoLimitGuardTest',
'PhotoLimitConcurrencyGuardTest',
'PhotoUploadValidationTest',
'OperatorAuthServiceTest',
'ReviewControllerRequestBodyContractTest',
'MatchmakerAuditFieldsTest',
'OperatorPermissionRevocationTest',
'MatchmakerSensitiveAccessAuditTest',
'MatchmakerWriteDenyUniformityTest',
]
const MIN_GUARDS = Number(process.env.BACKEND_GUARDS_MIN ?? CURATED.length)
// ── 步骤 1:文件存在性下限校验 ──────────────────────────────────────────────
function findClassFile(name) {
// 在 backend/src/test/java 下递归找 `${name}.java`
const stack = [backendTestRoot]
while (stack.length) {
const dir = stack.pop()
let entries
try {
entries = readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })
} catch {
continue
}
for (const e of entries) {
const full = resolve(dir, e.name)
if (e.isDirectory()) stack.push(full)
else if (e.name === `${name}.java`) return full
}
}
return null
}
// --list 模式:只打印,不执行
if (process.argv.includes('--list')) {
console.log(`后端契约门禁 curated 列表(${CURATED.length} 项,下限 ${MIN_GUARDS}):`)
for (const n of CURATED) console.log(` - ${n}`)
process.exit(0)
}
console.log(`后端契约门禁 — 校验 ${CURATED.length} 个契约测试源文件存在性(下限 ${MIN_GUARDS})\n`)
const missing = []
for (const name of CURATED) {
const f = findClassFile(name)
if (!f) {
missing.push(name)
console.log(` MISSING ${name}`)
} else {
console.log(` OK ${name}`)
}
}
if (missing.length > 0) {
console.error(
`\nERROR: ${missing.length} 个契约测试源文件缺失,少于下限 ${MIN_GUARDS} —— 测试可能被删除或改名,拒绝报绿。`,
)
console.error(' 新增契约测试请上调 CURATED 列表;确为有意删减请下调并说明原因。')
process.exit(1)
}
if (CURATED.length < MIN_GUARDS) {
console.error(
`ERROR: 仅 ${CURATED.length} 个契约测试,少于下限 ${MIN_GUARDS} —— 拒绝报绿。`,
)
process.exit(1)
}
console.log(`\n✅ 全部 ${CURATED.length} 个契约测试源文件存在,下限校验通过。\n`)
// ── 步骤 2:真跑(mvn test -Dtest=<列表>) ─────────────────────────────────
function detectMvn() {
for (const cand of ['mvnw', 'mvn']) {
const r = spawnSync(cand, ['-v'], { cwd: root, encoding: 'utf8' })
if (r.status === 0) return cand
}
// Windows 常见:backend 下有 mvnw.cmd
const winMvnw = resolve(root, 'backend', 'mvnw.cmd')
if (existsSync(winMvnw)) return winMvnw
return null
}
const testList = CURATED.join(',')
const t0 = Date.now()
let mvn = detectMvn()
if (mvn) {
console.log(`▶ 使用 Maven 执行:${mvn} test -Dtest=<${CURATED.length} 个契约测试>\n`)
const r = spawnSync(mvn, ['-B', 'test', `-Dtest=${testList}`, '-DfailIfNoTests=true'], {
cwd: resolve(root, 'backend'),
encoding: 'utf8',
env: { ...process.env, NO_COLOR: '1' },
})
const out = [r.stdout, r.stderr].filter(Boolean).join('\n')
analyze(out, r.status)
} else {
// 退路:Docker 测试镜像(与 .workbuddy/run-regression.sh 同三件套)
// 关键:docker daemon 在本机可能无响应,`spawnSync` 不设 timeout 会**挂死整个脚本**
// (2026-09-30 实测:docker CLI 在 PATH 但 daemon 未起,`image inspect` 直接卡住)。
// 因此所有 docker 探测都带 timeout,超时即视为不可用 → 走 cannotRun,绝不假绿也不挂死。
const docker = spawnSync('docker', ['--version'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000 })
const IMG = 'danyang-match-backend-test:latest'
if (docker.status === 0) {
const imgCheck = spawnSync('docker', ['image', 'inspect', IMG], {
encoding: 'utf8',
timeout: 15000,
})
if (imgCheck.status === 0) {
console.log(`▶ 本地无 Maven,回退 Docker 测试镜像 ${IMG}\n`)
const dockerExe =
process.env.DOCKER_EXE || 'D:/Data/Docker/DockerDesktop/resources/bin/docker.exe'
const settings = resolve(root, '.workbuddy', 'maven-settings-aliyun.xml')
const r = spawnSync(
dockerExe,
[
'run', '--rm',
'-v', `${root}:/proj`,
'-v', 'danyang-m2-cache:/root/.m2',
'-v', `${settings}:/root/aliyun-settings.xml`,
'-w', '/proj/backend', '--memory=3g', '-e', 'MAVEN_OPTS=-Xmx256m',
IMG, 'mvn', '-B', '-s', '/root/aliyun-settings.xml', 'test',
`-Dtest=${testList}`, '-DfailIfNoTests=true',
],
{ encoding: 'utf8', env: { ...process.env, MSYS_NO_PATHCONV: '1' }, timeout: 600000 },
)
const out = [r.stdout, r.stderr].filter(Boolean).join('\n')
analyze(out, r.status)
} else {
cannotRun()
}
} else {
cannotRun()
}
}
function cannotRun() {
console.error(
'\n⚠️ 本机无 JDK/Maven 且无可用的后端测试 Docker 镜像,无法本地执行后端契约门禁。',
)
console.error(' 该门禁由 CI(backend job)强制执行,请在 CI 中验证;或安装 Maven / 构建')
console.error(' danyang-match-backend-test 镜像后本地复跑。')
console.error(' (以退出码 2 表示「本环境无法执行」,而非谎报通过。)')
process.exit(2)
}
function analyze(out, status) {
// 解析 surefire 汇总:Tests run: X, Failures: Y, Errors: Z, Skipped: S
const re = /Tests run:\s*(\d+),\s*Failures:\s*(\d+),\s*Errors:\s*(\d+)/g
let m
let total = 0
let failures = 0
let errors = 0
while ((m = re.exec(out)) !== null) {
total += Number(m[1])
failures += Number(m[2])
errors += Number(m[3])
}
const secs = ((Date.now() - t0) / 1000).toFixed(1)
console.log('')
if (status === 0 && failures === 0 && errors === 0) {
console.log(`✅ PASS 后端契约门禁:${total} 测试全部通过,用时 ${secs}s`)
process.exit(0)
}
console.error(`❌ 后端契约门禁失败(exit=${status ?? 'null'}):`)
console.error(` 已执行测试 ${total},Failures=${failures},Errors=${errors}`)
// 把 surefire 关键片段打印出来便于定位
const tail = out.split('\n').filter((l) => /Tests run:|BUILD FAILURE|<<< FAILURE|<<< ERROR|No tests were executed/.test(l))
if (tail.length) {
console.error(' --- 关键输出 ---')
for (const l of tail.slice(-25)) console.error(' ' + l.trim())
}
process.exit(1)
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ const requiredMenuEntries = [
['/activities', 'activity.view'],
['/activities/checkin', 'activity.checkin'],
['/activities/interests', 'activity.review_registration'],
['/referral', 'referral.manage'],
['/matchmaker', 'matchmaker.service.view'],
['/referral', 'matchmaker.service'],
['/matchmaker', 'matchmaker.view'],
['/counseling', 'counseling.service.view'],
['/banner', 'banner.view'],
['/content', 'content.view'],
+28
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
// 纯函数回归测试:枚举码 → 中文映射(修复「枚举码直渲未映射中文」)
// 运行:node ui-tests/profileLabels.test.mjs
import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
import { createRequire } from 'node:module'
const require = createRequire(import.meta.url)
const { serviceTypeLabel, labelOf } = require('../miniapp/constants/profileLabels.js')
let passed = 0
function check(name, actual, expected) {
assert.equal(actual, expected, `${name}: 期望 "${expected}",实际 "${actual}"`)
passed++
}
// ===== 红娘服务类型映射(本次修复点:matchmaker-workbench 卡片曾直渲枚举码)=====
check('recommend_partner', serviceTypeLabel('recommend_partner'), '推荐对象')
check('review_preference', serviceTypeLabel('review_preference'), '择偶指导')
check('contact_intention', serviceTypeLabel('contact_intention'), '牵线意向')
check('未知码回退原值', serviceTypeLabel('mystery_code'), 'mystery_code')
check('空串返回空', serviceTypeLabel(''), '')
check('null 返回空', serviceTypeLabel(null), '')
// ===== 通用 labelOf(既有字典,回归不退化)=====
check('labelOf education', labelOf('educationCode', 'bachelor'), '本科')
check('labelOf marital', labelOf('maritalStatus', 'never_married'), '未婚')
check('labelOf 未知码回退', labelOf('maritalStatus', 'xxx'), 'xxx')
console.log(`✅ profileLabels 回归测试全部通过(${passed} 项)`)